aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/kernel/capability.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c288
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 239 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 33e51e78c2d8..36b4b4daebec 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
7 * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net> 7 * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
8 */ 8 */
9 9
10#include <linux/audit.h>
10#include <linux/capability.h> 11#include <linux/capability.h>
11#include <linux/mm.h> 12#include <linux/mm.h>
12#include <linux/module.h> 13#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -14,12 +15,7 @@
14#include <linux/syscalls.h> 15#include <linux/syscalls.h>
15#include <linux/pid_namespace.h> 16#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
16#include <asm/uaccess.h> 17#include <asm/uaccess.h>
17 18#include "cred-internals.h"
18/*
19 * This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current.
20 * Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock.
21 */
22static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock);
23 19
24/* 20/*
25 * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities 21 * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
@@ -33,6 +29,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
33EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set); 29EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
34EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set); 30EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
35 31
32#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
33int file_caps_enabled = 1;
34
35static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
36{
37 file_caps_enabled = 0;
38 return 1;
39}
40__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable);
41#endif
42
36/* 43/*
37 * More recent versions of libcap are available from: 44 * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
38 * 45 *
@@ -115,167 +122,12 @@ static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
115 return 0; 122 return 0;
116} 123}
117 124
118#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
119
120/*
121 * Without filesystem capability support, we nominally support one process
122 * setting the capabilities of another
123 */
124static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
125 kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
126{
127 struct task_struct *target;
128 int ret;
129
130 spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
131 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
132
133 if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) {
134 target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
135 if (!target) {
136 ret = -ESRCH;
137 goto out;
138 }
139 } else
140 target = current;
141
142 ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
143
144out:
145 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
146 spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
147
148 return ret;
149}
150
151/*
152 * cap_set_pg - set capabilities for all processes in a given process
153 * group. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
154 */
155static inline int cap_set_pg(int pgrp_nr, kernel_cap_t *effective,
156 kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
157 kernel_cap_t *permitted)
158{
159 struct task_struct *g, *target;
160 int ret = -EPERM;
161 int found = 0;
162 struct pid *pgrp;
163
164 spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
165 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
166
167 pgrp = find_vpid(pgrp_nr);
168 do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g) {
169 target = g;
170 while_each_thread(g, target) {
171 if (!security_capset_check(target, effective,
172 inheritable, permitted)) {
173 security_capset_set(target, effective,
174 inheritable, permitted);
175 ret = 0;
176 }
177 found = 1;
178 }
179 } while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g);
180
181 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
182 spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
183
184 if (!found)
185 ret = 0;
186 return ret;
187}
188
189/*
190 * cap_set_all - set capabilities for all processes other than init
191 * and self. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
192 */
193static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
194 kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
195 kernel_cap_t *permitted)
196{
197 struct task_struct *g, *target;
198 int ret = -EPERM;
199 int found = 0;
200
201 spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
202 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
203
204 do_each_thread(g, target) {
205 if (target == current
206 || is_container_init(target->group_leader))
207 continue;
208 found = 1;
209 if (security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable,
210 permitted))
211 continue;
212 ret = 0;
213 security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
214 } while_each_thread(g, target);
215
216 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
217 spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
218
219 if (!found)
220 ret = 0;
221
222 return ret;
223}
224
225/*
226 * Given the target pid does not refer to the current process we
227 * need more elaborate support... (This support is not present when
228 * filesystem capabilities are configured.)
229 */
230static inline int do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *effective,
231 kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
232 kernel_cap_t *permitted)
233{
234 struct task_struct *target;
235 int ret;
236
237 if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
238 return -EPERM;
239
240 if (pid == -1) /* all procs other than current and init */
241 return cap_set_all(effective, inheritable, permitted);
242
243 else if (pid < 0) /* all procs in process group */
244 return cap_set_pg(-pid, effective, inheritable, permitted);
245
246 /* target != current */
247 spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
248 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
249
250 target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
251 if (!target)
252 ret = -ESRCH;
253 else {
254 ret = security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable,
255 permitted);
256
257 /* having verified that the proposed changes are legal,
258 we now put them into effect. */
259 if (!ret)
260 security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable,
261 permitted);
262 }
263
264 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
265 spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
266
267 return ret;
268}
269
270#else /* ie., def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
271
272/* 125/*
273 * If we have configured with filesystem capability support, then the 126 * The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current
274 * only thing that can change the capabilities of the current process 127 * process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code
275 * is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code at the 128 * at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities
276 * same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities in this 129 * in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of
277 * process. The net result is that we can limit our use of locks to 130 * locks to when we are reading the caps of another process.
278 * when we are reading the caps of another process.
