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-rw-r--r--Documentation/DocBook/kernel-api.tmpl1
-rw-r--r--Documentation/SELinux.txt27
-rw-r--r--MAINTAINERS5
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h54
-rw-r--r--scripts/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/README2
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh69
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/mdp/.gitignore2
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile5
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/mdp/dbus_contexts6
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c242
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig8
-rw-r--r--security/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c2
-rw-r--r--security/inode.c33
-rw-r--r--security/security.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Kconfig3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c62
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c18
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c14
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c225
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c180
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c12
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h1
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c10
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c92
36 files changed, 995 insertions, 141 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/DocBook/kernel-api.tmpl b/Documentation/DocBook/kernel-api.tmpl
index b7b1482f6e04..cd0e6d5370d7 100644
--- a/Documentation/DocBook/kernel-api.tmpl
+++ b/Documentation/DocBook/kernel-api.tmpl
@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ X!Earch/x86/kernel/mca_32.c
283 <chapter id="security"> 283 <chapter id="security">
284 <title>Security Framework</title> 284 <title>Security Framework</title>
285!Isecurity/security.c 285!Isecurity/security.c
286!Esecurity/inode.c
286 </chapter> 287 </chapter>
287 288
288 <chapter id="audit"> 289 <chapter id="audit">
diff --git a/Documentation/SELinux.txt b/Documentation/SELinux.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..07eae00f3314
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/SELinux.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
1If you want to use SELinux, chances are you will want
2to use the distro-provided policies, or install the
3latest reference policy release from
4 http://oss.tresys.com/projects/refpolicy
5
6However, if you want to install a dummy policy for
7testing, you can do using 'mdp' provided under
8scripts/selinux. Note that this requires the selinux
9userspace to be installed - in particular you will
10need checkpolicy to compile a kernel, and setfiles and
11fixfiles to label the filesystem.
12
13 1. Compile the kernel with selinux enabled.
14 2. Type 'make' to compile mdp.
15 3. Make sure that you are not running with
16 SELinux enabled and a real policy. If
17 you are, reboot with selinux disabled
18 before continuing.
19 4. Run install_policy.sh:
20 cd scripts/selinux
21 sh install_policy.sh
22
23Step 4 will create a new dummy policy valid for your
24kernel, with a single selinux user, role, and type.
25It will compile the policy, will set your SELINUXTYPE to
26dummy in /etc/selinux/config, install the compiled policy
27as 'dummy', and relabel your filesystem.
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 8dae4555f10e..7a03bd5a91a3 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -3649,8 +3649,9 @@ M: jmorris@namei.org
3649P: Eric Paris 3649P: Eric Paris
3650M: eparis@parisplace.org 3650M: eparis@parisplace.org
3651L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (kernel issues) 3651L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (kernel issues)
3652L: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov (subscribers-only, general discussion) 3652L: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov (subscribers-only, general discussion)
3653W: http://www.nsa.gov/selinux 3653W: http://selinuxproject.org
3654T: git kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6.git
3654S: Supported 3655S: Supported
3655 3656
3656SENSABLE PHANTOM 3657SENSABLE PHANTOM
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index 3738cfa209ff..f5fc64f89c5c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM
6 tristate "TPM Hardware Support" 6 tristate "TPM Hardware Support"
7 depends on HAS_IOMEM 7 depends on HAS_IOMEM
8 depends on EXPERIMENTAL 8 depends on EXPERIMENTAL
9 select SECURITYFS
9 ---help--- 10 ---help---
10 If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which 11 If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which
11 implements the Trusted Computing Group's specification, 12 implements the Trusted Computing Group's specification,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 80c4d002864c..f5c4a51eb42e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1560,11 +1560,6 @@ struct security_operations {
1560extern int security_init(void); 1560extern int security_init(void);
1561extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops); 1561extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
1562extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops); 1562extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
1563extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode,
1564 struct dentry *parent, void *data,
1565 const struct file_operations *fops);
1566extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent);
1567extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
1568 1563
1569/* Security operations */ 1564/* Security operations */
1570int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); 1565int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
@@ -2424,25 +2419,6 @@ static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
2424 return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap); 2419 return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap);
2425} 2420}
2426 2421
2427static inline struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name,
2428 struct dentry *parent)
2429{
2430 return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
2431}
2432
2433static inline struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name,
2434 mode_t mode,
2435 struct dentry *parent,
2436 void *data,
2437 const struct file_operations *fops)
2438{
2439 return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
2440}
2441
2442static inline void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
2443{
2444}
2445
2446static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) 2422static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
2447{ 2423{
2448 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 2424 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -2806,5 +2782,35 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
2806#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ 2782#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
2807#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ 2783#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
2808 2784
2785#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
2786
2787extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode,
2788 struct dentry *parent, void *data,
2789 const struct file_operations *fops);
2790extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent);
2791extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
2792
2793#else /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */
2794
2795static inline struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name,
2796 struct dentry *parent)
2797{
2798 return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
2799}
2800
2801static inline struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name,
2802 mode_t mode,
2803 struct dentry *parent,
2804 void *data,
2805 const struct file_operations *fops)
2806{
2807 return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
2808}
2809
2810static inline void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
2811{}
2812
2813#endif
2814
2809#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */ 2815#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
2810 2816
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile
index 1c73c5aea66b..aafdf064feef 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/Makefile
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ hostprogs-y += unifdef
20 20
21subdir-$(CONFIG_MODVERSIONS) += genksyms 21subdir-$(CONFIG_MODVERSIONS) += genksyms
22subdir-y += mod 22subdir-y += mod
23subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
23 24
24# Let clean descend into subdirs 25# Let clean descend into subdirs
25subdir- += basic kconfig package 26subdir- += basic kconfig package selinux
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ca4b1ec01822
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
1subdir-y := mdp
2subdir- += mdp
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/README b/scripts/selinux/README
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a936315ba2c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/README
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
1Please see Documentation/SELinux.txt for information on
2installing a dummy SELinux policy.
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh b/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7b9ccf61f8f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
1#!/bin/sh
2if [ `id -u` -ne 0 ]; then
3 echo "$0: must be root to install the selinux policy"
4 exit 1
5fi
6SF=`which setfiles`
7if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
8 if [ -f /sbin/setfiles ]; then
9 SF="/usr/setfiles"
10 else
11 echo "no selinux tools installed: setfiles"
12 exit 1
13 fi
14fi
15
16cd mdp
17
18CP=`which checkpolicy`
19VERS=`$CP -V | awk '{print $1}'`
20
21./mdp policy.conf file_contexts
22$CP -o policy.$VERS policy.conf
23
24mkdir -p /etc/selinux/dummy/policy
25mkdir -p /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files
26
27cp file_contexts /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files
28cp dbus_contexts /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts
29cp policy.$VERS /etc/selinux/dummy/policy
30FC_FILE=/etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files/file_contexts
31
32if [ ! -d /etc/selinux ]; then
33 mkdir -p /etc/selinux
34fi
35if [ ! -f /etc/selinux/config ]; then
36 cat > /etc/selinux/config << EOF
37SELINUX=enforcing
38SELINUXTYPE=dummy
39EOF
40else
41 TYPE=`cat /etc/selinux/config | grep "^SELINUXTYPE" | tail -1 | awk -F= '{ print $2 '}`
42 if [ "eq$TYPE" != "eqdummy" ]; then
43 selinuxenabled
44 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
45 echo "SELinux already enabled with a non-dummy policy."
