4 files changed, 244 insertions, 17 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/connector/connector.txt b/Documentation/connector/connector.txt
index 54a0a14bfbe3..57a314b14cf8 100644
--- a/Documentation/connector/connector.txt
+++ b/Documentation/connector/connector.txt
@@ -131,3 +131,47 @@ Netlink itself is not reliable protocol, that means that messages can
 be lost due to memory pressure or process' receiving queue overflowed,
 so caller is warned must be prepared. That is why struct cn_msg [main
 connector's message header] contains u32 seq and u32 ack fields.
+
+/*****************************************/
+Userspace usage.
+/*****************************************/
+2.6.14 has a new netlink socket implementation, which by default does not
+allow to send data to netlink groups other than 1.
+So, if to use netlink socket (for example using connector) 
+with different group number userspace application must subscribe to 
+that group. It can be achieved by following pseudocode:
+
+s = socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_CONNECTOR);
+
+l_local.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
+l_local.nl_groups = 12345;
+l_local.nl_pid = 0;
+
+if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&l_local, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nl)) == -1) {
+        perror("bind");
+        close(s);
+        return -1;
+}
+
+{
+        int on = l_local.nl_groups;
+        setsockopt(s, 270, 1, &on, sizeof(on));
+}
+
+Where 270 above is SOL_NETLINK, and 1 is a NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP socket
+option. To drop multicast subscription one should call above socket option
+with NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP parameter which is defined as 0.
+
+2.6.14 netlink code only allows to select a group which is less or equal to
+the maximum group number, which is used at netlink_kernel_create() time.
+In case of connector it is CN_NETLINK_USERS + 0xf, so if you want to use
+group number 12345, you must increment CN_NETLINK_USERS to that number.
+Additional 0xf numbers are allocated to be used by non-in-kernel users.
+
+Due to this limitation, group 0xffffffff does not work now, so one can
+not use add/remove connector's group notifications, but as far as I know, 
+only cn_test.c test module used it.
+
+Some work in netlink area is still being done, so things can be changed in
+2.6.15 timeframe, if it will happen, documentation will be updated for that
+kernel.
diff --git a/Documentation/dell_rbu.txt b/Documentation/dell_rbu.txt
index 95d7f62e4dbc..941343a7a265 100644
--- a/Documentation/dell_rbu.txt
+++ b/Documentation/dell_rbu.txt
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ The driver load creates the following directories under the /sys file system.
 /sys/class/firmware/dell_rbu/data
 /sys/devices/platform/dell_rbu/image_type
 /sys/devices/platform/dell_rbu/data
+/sys/devices/platform/dell_rbu/packet_size
 
 The driver supports two types of update mechanism; monolithic and packetized.
 These update mechanism depends upon the BIOS currently running on the system.
@@ -47,8 +48,26 @@ By default the driver uses monolithic memory for the update type. This can be
 changed to packets during the driver load time by specifying the load
 parameter image_type=packet.  This can also be changed later as below
 echo packet > /sys/devices/platform/dell_rbu/image_type
-Also echoing either mono ,packet or init in to image_type will free up the
-memory allocated by the driver.
+
+In packet update mode the packet size has to be given before any packets can
+be downloaded. It is done as below
+echo XXXX > /sys/devices/platform/dell_rbu/packet_size
+In the packet update mechanism, the user neesd to create a new file having
+packets of data arranged back to back. It can be done as follows
+The user creates packets header, gets the chunk of the BIOS image and
+placs it next to the packetheader; now, the packetheader + BIOS image chunk
+added to geather should match the specified packet_size. This makes one
+packet, the user needs to create more such packets out of the entire BIOS
+image file and then arrange all these packets back to back in to one single
+file.
+This file is then copied to /sys/class/firmware/dell_rbu/data.
+Once this file gets to the driver, the driver extracts packet_size data from
+the file and spreads it accross the physical memory in contiguous packet_sized
+space.
+This method makes sure that all the packets get to the driver in a single operation.
+
+In monolithic update the user simply get the BIOS image (.hdr file) and copies
+to the data file as is without any change to the BIOS image itself.
 
