8 files changed, 162 insertions, 60 deletions

diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
index 8472b8b349c4..abd51cef2413 100644
--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
@@ -599,11 +599,12 @@ struct sctp_transport *sctp_assoc_add_peer(struct sctp_association *asoc,
         /* Check to see if this is a duplicate. */
         peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, addr);
         if (peer) {
+                /* An UNKNOWN state is only set on transports added by
+                 * user in sctp_connectx() call.  Such transports should be
+                 * considered CONFIRMED per RFC 4960, Section 5.4.
+                 */
                 if (peer->state == SCTP_UNKNOWN) {
-                        if (peer_state == SCTP_ACTIVE)
-                                peer->state = SCTP_ACTIVE;
-                        if (peer_state == SCTP_UNCONFIRMED)
-                                peer->state = SCTP_UNCONFIRMED;
+                        peer->state = SCTP_ACTIVE;
                 }
                 return peer;
         }
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 675a5c3e68a6..52db5f60daa0 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ static struct sctp_auth_bytes *sctp_auth_create_key(__u32 key_len, gfp_t gfp)
 {
         struct sctp_auth_bytes *key;
 
+        /* Verify that we are not going to overflow INT_MAX */
+        if ((INT_MAX - key_len) < sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes))
+                return NULL;
+
         /* Allocate the shared key */
         key = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes) + key_len, gfp);
         if (!key)
@@ -782,6 +786,9 @@ int sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
         for (i = 0; i < hmacs->shmac_num_idents; i++) {
                 id = hmacs->shmac_idents[i];
 
+                if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
+                        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
                 if (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1 == id)
                         has_sha1 = 1;
 
diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index e39a0cdef184..4c8d9f45ce09 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 
                 /* Initialize the CHUNKS parameter */
                 auth_chunks->param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS;
+                auth_chunks->param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t));
 
                 /* If the Add-IP functionality is enabled, we must
                  * authenticate, ASCONF and ASCONF-ACK chunks
@@ -110,8 +111,7 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
                 if (sctp_addip_enable) {
                         auth_chunks->chunks[0] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF;
                         auth_chunks->chunks[1] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK;
-                        auth_chunks->param_hdr.length =
-                                        htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) + 2);
+                        auth_chunks->param_hdr.length += htons(2);
                 }
         }
 
diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
index 483a01d0740a..47f91afa0211 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -319,7 +319,8 @@ static void sctp_v6_get_saddr(struct sctp_sock *sk,
                           __func__, asoc, dst, NIP6(daddr->v6.sin6_addr));
 
         if (!asoc) {
-                ipv6_dev_get_saddr(dst ? ip6_dst_idev(dst)->dev : NULL,
+                ipv6_dev_get_saddr(sock_net(sctp_opt2sk(sk)),
+                                   dst ? ip6_dst_idev(dst)->dev : NULL,
                                    &daddr->v6.sin6_addr,
                                    inet6_sk(&sk->inet.sk)->srcprefs,
                                    &saddr->v6.sin6_addr);
diff --git a/net/sctp/output.c b/net/sctp/output.c
index 0dc4a7dfb234..225c7123c41f 100644
--- a/net/sctp/output.c
+++ b/net/sctp/output.c
@@ -533,7 +533,8 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet)
         if (!(dst->dev->features & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM)) {
                 crc32 = sctp_start_cksum((__u8 *)sh, cksum_buf_len);
                 crc32 = sctp_end_cksum(crc32);
-        }
+        } else
+                nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
 
         /* 3) Put the resultant value into the checksum field in the
          *    common header, and leave the rest of the bits unchanged.
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index e8ca4e54981f..d68869f966c3 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1012,6 +1012,29 @@ end:
         return retval;
 }
 
+struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_violation_paramlen(
+        const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+        const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+        struct sctp_paramhdr *param)
+{
+        struct sctp_chunk *retval;
+        static const char error[] = "The following parameter had invalid length:";
+        size_t payload_len = sizeof(error) + sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) +
+                                sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
+
+        retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk, payload_len);
+        if (!retval)
+                goto nodata;
+
+        sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION,
+                        sizeof(error) + sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t));
+        sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(error), error);
+        sctp_addto_param(retval, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), param);
+
+nodata:
+        return retval;
+}
+
 /* Make a HEARTBEAT chunk.  */
 struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_heartbeat(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
                                   const struct sctp_transport *transport,
@@ -1782,11 +1805,6 @@ static int sctp_process_inv_paramlength(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
                                         const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
                                         struct sctp_chunk **errp)
 {
-        static const char error[] = "The following parameter had invalid length:";
-        size_t          payload_len = WORD_ROUND(sizeof(error)) +
-                                                sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
-
-
         /* This is a fatal error.  Any accumulated non-fatal errors are
          * not reported.
          */
@@ -1794,14 +1812,7 @@ static int sctp_process_inv_paramlength(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
                 sctp_chunk_free(*errp);
 