46 echo "Exiting. Please install policy by hand if that"
47 echo "is what you REALLY want."
48 exit 1
49 fi
50 mv /etc/selinux/config /etc/selinux/config.mdpbak
51 grep -v "^SELINUXTYPE" /etc/selinux/config.mdpbak >> /etc/selinux/config
52 echo "SELINUXTYPE=dummy" >> /etc/selinux/config
53 fi
54fi
55
56cd /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files
57$SF file_contexts /
58
59mounts=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | egrep "ext2|ext3|xfs|jfs|ext4|ext4dev|gfs2" | awk '{ print $2 '}`
60$SF file_contexts $mounts
61
62
63dodev=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | grep "/dev "`
64if [ "eq$dodev" != "eq" ]; then
65 mount --move /dev /mnt
66 $SF file_contexts /dev
67 mount --move /mnt /dev
68fi
69
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/.gitignore b/scripts/selinux/mdp/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..654546d8dffd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
1# Generated file
2mdp
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..eb365b333441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
1hostprogs-y := mdp
2HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
3
4always := $(hostprogs-y)
5clean-files := $(hostprogs-y) policy.* file_contexts
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/dbus_contexts b/scripts/selinux/mdp/dbus_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..116e684f9fc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/dbus_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
1<!DOCTYPE busconfig PUBLIC "-//freedesktop//DTD D-BUS Bus Configuration 1.0//EN"
2 "http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/dbus/1.0/busconfig.dtd">
3<busconfig>
4 <selinux>
5 </selinux>
6</busconfig>
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ca757d486187
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
1/*
2 *
3 * mdp - make dummy policy
4 *
5 * When pointed at a kernel tree, builds a dummy policy for that kernel
6 * with exactly one type with full rights to itself.
7 *
8 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
9 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
10 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
11 * (at your option) any later version.
12 *
13 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
14 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
15 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
16 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 *
18 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
19 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
20 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
21 *
22 * Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2006
23 *
24 * Authors: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
25 */
26
27#include <stdio.h>
28#include <stdlib.h>
29#include <unistd.h>
30#include <string.h>
31
32#include "flask.h"
33
34void usage(char *name)
35{
36 printf("usage: %s [-m] policy_file context_file\n", name);
37 exit(1);
38}
39
40void find_common_name(char *cname, char *dest, int len)
41{
42 char *start, *end;
43
44 start = strchr(cname, '_')+1;
45 end = strchr(start, '_');
46 if (!start || !end || start-cname > len || end-start > len) {
47 printf("Error with commons defines\n");
48 exit(1);
49 }
50 strncpy(dest, start, end-start);
51 dest[end-start] = '\0';
52}
53
54#define S_(x) x,
55static char *classlist[] = {
56#include "class_to_string.h"
57 NULL
58};
59#undef S_
60
61#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
62
63#define TB_(x) char *x[] = {
64#define TE_(x) NULL };
65#define S_(x) x,
66#include "common_perm_to_string.h"
67#undef TB_
68#undef TE_
69#undef S_
70
71struct common {
72 char *cname;
73 char **perms;
74};
75struct common common[] = {
76#define TB_(x) { #x, x },
77#define S_(x)
78#define TE_(x)
79#include "common_perm_to_string.h"
80#undef TB_
81#undef TE_
82#undef S_
83};
84
85#define S_(x, y, z) {x, #y},
86struct av_inherit {
87 int class;
88 char *common;
89};
90struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = {
91#include "av_inherit.h"
92};
93#undef S_
94
95#include "av_permissions.h"
96#define S_(x, y, z) {x, y, z},
97struct av_perms {
98 int class;
99 int perm_i;
100 char *perm_s;
101};
102struct av_perms av_perms[] = {
103#include "av_perm_to_string.h"
104};
105#undef S_
106
107int main(int argc, char *argv[])
108{
109 int i, j, mls = 0;
110 char **arg, *polout, *ctxout;
111 int classlist_len, initial_sid_to_string_len;
112 FILE *fout;
113
114 if (argc < 3)
115 usage(argv[0]);
116 arg = argv+1;
117 if (argc==4 && strcmp(argv[1], "-m") == 0) {
118 mls = 1;
119 arg++;
120 }
121 polout = *arg++;
122 ctxout = *arg;
123
124 fout = fopen(polout, "w");
125 if (!fout) {
126 printf("Could not open %s for writing\n", polout);
127 usage(argv[0]);
128 }
129
130 classlist_len = sizeof(classlist) / sizeof(char *);
131 /* print out the classes */
132 for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) {
133 if(classlist[i])
134 fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", classlist[i]);
135 else
136 fprintf(fout, "class user%d\n", i);
137 }
138 fprintf(fout, "\n");
139
140 initial_sid_to_string_len = sizeof(initial_sid_to_string) / sizeof (char *);
141 /* print out the sids */
142 for (i=1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
143 fprintf(fout, "sid %s\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]);
144 fprintf(fout, "\n");
145
146 /* print out the commons */
147 for (i=0; i< sizeof(common)/sizeof(struct common); i++) {
148 char cname[101];
149 find_common_name(common[i].cname, cname, 100);
150 cname[100] = '\0';
151 fprintf(fout, "common %s\n{\n", cname);
152 for (j=0; common[i].perms[j]; j++)
153 fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", common[i].perms[j]);
154 fprintf(fout, "}\n\n");
155 }
156 fprintf(fout, "\n");
157
158 /* print out the class permissions */
159 for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) {
160 if (classlist[i]) {
161 int firstperm = -1, numperms = 0;
162
163 fprintf(fout, "class %s\n", classlist[i]);
164 /* does it inherit from a common? */
165 for (j=0; j < sizeof(av_inherit)/sizeof(struct av_inherit); j++)
166 if (av_inherit[j].class == i)
167 fprintf(fout, "inherits %s\n", av_inherit[j].common);
168
169 for (j=0; j < sizeof(av_perms)/sizeof(struct av_perms); j++) {
170 if (av_perms[j].class == i) {
171 if (firstperm == -1)
172 firstperm = j;
173 numperms++;
174 }
175 }
176 if (!numperms) {
177 fprintf(fout, "\n");
178 continue;
179 }
180
181 fprintf(fout, "{\n");
182 /* print out the av_perms */
183 for (j=0; j < numperms; j++) {
184 fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", av_perms[firstperm+j].perm_s);
185 }
186 fprintf(fout, "}\n\n");
187 }
188 }
189 fprintf(fout, "\n");
190
191 /* NOW PRINT OUT MLS STUFF */
192 if (mls) {
193 printf("MLS not yet implemented\n");
194 exit(1);
195 }
196
197 /* types, roles, and allows */
198 fprintf(fout, "type base_t;\n");
199 fprintf(fout, "role base_r types { base_t };\n");
200 for (i=1; i < classlist_len; i++) {
201 if (classlist[i])
202 fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n", classlist[i]);
203 else
204 fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:user%d *;\n", i);
205 }
206 fprintf(fout, "user user_u roles { base_r };\n");
207 fprintf(fout, "\n");
208
209 /* default sids */
210 for (i=1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
211 fprintf(fout, "sid %s user_u:base_r:base_t\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]);
212 fprintf(fout, "\n");
213
214
215 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
216 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext3 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
217 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
218 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr xfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
219 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr reiserfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
220
221 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task pipefs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
222 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task sockfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
223
224 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans devpts user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
225 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans tmpfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
226 fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans shm user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
227
228 fprintf(fout, "genfscon proc / user_u:base_r:base_t\n");
229
230 fclose(fout);
231
232 fout = fopen(ctxout, "w");
233 if (!fout) {
234 printf("Wrote policy, but cannot open %s for writing\n", ctxout);
235 usage(argv[0]);
236 }
237 fprintf(fout, "/ user_u:base_r:base_t\n");
238 fprintf(fout, "/.* user_u:base_r:base_t\n");
239 fclose(fout);
240
241 return 0;
242}
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 559293922a47..d9f47ce7e207 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@ config SECURITY
51 51
52 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. 52 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
53 53
54config SECURITYFS
55 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
56 help
57 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
58 the TPM bios character driver. It is not used by SELinux or SMACK.
