1 files changed, 7 insertions, 62 deletions

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 836d74dd0187..19f0149fb6a2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -3760,8 +3760,8 @@ old_ack:
  * But, this can also be called on packets in the established flow when
  * the fast version below fails.
  */
-void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_options_received *opt_rx,
-                       const u8 **hvpp, int estab,
+void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+                       struct tcp_options_received *opt_rx, int estab,
                        struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc)
 {
         const unsigned char *ptr;
@@ -3845,31 +3845,6 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_options_received *o
                                  */
                                 break;
 #endif
-                        case TCPOPT_COOKIE:
-                                /* This option is variable length.
-                                 */
-                                switch (opsize) {
-                                case TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE:
-                                        /* not yet implemented */
-                                        break;
-                                case TCPOLEN_COOKIE_PAIR:
-                                        /* not yet implemented */
-                                        break;
-                                case TCPOLEN_COOKIE_MIN+0:
-                                case TCPOLEN_COOKIE_MIN+2:
-                                case TCPOLEN_COOKIE_MIN+4:
-                                case TCPOLEN_COOKIE_MIN+6:
-                                case TCPOLEN_COOKIE_MAX:
-                                        /* 16-bit multiple */
-                                        opt_rx->cookie_plus = opsize;
-                                        *hvpp = ptr;
-                                        break;
-                                default:
-                                        /* ignore option */
-                                        break;
-                                }
-                                break;
-
                         case TCPOPT_EXP:
                                 /* Fast Open option shares code 254 using a
                                  * 16 bits magic number. It's valid only in
@@ -3915,8 +3890,7 @@ static bool tcp_parse_aligned_timestamp(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr
  * If it is wrong it falls back on tcp_parse_options().
  */
 static bool tcp_fast_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                   const struct tcphdr *th,
-                                   struct tcp_sock *tp, const u8 **hvpp)
+                                   const struct tcphdr *th, struct tcp_sock *tp)
 {
         /* In the spirit of fast parsing, compare doff directly to constant
          * values.  Because equality is used, short doff can be ignored here.
@@ -3930,7 +3904,7 @@ static bool tcp_fast_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb,
                         return true;
         }
 
-        tcp_parse_options(skb, &tp->rx_opt, hvpp, 1, NULL);
+        tcp_parse_options(skb, &tp->rx_opt, 1, NULL);
         if (tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp)
                 tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tp->tsoffset;
 
@@ -5311,12 +5285,10 @@ out:
 static bool tcp_validate_incoming(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
                                   const struct tcphdr *th, int syn_inerr)
 {
-        const u8 *hash_location;
         struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 
         /* RFC1323: H1. Apply PAWS check first. */
-        if (tcp_fast_parse_options(skb, th, tp, &hash_location) &&
-            tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp &&
+        if (tcp_fast_parse_options(skb, th, tp) && tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp &&
             tcp_paws_discard(sk, skb)) {
                 if (!th->rst) {
                         NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PAWSESTABREJECTED);
@@ -5670,12 +5642,11 @@ static bool tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *synack,
 
         if (mss == tp->rx_opt.user_mss) {
                 struct tcp_options_received opt;
-                const u8 *hash_location;
 
                 /* Get original SYNACK MSS value if user MSS sets mss_clamp */
                 tcp_clear_options(&opt);
                 opt.user_mss = opt.mss_clamp = 0;
-                tcp_parse_options(synack, &opt, &hash_location, 0, NULL);
+                tcp_parse_options(synack, &opt, 0, NULL);
                 mss = opt.mss_clamp;
         }
 
@@ -5706,14 +5677,12 @@ static bool tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *synack,
 static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
                                          const struct tcphdr *th, unsigned int len)
 {
-        const u8 *hash_location;
         struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
         struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
-        struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = tp->cookie_values;
         struct tcp_fastopen_cookie foc = { .len = -1 };
         int saved_clamp = tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp;
 
-        tcp_parse_options(skb, &tp->rx_opt, &hash_location, 0, &foc);
+        tcp_parse_options(skb, &tp->rx_opt, 0, &foc);
         if (tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp)
                 tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tp->tsoffset;
 
@@ -5810,30 +5779,6 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
                  * is initialized. */
                 tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
 
-                if (cvp != NULL &&
-                    cvp->cookie_pair_size > 0 &&
-                    tp->rx_opt.cookie_plus > 0) {
-                        int cookie_size = tp->rx_opt.cookie_plus
-                                        - TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE;
-                        int cookie_pair_size = cookie_size
-                                             + cvp->cookie_desired;
-
-                        /* A cookie extension option was sent and returned.
-                         * Note that each incoming SYNACK replaces the
-                         * Responder cookie.  The initial exchange is most
-                         * fragile, as protection against spoofing relies
-                         * entirely upon the sequence and timestamp (above).
-                         * This replacement strategy allows the correct pair to
-                         * pass through, while any others will be filtered via
-                         * Responder verification later.
-                         */
-                        if (sizeof(cvp->cookie_pair) >= cookie_pair_size) {
-                                memcpy(&cvp->cookie_pair[cvp->cookie_desired],
-                                       hash_location, cookie_size);
-                                cvp->cookie_pair_size = cookie_pair_size;
-                        }
-                }
-
                 smp_mb();
 
                 tcp_finish_connect(sk, skb);