 Do the steps below to download the BIOS image.
 1) echo 1 > /sys/class/firmware/dell_rbu/loading
@@ -58,7 +77,10 @@ Do the steps below to download the BIOS image.
 The /sys/class/firmware/dell_rbu/ entries will remain till the following is
 done.
 echo -1 > /sys/class/firmware/dell_rbu/loading.
-Until this step is completed the drivr cannot be unloaded.
+Until this step is completed the driver cannot be unloaded.
+Also echoing either mono ,packet or init in to image_type will free up the
+memory allocated by the driver.
+
 If an user by accident executes steps 1 and 3 above without executing step 2;
 it will make the /sys/class/firmware/dell_rbu/ entries to disappear.
 The entries can be recreated by doing the following
@@ -66,15 +88,11 @@ echo init > /sys/devices/platform/dell_rbu/image_type
 NOTE: echoing init in image_type does not change it original value.
 
 Also the driver provides /sys/devices/platform/dell_rbu/data readonly file to
-read back the image downloaded. This is useful in case of packet update
-mechanism where the above steps 1,2,3 will repeated for every packet.
-By reading the /sys/devices/platform/dell_rbu/data file all packet data
-downloaded can be verified in a single file.
-The packets are arranged in this file one after the other in a FIFO order.
+read back the image downloaded.
 
 NOTE:
-This driver requires a patch for firmware_class.c which has the addition
-of request_firmware_nowait_nohotplug function to wortk
+This driver requires a patch for firmware_class.c which has the modified
+request_firmware_nowait function.
 Also after updating the BIOS image an user mdoe application neeeds to execute
 code which message the BIOS update request to the BIOS. So on the next reboot
 the BIOS knows about the new image downloaded and it updates it self.
diff --git a/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt b/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5f2b9c5edbb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+                              ===================
+                              KEY REQUEST SERVICE
+                              ===================
+
+The key request service is part of the key retention service (refer to
+Documentation/keys.txt). This document explains more fully how that the
+requesting algorithm works.
+
+The process starts by either the kernel requesting a service by calling
+request_key():
+
+        struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type,
+                                const char *description,
+                                const char *callout_string);
+
+Or by userspace invoking the request_key system call:
+
+        key_serial_t request_key(const char *type,
+                                 const char *description,
+                                 const char *callout_info,
+                                 key_serial_t dest_keyring);
+
+The main difference between the two access points is that the in-kernel
+interface does not need to link the key to a keyring to prevent it from being
+immediately destroyed. The kernel interface returns a pointer directly to the
+key, and it's up to the caller to destroy the key.
+
+The userspace interface links the key to a keyring associated with the process
+to prevent the key from going away, and returns the serial number of the key to
+the caller.
+
+
+===========
+THE PROCESS
+===========
+
+A request proceeds in the following manner:
+
+ (1) Process A calls request_key() [the userspace syscall calls the kernel
+     interface].
+
+ (2) request_key() searches the process's subscribed keyrings to see if there's
+     a suitable key there. If there is, it returns the key. If there isn't, and
+     callout_info is not set, an error is returned. Otherwise the process
+     proceeds to the next step.
+
+ (3) request_key() sees that A doesn't have the desired key yet, so it creates
+     two things:
+
+     (a) An uninstantiated key U of requested type and description.
+
+     (b) An authorisation key V that refers to key U and notes that process A
+         is the context in which key U should be instantiated and secured, and
+         from which associated key requests may be satisfied.
+
+ (4) request_key() then forks and executes /sbin/request-key with a new session
+     keyring that contains a link to auth key V.
+
+ (5) /sbin/request-key execs an appropriate program to perform the actual
+     instantiation.
+
+ (6) The program may want to access another key from A's context (say a
+     Kerberos TGT key). It just requests the appropriate key, and the keyring
+     search notes that the session keyring has auth key V in its bottom level.
+
+     This will permit it to then search the keyrings of process A with the
+     UID, GID, groups and security info of process A as if it was process A,
+     and come up with key W.
+
+ (7) The program then does what it must to get the data with which to
+     instantiate key U, using key W as a reference (perhaps it contacts a
+     Kerberos server using the TGT) and then instantiates key U.
+
+ (8) Upon instantiating key U, auth key V is automatically revoked so that it
+     may not be used again.
+
+ (9) The program then exits 0 and request_key() deletes key V and returns key
+     U to the caller.
+
+This also extends further. If key W (step 5 above) didn't exist, key W would be
+created uninstantiated, another auth key (X) would be created [as per step 3]
+and another copy of /sbin/request-key spawned [as per step 4]; but the context
+specified by auth key X will still be process A, as it was in auth key V.
+
+This is because process A's keyrings can't simply be attached to
+/sbin/request-key at the appropriate places because (a) execve will discard two
+of them, and (b) it requires the same UID/GID/Groups all the way through.
+
+
+======================
+NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION
+======================
+
+Rather than instantiating a key, it is possible for the possessor of an
+authorisation key to negatively instantiate a key that's under construction.
+This is a short duration placeholder that causes any attempt at re-requesting
+the key whilst it exists to fail with error ENOKEY.
+
+This is provided to prevent excessive repeated spawning of /sbin/request-key
+processes for a key that will never be obtainable.
+
+Should the /sbin/request-key process exit anything other than 0 or die on a
+signal, the key under construction will be automatically negatively
+instantiated for a short amount of time.
+
+
+====================
+THE SEARCH ALGORITHM
+====================
+
+A search of any particular keyring proceeds in the following fashion:
+
+ (1) When the key management code searches for a key (keyring_search_aux) it
+     firstly calls key_permission(SEARCH) on the keyring it's starting with,
+     if this denies permission, it doesn't search further.
+
+ (2) It considers all the non-keyring keys within that keyring and, if any key
+     matches the criteria specified, calls key_permission(SEARCH) on it to see
+     if the key is allowed to be found. If it is, that key is returned; if
+     not, the search continues, and the error code is retained if of higher
+     priority than the one currently set.
+
+ (3) It then considers all the keyring-type keys in the keyring it's currently
+     searching. It calls key_permission(SEARCH) on each keyring, and if this
+     grants permission, it recurses, executing steps (2) and (3) on that
+     keyring.
+
+The process stops immediately a valid key is found with permission granted to
+use it. Any error from a previous match attempt is discarded and the key is
+returned.
+
+When search_process_keyrings() is invoked, it performs the following searches
+until one succeeds:
+
+ (1) If extant, the process's thread keyring is searched.
+
+ (2) If extant, the process's process keyring is searched.
+
+ (3) The process's session keyring is searched.
+
+ (4) If the process has a request_key() authorisation key in its session
+     keyring then:
+
+     (a) If extant, the calling process's thread keyring is searched.
+
+     (b) If extant, the calling process's process keyring is searched.
+
+     (c) The calling process's session keyring is searched.
+
+The moment one succeeds, all pending errors are discarded and the found key is
+returned.
+
+Only if all these fail does the whole thing fail with the highest priority
+error. Note that several errors may have come from LSM.
+
+The error priority is:
+
+        EKEYREVOKED > EKEYEXPIRED > ENOKEY
+
+EACCES/EPERM are only returned on a direct search of a specific keyring where
+the basal keyring does not grant Search permission.
diff --git a/Documentation/keys.txt b/Documentation/keys.txt
index b22e7c8d059a..4afe03a58c5b 100644
--- a/Documentation/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/keys.txt
@@ -361,6 +361,8 @@ The main syscalls are:
      /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain a key. The
      callout_info string will be passed as an argument to the program.
 