59
60 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
61
54config SECURITY_NETWORK 62config SECURITY_NETWORK
55 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" 63 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
56 depends on SECURITY 64 depends on SECURITY
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index f65426099aa6..c05c127fff9a 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
10obj-y += commoncap.o 10obj-y += commoncap.o
11 11
12# Object file lists 12# Object file lists
13obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o inode.o 13obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o
14obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
14# Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly. 15# Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
15obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o 16obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o
16obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o 17obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e4c4b3fc0c04..399bfdb9e2da 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
541 * yet with increased caps. 541 * yet with increased caps.
542 * So we check for increased caps on the target process. 542 * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
543 */ 543 */
544static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p) 544static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
545{ 545{
546 if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) && 546 if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
547 !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) 547 !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index acc6cf0d7900..ca4958ebad8d 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static int create_by_name(const char *name, mode_t mode,
190 * @name: a pointer to a string containing the name of the file to create. 190 * @name: a pointer to a string containing the name of the file to create.
191 * @mode: the permission that the file should have 191 * @mode: the permission that the file should have
192 * @parent: a pointer to the parent dentry for this file. This should be a 192 * @parent: a pointer to the parent dentry for this file. This should be a
193 * directory dentry if set. If this paramater is NULL, then the 193 * directory dentry if set. If this parameter is %NULL, then the
194 * file will be created in the root of the securityfs filesystem. 194 * file will be created in the root of the securityfs filesystem.
195 * @data: a pointer to something that the caller will want to get to later 195 * @data: a pointer to something that the caller will want to get to later
196 * on. The inode.i_private pointer will point to this value on 196 * on. The inode.i_private pointer will point to this value on
@@ -199,18 +199,18 @@ static int create_by_name(const char *name, mode_t mode,
199 * this file. 199 * this file.
200 * 200 *
201 * This is the basic "create a file" function for securityfs. It allows for a 201 * This is the basic "create a file" function for securityfs. It allows for a
202 * wide range of flexibility in createing a file, or a directory (if you 202 * wide range of flexibility in creating a file, or a directory (if you
203 * want to create a directory, the securityfs_create_dir() function is 203 * want to create a directory, the securityfs_create_dir() function is
204 * recommended to be used instead.) 204 * recommended to be used instead).
205 * 205 *
206 * This function will return a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds. This 206 * This function returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds. This
207 * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is 207 * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is
208 * to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded, 208 * to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded,
209 * you are responsible here.) If an error occurs, NULL will be returned. 209 * you are responsible here). If an error occurs, %NULL is returned.
210 * 210 *
211 * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value -ENODEV will be 211 * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value %-ENODEV is
212 * returned. It is not wise to check for this value, but rather, check for 212 * returned. It is not wise to check for this value, but rather, check for
213 * NULL or !NULL instead as to eliminate the need for #ifdef in the calling 213 * %NULL or !%NULL instead as to eliminate the need for #ifdef in the calling
214 * code. 214 * code.
215 */ 215 */
216struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode, 216struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode,
@@ -252,19 +252,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_file);
252 * @name: a pointer to a string containing the name of the directory to 252 * @name: a pointer to a string containing the name of the directory to
253 * create. 253 * create.
254 * @parent: a pointer to the parent dentry for this file. This should be a 254 * @parent: a pointer to the parent dentry for this file. This should be a
255 * directory dentry if set. If this paramater is NULL, then the 255 * directory dentry if set. If this parameter is %NULL, then the
256 * directory will be created in the root of the securityfs filesystem. 256 * directory will be created in the root of the securityfs filesystem.
257 * 257 *
258 * This function creates a directory in securityfs with the given name. 258 * This function creates a directory in securityfs with the given @name.
259 * 259 *
260 * This function will return a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds. This 260 * This function returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds. This
261 * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is 261 * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is
262 * to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded, 262 * to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded,
263 * you are responsible here.) If an error occurs, NULL will be returned. 263 * you are responsible here). If an error occurs, %NULL will be returned.
264 * 264 *
265 * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value -ENODEV will be 265 * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value %-ENODEV is
266 * returned. It is not wise to check for this value, but rather, check for 266 * returned. It is not wise to check for this value, but rather, check for
267 * NULL or !NULL instead as to eliminate the need for #ifdef in the calling 267 * %NULL or !%NULL instead as to eliminate the need for #ifdef in the calling
268 * code. 268 * code.
269 */ 269 */
270struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent) 270struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
@@ -278,16 +278,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_dir);
278/** 278/**
279 * securityfs_remove - removes a file or directory from the securityfs filesystem 279 * securityfs_remove - removes a file or directory from the securityfs filesystem
280 * 280 *
281 * @dentry: a pointer to a the dentry of the file or directory to be 281 * @dentry: a pointer to a the dentry of the file or directory to be removed.
282 * removed.
283 * 282 *
284 * This function removes a file or directory in securityfs that was previously 283 * This function removes a file or directory in securityfs that was previously
285 * created with a call to another securityfs function (like 284 * created with a call to another securityfs function (like
286 * securityfs_create_file() or variants thereof.) 285 * securityfs_create_file() or variants thereof.)
287 * 286 *
288 * This function is required to be called in order for the file to be 287 * This function is required to be called in order for the file to be
289 * removed, no automatic cleanup of files will happen when a module is 288 * removed. No automatic cleanup of files will happen when a module is
290 * removed, you are responsible here. 289 * removed; you are responsible here.
291 */ 290 */
292void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry) 291void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
293{ 292{
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3a4b4f55b33f..255b08559b2b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
82 * 82 *
83 * Return true if: 83 * Return true if:
84 * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time, 84 * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
85 * -or user didsn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask 85 * -or user didn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask
86 * for registeration permissoin, 86 * for registration permission,
87 * -or the passed LSM is currently loaded. 87 * -or the passed LSM is currently loaded.
88 * Otherwise, return false. 88 * Otherwise, return false.