         /* Create an error chunk and fill it in with our payload. */
-        *errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, payload_len);
-
-        if (*errp) {
-                sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION,
-                                sizeof(error) + sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t));
-                sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(error), error);
-                sctp_addto_param(*errp, sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t), param);
-        }
+        *errp = sctp_make_violation_paramlen(asoc, chunk, param);
 
         return 0;
 }
@@ -1886,11 +1897,13 @@ static void sctp_process_ext_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
                             /* if the peer reports AUTH, assume that he
                              * supports AUTH.
                              */
-                            asoc->peer.auth_capable = 1;
+                            if (sctp_auth_enable)
+                                    asoc->peer.auth_capable = 1;
                             break;
                     case SCTP_CID_ASCONF:
                     case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK:
-                            asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
+                            if (sctp_addip_enable)
+                                    asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
                             break;
                     default:
                             break;
@@ -2319,12 +2332,10 @@ clean_up:
         /* Release the transport structures. */
         list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
                 transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
-                list_del_init(pos);
-                sctp_transport_free(transport);
+                if (transport->state != SCTP_ACTIVE)
+                        sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, transport);
         }
 
-        asoc->peer.transport_count = 0;
-
 nomem:
         return 0;
 }
@@ -2460,6 +2471,9 @@ do_addr_param:
                 break;
 
         case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+                if (!sctp_addip_enable)
+                        goto fall_through;
+
                 addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
 
                 af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 8848d329aa2c..7c622af2ce55 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(
                                      const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
                                      const struct sctp_association *asoc,
                                      const sctp_subtype_t type,
-                                     void *arg,
+                                     void *arg, void *ext,
                                      sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands);
 
 static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_ctsn(
@@ -3425,7 +3425,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
         addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)hdr->params;
         length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
         if (length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
-                return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(ep, asoc, type,
+                return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
                            (void *)addr_param, commands);
 
         /* Verify the ASCONF chunk before processing it. */
@@ -3433,8 +3433,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
                             (sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
                             (void *)chunk->chunk_end,
                             &err_param))
-                return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(ep, asoc, type,
-                                                  (void *)&err_param, commands);
+                return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+                                                  (void *)err_param, commands);
 
         /* ADDIP 5.2 E1) Compare the value of the serial number to the value
          * the endpoint stored in a new association variable
@@ -3542,8 +3542,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
             (sctp_paramhdr_t *)addip_hdr->params,
             (void *)asconf_ack->chunk_end,
             &err_param))
-                return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(ep, asoc, type,
-                           (void *)&err_param, commands);
+                return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+                           (void *)err_param, commands);
 
         if (last_asconf) {
                 addip_hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)last_asconf->subh.addip_hdr;
@@ -4240,12 +4240,38 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(
                                      const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
                                      const struct sctp_association *asoc,
                                      const sctp_subtype_t type,
-                                     void *arg,
-                                     sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands) {
-        static const char err_str[] = "The following parameter had invalid length:";
+                                     void *arg, void *ext,
+                                     sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
+{
+        struct sctp_chunk *chunk =  arg;
+        struct sctp_paramhdr *param = ext;
+        struct sctp_chunk *abort = NULL;
 
-        return sctp_sf_abort_violation(ep, asoc, arg, commands, err_str,
-                                        sizeof(err_str));
+        if (sctp_auth_recv_cid(SCTP_CID_ABORT, asoc))
+                goto discard;
+
+        /* Make the abort chunk. */
+        abort = sctp_make_violation_paramlen(asoc, chunk, param);
+        if (!abort)
+                goto nomem;
+
+        sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
+        SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
+
+        sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
+                        SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
+        sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
+                        SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION));
+        SCTP_DEC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
+
+discard:
+        sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, SCTP_ST_CHUNK(0), arg, commands);
+
+        SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
+
+        return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
+nomem:
+        return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
 }
 
 /* Handle a protocol violation when the peer trying to advance the
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index dbb79adf8f3c..5ffb9dec1c3f 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -3055,6 +3055,9 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_chunk(struct sock *sk,
 {
         struct sctp_authchunk val;
 
+        if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+                return -EACCES;
+
         if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk))
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, optlen))
@@ -3083,8 +3086,12 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk,
                                     int optlen)
 {
         struct sctp_hmacalgo *hmacs;
+        u32 idents;
         int err;
 
+        if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+                return -EACCES;
+
         if (optlen < sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -3097,8 +3104,9 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk,
                 goto out;
         }
 
-        if (hmacs->shmac_num_idents == 0 ||
-            hmacs->shmac_num_idents > SCTP_AUTH_NUM_HMACS) {
+        idents = hmacs->shmac_num_idents;
+        if (idents == 0 || idents > SCTP_AUTH_NUM_HMACS ||
+            (idents * sizeof(u16)) > (optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo))) {
                 err = -EINVAL;
                 goto out;
         }
@@ -3123,6 +3131,9 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk,
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
         int ret;
 