+     See also Documentation/keys-request-key.txt.
+
 
 The keyctl syscall functions are:
 
@@ -533,8 +535,8 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
 
  (*) Read the payload data from a key:
 
-        key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_READ, key_serial_t keyring, char *buffer,
-                            size_t buflen);
+        long keyctl(KEYCTL_READ, key_serial_t keyring, char *buffer,
+                    size_t buflen);
 
      This function attempts to read the payload data from the specified key
      into the buffer. The process must have read permission on the key to
@@ -555,9 +557,9 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
 
  (*) Instantiate a partially constructed key.
 
-        key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, key_serial_t key,
-                            const void *payload, size_t plen,
-                            key_serial_t keyring);
+        long keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, key_serial_t key,
+                    const void *payload, size_t plen,
+                    key_serial_t keyring);
 
      If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a
      key, userspace should use this call to supply data for the key before the
@@ -576,8 +578,8 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
 
  (*) Negatively instantiate a partially constructed key.
 
-        key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_NEGATE, key_serial_t key,
-                            unsigned timeout, key_serial_t keyring);
+        long keyctl(KEYCTL_NEGATE, key_serial_t key,
+                    unsigned timeout, key_serial_t keyring);
 
      If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a
      key, userspace should use this call mark the key as negative before the
@@ -688,6 +690,8 @@ payload contents" for more information.
     If successful, the key will have been attached to the default keyring for
     implicitly obtained request-key keys, as set by KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING.
 
+    See also Documentation/keys-request-key.txt.
+
 
 (*) When it is no longer required, the key should be released using: