1 files changed, 23 insertions, 204 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index adb262f83de1..58b00519624a 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -127,160 +127,6 @@ static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
         return 0;
 }
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-
-/*
- * Without filesystem capability support, we nominally support one process
- * setting the capabilities of another
- */
-static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
-                                     kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
-{
-        struct task_struct *target;
-        int ret;
-
-        spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
-        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-
-        if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) {
-                target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
-                if (!target) {
-                        ret = -ESRCH;
-                        goto out;
-                }
-        } else
-                target = current;
-
-        ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
-
-out:
-        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-        spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
-
-        return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * cap_set_pg - set capabilities for all processes in a given process
- * group.  We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
- */
-static inline int cap_set_pg(int pgrp_nr, kernel_cap_t *effective,
-                             kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-                             kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
-        struct task_struct *g, *target;
-        int ret = -EPERM;
-        int found = 0;
-        struct pid *pgrp;
-
-        spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
-        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-
-        pgrp = find_vpid(pgrp_nr);
-        do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g) {
-                target = g;
-                while_each_thread(g, target) {
-                        if (!security_capset_check(target, effective,
-                                                   inheritable, permitted)) {
-                                security_capset_set(target, effective,
-                                                    inheritable, permitted);
-                                ret = 0;
-                        }
-                        found = 1;
-                }
-        } while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g);
-
-        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-        spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
-
-        if (!found)
-                ret = 0;
-        return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * cap_set_all - set capabilities for all processes other than init
- * and self.  We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
- */
-static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
-                              kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-                              kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
-        struct task_struct *g, *target;
-        int ret = -EPERM;
-        int found = 0;
-
-        spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
-        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-
-        do_each_thread(g, target) {
-                if (target == current
-                    || is_container_init(target->group_leader))
-                        continue;
-                found = 1;
-                if (security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable,
-                                          permitted))
-                        continue;
-                ret = 0;
-                security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
-        } while_each_thread(g, target);
-
-        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-        spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
-
-        if (!found)
-                ret = 0;
-
-        return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Given the target pid does not refer to the current process we
- * need more elaborate support... (This support is not present when
- * filesystem capabilities are configured.)
- */
-static inline int do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *effective,
-                                            kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-                                            kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
-        struct task_struct *target;
-        int ret;
-
-        if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
-                return -EPERM;
-
-        if (pid == -1)            /* all procs other than current and init */
-                return cap_set_all(effective, inheritable, permitted);
-
-        else if (pid < 0)                    /* all procs in process group */
-                return cap_set_pg(-pid, effective, inheritable, permitted);
-
-        /* target != current */
-        spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
-        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-
-        target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
-        if (!target)
-                ret = -ESRCH;
-        else {
-                ret = security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable,
-                                            permitted);
-
-                /* having verified that the proposed changes are legal,
-                   we now put them into effect. */
-                if (!ret)
-                        security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable,
-                                            permitted);
-        }
-
-        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-        spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
-
-        return ret;
-}
-
-#else /* ie., def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-
 /*
  * If we have configured with filesystem capability support, then the
  * only thing that can change the capabilities of the current process
@@ -315,22 +161,6 @@ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
 }
 
 /*
- * With filesystem capability support configured, the kernel does not
- * permit the changing of capabilities in one process by another
- * process. (CAP_SETPCAP has much less broad semantics when configured
- * this way.)
- */
-static inline int do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid_t pid,
-                                            kernel_cap_t *effective,
-                                            kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-                                            kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
-        return -EPERM;
-}
-
-#endif /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-
-/*
  * Atomically modify the effective capabilities returning the original
  * value. No permission check is performed here - it is assumed that the
  * caller is permitted to set the desired effective capabilities.
@@ -424,16 +254,14 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
  * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
  *      and inheritable capabilities
  *
- * Set capabilities for a given process, all processes, or all
- * processes in a given process group.
+ * Set capabilities for the current process only.  The ability to any other
+ * process(es) has been deprecated and removed.
  *
  * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
  *
- * [pid is for the 'target' task.  'current' is the calling task.]
- *
- * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
- * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
- * E: must be set to a subset of (new target) permitted
+ * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
+ * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
+ * E: must be set to a subset of new permitted
  *
  * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
  */
@@ -452,10 +280,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
         if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
                 return -EFAULT;
 
+        /* may only affect current now */
+        if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
+                return -EPERM;
+
         if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy
-                           * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
+                           * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct)))
                 return -EFAULT;
-        }
 
         for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
                 effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
@@ -473,32 +304,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
         if (ret)
                 return ret;
 
-        if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current)))
-                ret = do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid, &effective, &inheritable,
-                                                &permitted);
-        else {
-                /*
-                 * This lock is required even when filesystem
-                 * capability support is configured - it protects the
-                 * sys_capget() call from returning incorrect data in
-                 * the case that the targeted process is not the
-                 * current one.
-                 */
-                spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
-
-                ret = security_capset_check(current, &effective, &inheritable,
-                                            &permitted);
-                /*
-                 * Having verified that the proposed changes are
-                 * legal, we now put them into effect.
-                 */
-                if (!ret)
-                        security_capset_set(current, &effective, &inheritable,
-                                            &permitted);
-                spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
-        }
-
+        /* This lock is required even when filesystem capability support is
+         * configured - it protects the sys_capget() call from returning
+         * incorrect data in the case that the targeted process is not the
+         * current one.
+         */
+        spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
 
+        ret = security_capset_check(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
+        /* Having verified that the proposed changes are legal, we now put them
+         * into effect.
+         */
+        if (!ret)
+                security_capset_set(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
+        spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
         return ret;
 }