279 */ 131 */
280static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp, 132static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
281 kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp) 133 kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
@@ -285,7 +137,6 @@ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
285 if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) { 137 if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) {
286 struct task_struct *target; 138 struct task_struct *target;
287 139
288 spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
289 read_lock(&tasklist_lock); 140 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
290 141
291 target = find_task_by_vpid(pid); 142 target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
@@ -295,50 +146,12 @@ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
295 ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp); 146 ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
296 147
297 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); 148 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
298 spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
299 } else 149 } else
300 ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp); 150 ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
301 151
302 return ret; 152 return ret;
303} 153}
304 154
305/*
306 * With filesystem capability support configured, the kernel does not
307 * permit the changing of capabilities in one process by another
308 * process. (CAP_SETPCAP has much less broad semantics when configured
309 * this way.)
310 */
311static inline int do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid_t pid,
312 kernel_cap_t *effective,
313 kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
314 kernel_cap_t *permitted)
315{
316 return -EPERM;
317}
318
319#endif /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
320
321/*
322 * Atomically modify the effective capabilities returning the original
323 * value. No permission check is performed here - it is assumed that the
324 * caller is permitted to set the desired effective capabilities.
325 */
326kernel_cap_t cap_set_effective(const kernel_cap_t pE_new)
327{
328 kernel_cap_t pE_old;
329
330 spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
331
332 pE_old = current->cap_effective;
333 current->cap_effective = pE_new;
334
335 spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
336
337 return pE_old;
338}
339
340EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_set_effective);
341
342/** 155/**
343 * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process. 156 * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
344 * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and 157 * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
@@ -366,7 +179,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
366 return -EINVAL; 179 return -EINVAL;
367 180
368 ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP); 181 ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP);
369
370 if (!ret) { 182 if (!ret) {
371 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; 183 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
372 unsigned i; 184 unsigned i;
@@ -412,16 +224,14 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
412 * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted, 224 * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
413 * and inheritable capabilities 225 * and inheritable capabilities
414 * 226 *
415 * Set capabilities for a given process, all processes, or all 227 * Set capabilities for the current process only. The ability to any other
416 * processes in a given process group. 228 * process(es) has been deprecated and removed.
417 * 229 *
418 * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as: 230 * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
419 * 231 *
420 * [pid is for the 'target' task. 'current' is the calling task.] 232 * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
421 * 233 * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
422 * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted 234 * E: must be set to a subset of new permitted
423 * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
424 * E: must be set to a subset of (new target) permitted
425 * 235 *
426 * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error. 236 * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
427 */ 237 */
@@ -430,6 +240,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
430 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; 240 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
431 unsigned i, tocopy; 241 unsigned i, tocopy;
432 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; 242 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
243 struct cred *new;
433 int ret; 244 int ret;
434 pid_t pid; 245 pid_t pid;
435 246
@@ -440,10 +251,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
440 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) 251 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
441 return -EFAULT; 252 return -EFAULT;
442 253
443 if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy 254 /* may only affect current now */
444 * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) { 255 if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
256 return -EPERM;
257
258 if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data,
259 tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct)))
445 return -EFAULT; 260 return -EFAULT;
446 }
447 261
448 for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) { 262 for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
449 effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective; 263 effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
@@ -457,32 +271,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
457 i++; 271 i++;
458 } 272 }
459 273
460 if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) 274 new = prepare_creds();
461 ret = do_sys_capset_other_tasks(pid, &effective, &inheritable, 275 if (!new)
462 &permitted); 276 return -ENOMEM;
463 else {
464 /*
465 * This lock is required even when filesystem
466 * capability support is configured - it protects the
467 * sys_capget() call from returning incorrect data in
468 * the case that the targeted process is not the
469 * current one.
470 */
471 spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
472 277
473 ret = security_capset_check(current, &effective, &inheritable, 278 ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
474 &permitted); 279 &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
475 /* 280 if (ret < 0)
476 * Having verified that the proposed changes are 281 goto error;
477 * legal, we now put them into effect. 282
478 */ 283 ret = audit_log_capset(pid, new, current_cred());
479 if (!ret) 284 if (ret < 0)
480 security_capset_set(current, &effective, &inheritable, 285 return ret;
481 &permitted);
482 spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
483 }
484 286
287 return commit_creds(new);
485 288
289error:
290 abort_creds(new);
486 return ret; 291 return ret;
487} 292}
488 293
@@ -498,6 +303,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
498 */ 303 */
499int capable(int cap) 304int capable(int cap)
500{ 305{
306 if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
307 printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
308 BUG();
309 }
310
501 if (has_capability(current, cap)) { 311 if (has_capability(current, cap)) {
502 current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; 312 current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
503 return 1; 313 return 1;