89 */ 89 */
@@ -101,13 +101,13 @@ int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
101 * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel 101 * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel
102 * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered 102 * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered
103 * 103 *
104 * This function is to allow a security module to register itself with the 104 * This function allows a security module to register itself with the
105 * kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops 105 * kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops
106 * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM 106 * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM
107 * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops). 107 * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops).
108 * 108 *
109 * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel, 109 * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel,
110 * an error will be returned. Otherwise 0 is returned on success. 110 * an error will be returned. Otherwise %0 is returned on success.
111 */ 111 */
112int register_security(struct security_operations *ops) 112int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
113{ 113{
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index a436d1cfa88b..26301dd651d3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -6,9 +6,6 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX
6 help 6 help
7 This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). 7 This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
8 You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem. 8 You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
9 You can obtain the policy compiler (checkpolicy), the utility for
10 labeling filesystems (setfiles), and an example policy configuration
11 from <http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/>.
12 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. 9 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
13 10
14config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM 11config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 114b4b4c97b2..cb30c7e350b3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
136 * @tclass: target security class 136 * @tclass: target security class
137 * @av: access vector 137 * @av: access vector
138 */ 138 */
139static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av) 139void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
140{ 140{
141 const char **common_pts = NULL; 141 const char **common_pts = NULL;
142 u32 common_base = 0; 142 u32 common_base = 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 03fc6a81ae32..4a7374c12d9c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -957,7 +957,8 @@ out_err:
957 return rc; 957 return rc;
958} 958}
959 959
960void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) 960static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
961 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
961{ 962{
962 int i; 963 int i;
963 char *prefix; 964 char *prefix;
@@ -1290,7 +1291,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
1290 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ 1291 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1291 isec->sid = sbsec->sid; 1292 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1292 1293
1293 if (sbsec->proc) { 1294 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1294 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); 1295 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1295 if (proci->pde) { 1296 if (proci->pde) {
1296 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); 1297 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
@@ -3548,38 +3549,44 @@ out:
3548#endif /* IPV6 */ 3549#endif /* IPV6 */
3549 3550
3550static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, 3551static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3551 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto) 3552 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3552{ 3553{
3553 int ret = 0; 3554 char *addrp;
3555 int ret;
3554 3556
3555 switch (ad->u.net.family) { 3557 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3556 case PF_INET: 3558 case PF_INET:
3557 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); 3559 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3558 if (ret || !addrp) 3560 if (ret)
3559 break; 3561 goto parse_error;
3560 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr : 3562 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3561 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr); 3563 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3562 break; 3564 goto okay;
3563 3565
3564#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) 3566#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3565 case PF_INET6: 3567 case PF_INET6:
3566 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); 3568 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3567 if (ret || !addrp) 3569 if (ret)
3568 break; 3570 goto parse_error;
3569 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr : 3571 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3570 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr); 3572 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3571 break; 3573 goto okay;
3572#endif /* IPV6 */ 3574#endif /* IPV6 */
3573 default: 3575 default:
3574 break; 3576 addrp = NULL;
3577 goto okay;
3575 } 3578 }
3576 3579
3577 if (unlikely(ret)) 3580parse_error:
3578 printk(KERN_WARNING 3581 printk(KERN_WARNING
3579 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," 3582 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3580 " unable to parse packet\n"); 3583 " unable to parse packet\n");
3581
3582 return ret; 3584 return ret;
3585
3586okay:
3587 if (_addrp)
3588 *_addrp = addrp;
3589 return 0;
3583} 3590}
3584 3591
3585/** 3592/**
@@ -5219,8 +5226,12 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5219 5226
5220 if (sid == 0) 5227 if (sid == 0)
5221 return -EINVAL; 5228 return -EINVAL;
5222 5229 /*
5223 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ 5230 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5231 * - Single threaded processes.
5232 * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5233 * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5234 */
5224 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) { 5235 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5225 struct task_struct *g, *t; 5236 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5226 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm; 5237 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
@@ -5228,11 +5239,16 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5228 do_each_thread(g, t) { 5239 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5229 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) { 5240 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5230 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); 5241 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5231 return -EPERM; 5242 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5243 if (!error)
5244 goto boundary_ok;
5245
5246 return error;
5232 } 5247 }
5233 } while_each_thread(g, t); 5248 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5234 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); 5249 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5235 } 5250 }
5251boundary_ok:
5236 5252
5237 /* Check permissions for the transition. */ 5253 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5238 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, 5254 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 7b9769f5e775..d12ff1a9c0aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
12#include <linux/kdev_t.h> 12#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
13#include <linux/spinlock.h> 13#include <linux/spinlock.h>
14#include <linux/init.h> 14#include <linux/init.h>
15#include <linux/audit.h>
15#include <linux/in6.h> 16#include <linux/in6.h>
16#include <linux/path.h> 17#include <linux/path.h>
17#include <asm/system.h> 18#include <asm/system.h>
@@ -126,6 +127,9 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
126 u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, 127 u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
127 u16 tclass, u32 perms); 128 u16 tclass, u32 perms);
128 129
130/* Shows permission in human readable form */
131void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av);
132
129/* Exported to selinuxfs */ 133/* Exported to selinuxfs */
130int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page); 134int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
131extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold; 135extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 7c543003d653..72447370bc95 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -27,13 +27,14 @@
27#define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS 21 27#define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS 21
28#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP 22 28#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP 22
29#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE 23 29#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE 23
30#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY 24
30 31
31/* Range of policy versions we understand*/ 32/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
32#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE 33#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
33#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX 34#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
34#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE 35#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
35#else 36#else
36#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE 37#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
37#endif 38#endif
38 39
39#define CONTEXT_MNT 0x01 40#define CONTEXT_MNT 0x01
@@ -62,6 +63,16 @@ enum {
62extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer; 63extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
63extern int selinux_policycap_openperm; 64extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
64 65
66/*
67 * type_datum properties
68 * available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
69 */
70#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY 0x0001
71#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE 0x0002
72
73/* limitation of boundary depth */
74#define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH 4
75
65int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len); 76int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
66 77
67int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap); 78int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
@@ -117,6 +128,8 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
117int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, 128int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
118 u16 tclass); 129 u16 tclass);
119 130
131int security_bounded_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
132
120int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid); 133int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
121 134
122int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, 135int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index a1be97f8beea..1215b8e47dba 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ struct avtab_node *
98avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum) 98avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
99{ 99{
100 int hvalue; 100 int hvalue;
101 struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode; 101 struct avtab_node *prev, *cur;
102 u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD); 102 u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
103 103
104 if (!h || !h->htable) 104 if (!h || !h->htable)
@@ -122,9 +122,7 @@ avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datu
122 key->target_class < cur->key.target_class) 122 key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
123 break; 123 break;
124 } 124 }
125 newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum); 125 return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
126
127 return newnode;
128} 126}
129 127
130struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key) 128struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
@@ -231,7 +229,7 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
231 229
232 for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) { 230 for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
233 cur = h->htable[i]; 231 cur = h->htable[i];
234 while (cur != NULL) { 232 while (cur) {
235 temp = cur; 233 temp = cur;
236 cur = cur->next; 234 cur = cur->next;
237 kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp); 235 kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index fb4efe4f4bc8..4a4e35cac22b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
29 int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH]; 29 int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
30 int sp = -1; 30 int sp = -1;
31 31
32 for (cur = expr; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { 32 for (cur = expr; cur; cur = cur->next) {
33 switch (cur->expr_type) { 33 switch (cur->expr_type) {
34 case COND_BOOL: 34 case COND_BOOL:
35 if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1)) 35 if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
@@ -97,14 +97,14 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
97 if (new_state == -1) 97 if (new_state == -1)
98 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n"); 98 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
99 /* turn the rules on or off */ 99 /* turn the rules on or off */
100 for (cur = node->true_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { 100 for (cur = node->true_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
101 if (new_state <= 0) 101 if (new_state <= 0)
102 cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED; 102 cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
103 else 103 else
104 cur->node->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED; 104 cur->node->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
105 } 105 }
106 106
107 for (cur = node->false_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { 107 for (cur = node->false_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
108 /* -1 or 1 */ 108 /* -1 or 1 */
109 if (new_state) 109 if (new_state)
110 cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED; 110 cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
128static void cond_av_list_destroy(struct cond_av_list *list) 128static void cond_av_list_destroy(struct cond_av_list *list)
129{ 129{
130 struct cond_av_list *cur, *next; 130 struct cond_av_list *cur, *next;
131 for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = next) { 131 for (cur = list; cur; cur = next) {
132 next = cur->next; 132 next = cur->next;
133 /* the avtab_ptr_t node is destroy by the avtab */ 133 /* the avtab_ptr_t node is destroy by the avtab */
134 kfree(cur); 134 kfree(cur);
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
139{ 139{
140 struct cond_expr *cur_expr, *next_expr; 140 struct cond_expr *cur_expr, *next_expr;
141 141
142 for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = next_expr) { 142 for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr; cur_expr = next_expr) {
143 next_expr = cur_expr->next; 143 next_expr = cur_expr->next;
144 kfree(cur_expr); 144 kfree(cur_expr);
145 } 145 }
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static void cond_list_destroy(struct cond_node *list)
155 if (list == NULL) 155 if (list == NULL)
156 return; 156 return;
157 157
158 for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = next) { 158 for (cur = list; cur; cur = next) {
159 next = cur->next; 159 next = cur->next;
160 cond_node_destroy(cur); 160 cond_node_destroy(cur);
161 } 161 }
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
239 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); 239 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
240 if (rc < 0) 240 if (rc < 0)
241 goto err; 241 goto err;
242 key[len] = 0; 242 key[len] = '\0';
243 if (hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum)) 243 if (hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum))
244 goto err; 244 goto err;
245 245
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
291 goto err; 291 goto err;
292 } 292 }
293 found = 0; 293 found = 0;
294 for (cur = other; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { 294 for (cur = other; cur; cur = cur->next) {
295 if (cur->node == node_ptr) { 295 if (cur->node == node_ptr) {
296 found = 1; 296 found = 1;
297 break; 297 break;
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decisi
485 if (!ctab || !key || !avd) 485 if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
486 return; 486 return;
487 487
488 for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node != NULL; 488 for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
489 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) { 489 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
490 if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) == 490 if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
491 (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED))) 491 (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
index 65b9f8366e9c..53ddb013ae57 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct cond_expr {
28#define COND_XOR 5 /* bool ^ bool */ 28#define COND_XOR 5 /* bool ^ bool */
29#define COND_EQ 6 /* bool == bool */ 29#define COND_EQ 6 /* bool == bool */
30#define COND_NEQ 7 /* bool != bool */ 30#define COND_NEQ 7 /* bool != bool */
31#define COND_LAST 8 31#define COND_LAST COND_NEQ
32 __u32 expr_type; 32 __u32 expr_type;
33 __u32 bool; 33 __u32 bool;
34 struct cond_expr *next; 34 struct cond_expr *next;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index ddc275490af8..68c7348d1acc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
109 *catmap = c_iter; 109 *catmap = c_iter;
110 c_iter->startbit = e_iter->startbit & ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1); 110 c_iter->startbit = e_iter->startbit & ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
111 111
112 while (e_iter != NULL) { 112 while (e_iter) {
113 for (i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++) { 113 for (i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++) {
114 unsigned int delta, e_startbit, c_endbit; 114 unsigned int delta, e_startbit, c_endbit;
115 115
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
197 } 197 }
198 } 198 }
199 c_iter = c_iter->next; 199 c_iter = c_iter->next;
200 } while (c_iter != NULL); 200 } while (c_iter);
201 if (e_iter != NULL) 201 if (e_iter != NULL)
202 ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE; 202 ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
203 else 203 else
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 2e7788e13213..933e735bb185 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *key)
81 81
82 hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key); 82 hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
83 cur = h->htable[hvalue]; 83 cur = h->htable[hvalue];
84 while (cur != NULL && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0) 84 while (cur && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0)
85 cur = cur->next; 85 cur = cur->next;
86 86
87 if (cur == NULL || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0)) 87 if (cur == NULL || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0))
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
100 100
101 for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) { 101 for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
102 cur = h->htable[i]; 102 cur = h->htable[i];
103 while (cur != NULL) { 103 while (cur) {
104 temp = cur; 104 temp = cur;
105 cur = cur->next; 105 cur = cur->next;
106 kfree(temp); 106 kfree(temp);
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
127 127
128 for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) { 128 for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
129 cur = h->htable[i]; 129 cur = h->htable[i];
130 while (cur != NULL) { 130 while (cur) {
131 ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args); 131 ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
132 if (ret) 132 if (ret)
133 return ret; 133 return ret;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 77d745da48bb..b5407f16c2a4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
283 p++; 283 p++;
284 284
285 delim = *p; 285 delim = *p;
286 if (delim != 0) 286 if (delim != '\0')
287 *p++ = 0; 287 *p++ = '\0';
288 288
289 for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) { 289 for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
290 levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, scontextp); 290 levdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_levels.table, scontextp);
@@ -302,14 +302,14 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
302 while (*p && *p != ',' && *p != '-') 302 while (*p && *p != ',' && *p != '-')
303 p++; 303 p++;
304 delim = *p; 304 delim = *p;
305 if (delim != 0) 305 if (delim != '\0')
306 *p++ = 0; 306 *p++ = '\0';
307 307
308 /* Separate into range if exists */ 308 /* Separate into range if exists */
309 rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.'); 309 rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.');
310 if (rngptr != NULL) { 310 if (rngptr != NULL) {
311 /* Remove '.' */ 311 /* Remove '.' */
312 *rngptr++ = 0; 312 *rngptr++ = '\0';
313 } 313 }
314 314
315 catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table, 315 catdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_cats.table,
@@ -357,8 +357,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
357 p++; 357 p++;
358 358
359 delim = *p; 359 delim = *p;
360 if (delim != 0) 360 if (delim != '\0')
361 *p++ = 0; 361 *p++ = '\0';
362 } else 362 } else
363 break; 363 break;
364 } 364 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 2391761ae422..72e4a54973aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
30#include <linux/slab.h> 30#include <linux/slab.h>
31#include <linux/string.h> 31#include <linux/string.h>
32#include <linux/errno.h> 32#include <linux/errno.h>
33#include <linux/audit.h>
33#include "security.h" 34#include "security.h"
34 35
35#include "policydb.h" 36#include "policydb.h"
@@ -116,7 +117,12 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
116 .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE, 117 .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
117 .sym_num = SYM_NUM, 118 .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
118 .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, 119 .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
119 } 120 },
121 {
122 .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
123 .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
124 .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
125 },
120}; 126};
121 127
122static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) 128static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -254,7 +260,9 @@ static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
254 260
255 role = datum; 261 role = datum;
256 p = datap; 262 p = datap;
257 if (!role->value || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim) 263 if (!role->value
264 || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim
265 || role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
258 return -EINVAL; 266 return -EINVAL;
259 p->p_role_val_to_name[role->value - 1] = key; 267 p->p_role_val_to_name[role->value - 1] = key;
260 p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role; 268 p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
@@ -270,9 +278,12 @@ static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
270 p = datap; 278 p = datap;
271 279
272 if (typdatum->primary) { 280 if (typdatum->primary) {
273 if (!typdatum->value || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim) 281 if (!typdatum->value
282 || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim
283 || typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
274 return -EINVAL; 284 return -EINVAL;
275 p->p_type_val_to_name[typdatum->value - 1] = key; 285 p->p_type_val_to_name[typdatum->value - 1] = key;
286 p->type_val_to_struct[typdatum->value - 1] = typdatum;
276 } 287 }
277 288
278 return 0; 289 return 0;
@@ -285,7 +296,9 @@ static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
285 296
286 usrdatum = datum; 297 usrdatum = datum;
287 p = datap; 298 p = datap;
288 if (!usrdatum->value || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim) 299 if (!usrdatum->value
300 || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim
301 || usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
289 return -EINVAL; 302 return -EINVAL;
290 p->p_user_val_to_name[usrdatum->value - 1] = key; 303 p->p_user_val_to_name[usrdatum->value - 1] = key;
291 p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum; 304 p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
@@ -438,6 +451,14 @@ static int policydb_index_others(struct policydb *p)
438 goto out; 451 goto out;
439 } 452 }
440 453
454 p->type_val_to_struct =
455 kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim * sizeof(*(p->type_val_to_struct)),
456 GFP_KERNEL);
457 if (!p->type_val_to_struct) {
458 rc = -ENOMEM;
459 goto out;
460 }
461
441 if (cond_init_bool_indexes(p)) { 462 if (cond_init_bool_indexes(p)) {
442 rc = -ENOMEM; 463 rc = -ENOMEM;
443 goto out; 464 goto out;
@@ -625,6 +646,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
625 kfree(p->class_val_to_struct); 646 kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
626 kfree(p->role_val_to_struct); 647 kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
627 kfree(p->user_val_to_struct); 648 kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
649 kfree(p->type_val_to_struct);
628 650
629 avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab); 651 avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
630 652
@@ -932,7 +954,7 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
932 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); 954 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
933 if (rc < 0) 955 if (rc < 0)
934 goto bad; 956 goto bad;
935 key[len] = 0; 957 key[len] = '\0';
936 958
937 rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, perdatum); 959 rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, perdatum);
938 if (rc) 960 if (rc)
@@ -979,7 +1001,7 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
979 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); 1001 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
980 if (rc < 0) 1002 if (rc < 0)
981 goto bad; 1003 goto bad;
982 key[len] = 0; 1004 key[len] = '\0';
983 1005
984 for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { 1006 for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
985 rc = perm_read(p, comdatum->permissions.table, fp); 1007 rc = perm_read(p, comdatum->permissions.table, fp);
@@ -1117,7 +1139,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1117 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); 1139 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
1118 if (rc < 0) 1140 if (rc < 0)
1119 goto bad; 1141 goto bad;
1120 key[len] = 0; 1142 key[len] = '\0';
1121 1143
1122 if (len2) { 1144 if (len2) {
1123 cladatum->comkey = kmalloc(len2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 1145 cladatum->comkey = kmalloc(len2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1128,7 +1150,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1128 rc = next_entry(cladatum->comkey, fp, len2); 1150 rc = next_entry(cladatum->comkey, fp, len2);
1129 if (rc < 0) 1151 if (rc < 0)
1130 goto bad; 1152 goto bad;
1131 cladatum->comkey[len2] = 0; 1153 cladatum->comkey[len2] = '\0';
1132 1154
1133 cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table, 1155 cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table,
1134 cladatum->comkey); 1156 cladatum->comkey);
@@ -1176,8 +1198,8 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1176{ 1198{
1177 char *key = NULL; 1199 char *key = NULL;
1178 struct role_datum *role; 1200 struct role_datum *role;
1179 int rc; 1201 int rc, to_read = 2;
1180 __le32 buf[2]; 1202 __le32 buf[3];
1181 u32 len; 1203 u32 len;
1182 1204
1183 role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL); 1205 role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1186,12 +1208,17 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1186 goto out; 1208 goto out;
1187 } 1209 }
1188 1210
1189 rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); 1211 if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
1212 to_read = 3;
1213
1214 rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
1190 if (rc < 0) 1215 if (rc < 0)
1191 goto bad; 1216 goto bad;
1192 1217
1193 len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); 1218 len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
1194 role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); 1219 role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
1220 if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
1221 role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
1195 1222
1196 key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 1223 key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1197 if (!key) { 1224 if (!key) {
@@ -1201,7 +1228,7 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1201 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); 1228 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
1202 if (rc < 0) 1229 if (rc < 0)
1203 goto bad; 1230 goto bad;
1204 key[len] = 0; 1231 key[len] = '\0';
1205 1232
1206 rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp); 1233 rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp);
1207 if (rc) 1234 if (rc)
@@ -1236,8 +1263,8 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1236{ 1263{
1237 char *key = NULL; 1264 char *key = NULL;
1238 struct type_datum *typdatum; 1265 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1239 int rc; 1266 int rc, to_read = 3;
1240 __le32 buf[3]; 1267 __le32 buf[4];
1241 u32 len; 1268 u32 len;
1242 1269
1243 typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL); 1270 typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1246,13 +1273,27 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1246 return rc; 1273 return rc;
1247 } 1274 }
1248 1275
1249 rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); 1276 if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
1277 to_read = 4;
1278
1279 rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
1250 if (rc < 0) 1280 if (rc < 0)
1251 goto bad; 1281 goto bad;
1252 1282
1253 len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); 1283 len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
1254 typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); 1284 typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
1255 typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]); 1285 if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
1286 u32 prop = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
1287
1288 if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY)
1289 typdatum->primary = 1;
1290 if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE)
1291 typdatum->attribute = 1;
1292
1293 typdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
1294 } else {
1295 typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
1296 }
1256 1297
1257 key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 1298 key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1258 if (!key) { 1299 if (!key) {
@@ -1262,7 +1303,7 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1262 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); 1303 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
1263 if (rc < 0) 1304 if (rc < 0)
1264 goto bad; 1305 goto bad;
1265 key[len] = 0; 1306 key[len] = '\0';
