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1 | =================== | ||
2 | KEY REQUEST SERVICE | ||
3 | =================== | ||
4 | |||
5 | The key request service is part of the key retention service (refer to | ||
6 | Documentation/keys.txt). This document explains more fully how that the | ||
7 | requesting algorithm works. | ||
8 | |||
9 | The process starts by either the kernel requesting a service by calling | ||
10 | request_key(): | ||
11 | |||
12 | struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type, | ||
13 | const char *description, | ||
14 | const char *callout_string); | ||
15 | |||
16 | Or by userspace invoking the request_key system call: | ||
17 | |||
18 | key_serial_t request_key(const char *type, | ||
19 | const char *description, | ||
20 | const char *callout_info, | ||
21 | key_serial_t dest_keyring); | ||
22 | |||
23 | The main difference between the two access points is that the in-kernel | ||
24 | interface does not need to link the key to a keyring to prevent it from being | ||
25 | immediately destroyed. The kernel interface returns a pointer directly to the | ||
26 | key, and it's up to the caller to destroy the key. | ||
27 | |||
28 | The userspace interface links the key to a keyring associated with the process | ||
29 | to prevent the key from going away, and returns the serial number of the key to | ||
30 | the caller. | ||
31 | |||
32 | |||
33 | =========== | ||
34 | THE PROCESS | ||
35 | =========== | ||
36 | |||
37 | A request proceeds in the following manner: | ||
38 | |||
39 | (1) Process A calls request_key() [the userspace syscall calls the kernel | ||
40 | interface]. | ||
41 | |||
42 | (2) request_key() searches the process's subscribed keyrings to see if there's | ||
43 | a suitable key there. If there is, it returns the key. If there isn't, and | ||
44 | callout_info is not set, an error is returned. Otherwise the process | ||
45 | proceeds to the next step. | ||
46 | |||
47 | (3) request_key() sees that A doesn't have the desired key yet, so it creates | ||
48 | two things: | ||
49 | |||
50 | (a) An uninstantiated key U of requested type and description. | ||
51 | |||
52 | (b) An authorisation key V that refers to key U and notes that process A | ||
53 | is the context in which key U should be instantiated and secured, and | ||
54 | from which associated key requests may be satisfied. | ||
55 | |||
56 | (4) request_key() then forks and executes /sbin/request-key with a new session | ||
57 | keyring that contains a link to auth key V. | ||
58 | |||
59 | (5) /sbin/request-key execs an appropriate program to perform the actual | ||
60 | instantiation. | ||
61 | |||
62 | (6) The program may want to access another key from A's context (say a | ||
63 | Kerberos TGT key). It just requests the appropriate key, and the keyring | ||
64 | search notes that the session keyring has auth key V in its bottom level. | ||
65 | |||
66 | This will permit it to then search the keyrings of process A with the | ||
67 | UID, GID, groups and security info of process A as if it was process A, | ||
68 | and come up with key W. | ||
69 | |||
70 | (7) The program then does what it must to get the data with which to | ||
71 | instantiate key U, using key W as a reference (perhaps it contacts a | ||
72 | Kerberos server using the TGT) and then instantiates key U. | ||
73 | |||
74 | (8) Upon instantiating key U, auth key V is automatically revoked so that it | ||
75 | may not be used again. | ||
76 | |||
77 | (9) The program then exits 0 and request_key() deletes key V and returns key | ||
78 | U to the caller. | ||
79 | |||
80 | This also extends further. If key W (step 5 above) didn't exist, key W would be | ||
81 | created uninstantiated, another auth key (X) would be created [as per step 3] | ||
82 | and another copy of /sbin/request-key spawned [as per step 4]; but the context | ||
83 | specified by auth key X will still be process A, as it was in auth key V. | ||
84 | |||
85 | This is because process A's keyrings can't simply be attached to | ||
86 | /sbin/request-key at the appropriate places because (a) execve will discard two | ||
87 | of them, and (b) it requires the same UID/GID/Groups all the way through. | ||
88 | |||
89 | |||
90 | ====================== | ||
91 | NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION | ||
92 | ====================== | ||
93 | |||
94 | Rather than instantiating a key, it is possible for the possessor of an | ||
95 | authorisation key to negatively instantiate a key that's under construction. | ||
96 | This is a short duration placeholder that causes any attempt at re-requesting | ||
97 | the key whilst it exists to fail with error ENOKEY. | ||
98 | |||
99 | This is provided to prevent excessive repeated spawning of /sbin/request-key | ||
100 | processes for a key that will never be obtainable. | ||
101 | |||
102 | Should the /sbin/request-key process exit anything other than 0 or die on a | ||
103 | signal, the key under construction will be automatically negatively | ||
104 | instantiated for a short amount of time. | ||
105 | |||
106 | |||
107 | ==================== | ||
108 | THE SEARCH ALGORITHM | ||
109 | ==================== | ||
110 | |||
111 | A search of any particular keyring proceeds in the following fashion: | ||
112 | |||
113 | (1) When the key management code searches for a key (keyring_search_aux) it | ||
114 | firstly calls key_permission(SEARCH) on the keyring it's starting with, | ||
115 | if this denies permission, it doesn't search further. | ||
116 | |||
117 | (2) It considers all the non-keyring keys within that keyring and, if any key | ||
118 | matches the criteria specified, calls key_permission(SEARCH) on it to see | ||
119 | if the key is allowed to be found. If it is, that key is returned; if | ||
120 | not, the search continues, and the error code is retained if of higher | ||
121 | priority than the one currently set. | ||
122 | |||
123 | (3) It then considers all the keyring-type keys in the keyring it's currently | ||
124 | searching. It calls key_permission(SEARCH) on each keyring, and if this | ||
125 | grants permission, it recurses, executing steps (2) and (3) on that | ||
126 | keyring. | ||
127 | |||
128 | The process stops immediately a valid key is found with permission granted to | ||
129 | use it. Any error from a previous match attempt is discarded and the key is | ||
130 | returned. | ||
131 | |||
132 | When search_process_keyrings() is invoked, it performs the following searches | ||
133 | until one succeeds: | ||
134 | |||
135 | (1) If extant, the process's thread keyring is searched. | ||
136 | |||
137 | (2) If extant, the process's process keyring is searched. | ||
138 | |||
139 | (3) The process's session keyring is searched. | ||
140 | |||
141 | (4) If the process has a request_key() authorisation key in its session | ||
142 | keyring then: | ||
143 | |||
144 | (a) If extant, the calling process's thread keyring is searched. | ||
145 | |||
146 | (b) If extant, the calling process's process keyring is searched. | ||
147 | |||
148 | (c) The calling process's session keyring is searched. | ||
149 | |||
150 | The moment one succeeds, all pending errors are discarded and the found key is | ||
151 | returned. | ||
152 | |||
153 | Only if all these fail does the whole thing fail with the highest priority | ||
154 | error. Note that several errors may have come from LSM. | ||
155 | |||
156 | The error priority is: | ||
157 | |||
158 | EKEYREVOKED > EKEYEXPIRED > ENOKEY | ||
159 | |||
160 | EACCES/EPERM are only returned on a direct search of a specific keyring where | ||
161 | the basal keyring does not grant Search permission. | ||