+        if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+                return -EACCES;
+
         if (optlen <= sizeof(struct sctp_authkey))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -3135,6 +3146,11 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk,
                 goto out;
         }
 
+        if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_authkey)) {
+                ret = -EINVAL;
+                goto out;
+        }
+
         asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, authkey->sca_assoc_id);
         if (!asoc && authkey->sca_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP)) {
                 ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -3160,6 +3176,9 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk,
         struct sctp_authkeyid val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
 
+        if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+                return -EACCES;
+
         if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, optlen))
@@ -3185,6 +3204,9 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_del_key(struct sock *sk,
         struct sctp_authkeyid val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
 
+        if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+                return -EACCES;
+
         if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, optlen))
@@ -5197,19 +5219,29 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_maxburst(struct sock *sk, int len,
 static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
                                     char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
 {
+        struct sctp_hmacalgo  __user *p = (void __user *)optval;
         struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
-        __u16 param_len;
+        __u16 data_len = 0;
+        u32 num_idents;
+
+        if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+                return -EACCES;
 
         hmacs = sctp_sk(sk)->ep->auth_hmacs_list;
-        param_len = ntohs(hmacs->param_hdr.length);
+        data_len = ntohs(hmacs->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
 
-        if (len < param_len)
+        if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo) + data_len)
                 return -EINVAL;
+
+        len = sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo) + data_len;
+        num_idents = data_len / sizeof(u16);
+
         if (put_user(len, optlen))
                 return -EFAULT;
-        if (copy_to_user(optval, hmacs->hmac_ids, len))
+        if (put_user(num_idents, &p->shmac_num_idents))
+                return -EFAULT;
+        if (copy_to_user(p->shmac_idents, hmacs->hmac_ids, data_len))
                 return -EFAULT;
-
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -5219,6 +5251,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk, int len,
         struct sctp_authkeyid val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
 
+        if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+                return -EACCES;
+
         if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
                 return -EINVAL;
         if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)))
@@ -5233,6 +5268,12 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk, int len,
         else
                 val.scact_keynumber = sctp_sk(sk)->ep->active_key_id;
 
+        len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
+        if (put_user(len, optlen))
+                return -EFAULT;
+        if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
+                return -EFAULT;
+
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -5243,13 +5284,16 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
         struct sctp_authchunks val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
         struct sctp_chunks_param *ch;
-        u32    num_chunks;
+        u32    num_chunks = 0;
         char __user *to;
 
-        if (len <= sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks))
+        if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+                return -EACCES;
+
+        if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        if (copy_from_user(&val, p, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks)))
+        if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks)))
                 return -EFAULT;
 
         to = p->gauth_chunks;
@@ -5258,20 +5302,21 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
                 return -EINVAL;
 
         ch = asoc->peer.peer_chunks;
+        if (!ch)
+                goto num;
 
         /* See if the user provided enough room for all the data */
         num_chunks = ntohs(ch->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
         if (len < num_chunks)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        len = num_chunks;
-        if (put_user(len, optlen))
+        if (copy_to_user(to, ch->chunks, num_chunks))
                 return -EFAULT;
+num:
+        len = sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks;
+        if (put_user(len, optlen)) return -EFAULT;
         if (put_user(num_chunks, &p->gauth_number_of_chunks))
                 return -EFAULT;
-        if (copy_to_user(to, ch->chunks, len))
-                return -EFAULT;
-
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -5282,13 +5327,16 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
         struct sctp_authchunks val;
         struct sctp_association *asoc;
         struct sctp_chunks_param *ch;
-        u32    num_chunks;
+        u32    num_chunks = 0;
         char __user *to;
 
-        if (len <= sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks))
+        if (!sctp_auth_enable)
+                return -EACCES;
+
+        if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks))
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        if (copy_from_user(&val, p, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks)))
+        if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks)))
                 return -EFAULT;
 
         to = p->gauth_chunks;
@@ -5301,17 +5349,21 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
         else
                 ch = sctp_sk(sk)->ep->auth_chunk_list;
 
+        if (!ch)
+                goto num;
+
         num_chunks = ntohs(ch->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
-        if (len < num_chunks)
+        if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
-        len = num_chunks;
+        if (copy_to_user(to, ch->chunks, num_chunks))
+                return -EFAULT;
+num:
+        len = sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks;
         if (put_user(len, optlen))
                 return -EFAULT;
         if (put_user(num_chunks, &p->gauth_number_of_chunks))
                 return -EFAULT;
-        if (copy_to_user(to, ch->chunks, len))
-                return -EFAULT;
 
         return 0;
 }