1266 1307
1267 rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, typdatum); 1308 rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, typdatum);
1268 if (rc) 1309 if (rc)
@@ -1309,8 +1350,8 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1309{ 1350{
1310 char *key = NULL; 1351 char *key = NULL;
1311 struct user_datum *usrdatum; 1352 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1312 int rc; 1353 int rc, to_read = 2;
1313 __le32 buf[2]; 1354 __le32 buf[3];
1314 u32 len; 1355 u32 len;
1315 1356
1316 usrdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL); 1357 usrdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1319,12 +1360,17 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1319 goto out; 1360 goto out;
1320 } 1361 }
1321 1362
1322 rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); 1363 if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
1364 to_read = 3;
1365
1366 rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
1323 if (rc < 0) 1367 if (rc < 0)
1324 goto bad; 1368 goto bad;
1325 1369
1326 len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); 1370 len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
1327 usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); 1371 usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
1372 if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
1373 usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
1328 1374
1329 key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 1375 key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1330 if (!key) { 1376 if (!key) {
@@ -1334,7 +1380,7 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1334 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); 1380 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
1335 if (rc < 0) 1381 if (rc < 0)
1336 goto bad; 1382 goto bad;
1337 key[len] = 0; 1383 key[len] = '\0';
1338 1384
1339 rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp); 1385 rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
1340 if (rc) 1386 if (rc)
@@ -1388,7 +1434,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1388 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); 1434 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
1389 if (rc < 0) 1435 if (rc < 0)
1390 goto bad; 1436 goto bad;
1391 key[len] = 0; 1437 key[len] = '\0';
1392 1438
1393 levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mls_level), GFP_ATOMIC); 1439 levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mls_level), GFP_ATOMIC);
1394 if (!levdatum->level) { 1440 if (!levdatum->level) {
@@ -1440,7 +1486,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1440 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); 1486 rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
1441 if (rc < 0) 1487 if (rc < 0)
1442 goto bad; 1488 goto bad;
1443 key[len] = 0; 1489 key[len] = '\0';
1444 1490
1445 rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, catdatum); 1491 rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, catdatum);
1446 if (rc) 1492 if (rc)
@@ -1465,6 +1511,133 @@ static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
1465 cat_read, 1511 cat_read,
1466}; 1512};
1467 1513
1514static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
1515{
1516 struct user_datum *upper, *user;
1517 struct policydb *p = datap;
1518 int depth = 0;
1519
1520 upper = user = datum;
1521 while (upper->bounds) {
1522 struct ebitmap_node *node;
1523 unsigned long bit;
1524
1525 if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
1526 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: user %s: "
1527 "too deep or looped boundary",
1528 (char *) key);
1529 return -EINVAL;
1530 }
1531
1532 upper = p->user_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
1533 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, node, bit) {
1534 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit))
1535 continue;
1536
1537 printk(KERN_ERR
1538 "SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
1539 "user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n",
1540 p->p_user_val_to_name[user->value - 1],
1541 p->p_role_val_to_name[bit],
1542 p->p_user_val_to_name[upper->value - 1]);
1543
1544 return -EINVAL;
1545 }
1546 }
1547
1548 return 0;
1549}
1550
1551static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
1552{
1553 struct role_datum *upper, *role;
1554 struct policydb *p = datap;
1555 int depth = 0;
1556
1557 upper = role = datum;
1558 while (upper->bounds) {
1559 struct ebitmap_node *node;
1560 unsigned long bit;
1561
1562 if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
1563 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: role %s: "
1564 "too deep or looped bounds\n",
1565 (char *) key);
1566 return -EINVAL;
1567 }
1568
1569 upper = p->role_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
1570 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, node, bit) {
1571 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit))
1572 continue;
1573
1574 printk(KERN_ERR
1575 "SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
1576 "role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n",
1577 p->p_role_val_to_name[role->value - 1],
1578 p->p_type_val_to_name[bit],
1579 p->p_role_val_to_name[upper->value - 1]);
1580
1581 return -EINVAL;
1582 }
1583 }
1584
1585 return 0;
1586}
1587
1588static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
1589{
1590 struct type_datum *upper, *type;
1591 struct policydb *p = datap;
1592 int depth = 0;
1593
1594 upper = type = datum;
1595 while (upper->bounds) {
1596 if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
1597 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: "
1598 "too deep or looped boundary\n",
1599 (char *) key);
1600 return -EINVAL;
1601 }
1602
1603 upper = p->type_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
1604 if (upper->attribute) {
1605 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: "
1606 "bounded by attribute %s",
1607 (char *) key,
1608 p->p_type_val_to_name[upper->value - 1]);
1609 return -EINVAL;
1610 }
1611 }
1612
1613 return 0;
1614}
1615
1616static int policydb_bounds_sanity_check(struct policydb *p)
1617{
1618 int rc;
1619
1620 if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
1621 return 0;
1622
1623 rc = hashtab_map(p->p_users.table,
1624 user_bounds_sanity_check, p);
1625 if (rc)
1626 return rc;
1627
1628 rc = hashtab_map(p->p_roles.table,
1629 role_bounds_sanity_check, p);
1630 if (rc)
1631 return rc;
1632
1633 rc = hashtab_map(p->p_types.table,
1634 type_bounds_sanity_check, p);
1635 if (rc)
1636 return rc;
1637
1638 return 0;
1639}
1640
1468extern int ss_initialized; 1641extern int ss_initialized;
1469 1642
1470/* 1643/*
@@ -1523,7 +1696,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
1523 kfree(policydb_str); 1696 kfree(policydb_str);
1524 goto bad; 1697 goto bad;
1525 } 1698 }
1526 policydb_str[len] = 0; 1699 policydb_str[len] = '\0';
1527 if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) { 1700 if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
1528 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string %s does not match " 1701 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string %s does not match "
1529 "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING); 1702 "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
@@ -1961,6 +2134,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
1961 goto bad; 2134 goto bad;
1962 } 2135 }
1963 2136
2137 rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p);
2138 if (rc)
2139 goto bad;
2140
1964 rc = 0; 2141 rc = 0;
1965out: 2142out:
1966 return rc; 2143 return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 4253370fda6a..55152d498b53 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct class_datum {
61/* Role attributes */ 61/* Role attributes */
62struct role_datum { 62struct role_datum {
63 u32 value; /* internal role value */ 63 u32 value; /* internal role value */
64 u32 bounds; /* boundary of role */
64 struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */ 65 struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
65 struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */ 66 struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
66}; 67};
@@ -81,12 +82,15 @@ struct role_allow {
81/* Type attributes */ 82/* Type attributes */
82struct type_datum { 83struct type_datum {
83 u32 value; /* internal type value */ 84 u32 value; /* internal type value */
85 u32 bounds; /* boundary of type */
84 unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */ 86 unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
87 unsigned char attribute;/* attribute ?*/
85}; 88};
86 89
87/* User attributes */ 90/* User attributes */
88struct user_datum { 91struct user_datum {
89 u32 value; /* internal user value */ 92 u32 value; /* internal user value */
93 u32 bounds; /* bounds of user */
90 struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */ 94 struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
91 struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */ 95 struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
92 struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */ 96 struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
@@ -209,6 +213,7 @@ struct policydb {
209 struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct; 213 struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
210 struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct; 214 struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
211 struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct; 215 struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
216 struct type_datum **type_val_to_struct;
212 217
213 /* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */ 218 /* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
214 struct avtab te_avtab; 219 struct avtab te_avtab;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8551952ef329..ab0cc0c7b944 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ static u32 latest_granting;
88static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, 88static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
89 u32 *scontext_len); 89 u32 *scontext_len);
90 90
91static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
92 struct context *tcontext,
93 u16 tclass,
94 u32 requested,
95 struct av_decision *avd);
91/* 96/*
92 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression 97 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
93 * when it is applied to the specified source and target 98 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
@@ -274,6 +279,100 @@ mls_ops:
274} 279}
275 280
276/* 281/*
282 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
283 * on boundary constraint.
284 */
285static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
286 struct context *tcontext,
287 u16 tclass,
288 u32 requested,
289 struct av_decision *avd)
290{
291 struct context lo_scontext;
292 struct context lo_tcontext;
293 struct av_decision lo_avd;
294 struct type_datum *source
295 = policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
296 struct type_datum *target
297 = policydb.type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
298 u32 masked = 0;
299
300 if (source->bounds) {
301 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
302
303 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
304 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
305
306 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
307 tcontext,
308 tclass,
309 requested,
310 &lo_avd);
311 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
312 return; /* no masked permission */
313 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
314 }
315
316 if (target->bounds) {
317 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
318
319 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
320 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
321
322 context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
323 &lo_tcontext,
324 tclass,
325 requested,
326 &lo_avd);
327 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
328 return; /* no masked permission */
329 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
330 }
331
332 if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
333 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
334 /*
335 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
336 * set up.
337 */
338
339 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
340 &lo_tcontext,
341 tclass,
342 requested,
343 &lo_avd);
344 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
345 return; /* no masked permission */
346 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
347 }
348
349 if (masked) {
350 struct audit_buffer *ab;
351 char *stype_name
352 = policydb.p_type_val_to_name[source->value - 1];
353 char *ttype_name
354 = policydb.p_type_val_to_name[target->value - 1];
355 char *tclass_name
356 = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
357
358 /* mask violated permissions */
359 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
360
361 /* notice to userspace via audit message */
362 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
363 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
364 if (!ab)
365 return;
366
367 audit_log_format(ab, "av boundary violation: "
368 "source=%s target=%s tclass=%s",
369 stype_name, ttype_name, tclass_name);
370 avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, masked);
371 audit_log_end(ab);
372 }
373}
374
375/*
277 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for 376 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
278 * the permissions in a particular class. 377 * the permissions in a particular class.
279 */ 378 */
@@ -356,7 +455,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
356 avkey.source_type = i + 1; 455 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
357 avkey.target_type = j + 1; 456 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
358 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey); 457 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
359 node != NULL; 458 node;
360 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) { 459 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
361 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED) 460 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
362 avd->allowed |= node->datum.data; 461 avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
@@ -404,6 +503,14 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
404 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION); 503 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
405 } 504 }
406 505
506 /*
507 * If the given source and target types have boundary
508 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
509 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
510 */
511 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
512 tclass, requested, avd);
513
407 return 0; 514 return 0;
408 515
409inval_class: 516inval_class:
@@ -549,6 +656,69 @@ out:
549 return rc; 656 return rc;
550} 657}
551 658
659/*
660 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
661 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
662 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
663 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
664 *
665 * @oldsid : current security identifier
666 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
667 */
668int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
669{
670 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
671 struct type_datum *type;
672 int index;
673 int rc = -EINVAL;
674
675 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
676
677 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
678 if (!old_context) {
679 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
680 __func__, old_sid);
681 goto out;
682 }
683
684 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
685 if (!new_context) {
686 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
687 __func__, new_sid);
688 goto out;
689 }
690
691 /* type/domain unchaned */
692 if (old_context->type == new_context->type) {
693 rc = 0;
694 goto out;
695 }
696
697 index = new_context->type;
698 while (true) {
699 type = policydb.type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
700 BUG_ON(!type);
701
702 /* not bounded anymore */
703 if (!type->bounds) {
704 rc = -EPERM;
705 break;
706 }
707
708 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
709 if (type->bounds == old_context->type) {
710 rc = 0;
711 break;
712 }
713 index = type->bounds;
714 }
715out:
716 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
717
718 return rc;
719}
720
721
552/** 722/**
553 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions. 723 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
554 * @ssid: source security identifier 724 * @ssid: source security identifier
@@ -794,7 +964,7 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
794 *p++ = 0; 964 *p++ = 0;
795 965
796 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp); 966 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
797 if (!typdatum) 967 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
798 goto out; 968 goto out;
799 969
800 ctx->type = typdatum->value; 970 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
@@ -1037,7 +1207,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1037 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */ 1207 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1038 if (!avdatum) { 1208 if (!avdatum) {
1039 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey); 1209 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1040 for (; node != NULL; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) { 1210 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1041 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) { 1211 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1042 avdatum = &node->datum; 1212 avdatum = &node->datum;
1043 break; 1213 break;
@@ -2050,7 +2220,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2050 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0; 2220 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2051 } 2221 }
2052 2222
2053 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { 2223 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2054 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur); 2224 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2055 if (rc) 2225 if (rc)
2056 goto out; 2226 goto out;
@@ -2102,7 +2272,7 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2102 if (booldatum) 2272 if (booldatum)
2103 booldatum->state = bvalues[i]; 2273 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2104 } 2274 }
2105 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { 2275 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2106 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur); 2276 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2107 if (rc) 2277 if (rc)
2108 goto out; 2278 goto out;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index a81ded104129..e817989764cd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
43 hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid); 43 hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
44 prev = NULL; 44 prev = NULL;
45 cur = s->htable[hvalue]; 45 cur = s->htable[hvalue];
46 while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid) { 46 while (cur && sid > cur->sid) {
47 prev = cur; 47 prev = cur;
48 cur = cur->next; 48 cur = cur->next;
49 } 49 }
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
92 92
93 hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid); 93 hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
94 cur = s->htable[hvalue]; 94 cur = s->htable[hvalue];
95 while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid) 95 while (cur && sid > cur->sid)
96 cur = cur->next; 96 cur = cur->next;
97 97
98 if (force && cur && sid == cur->sid && cur->context.len) 98 if (force && cur && sid == cur->sid && cur->context.len)
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
103 sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; 103 sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
104 hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid); 104 hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
105 cur = s->htable[hvalue]; 105 cur = s->htable[hvalue];
106 while (cur != NULL && sid > cur->sid) 106 while (cur && sid > cur->sid)
107 cur = cur->next; 107 cur = cur->next;
108 if (!cur || sid != cur->sid) 108 if (!cur || sid != cur->sid)
109 return NULL; 109 return NULL;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
136 136
137 for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) { 137 for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
138 cur = s->htable[i]; 138 cur = s->htable[i];
139 while (cur != NULL) { 139 while (cur) {
140 rc = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args); 140 rc = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
141 if (rc) 141 if (rc)
142 goto out; 142 goto out;
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
155 155
156 for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) { 156 for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
157 cur = s->htable[i]; 157 cur = s->htable[i];
158 while (cur != NULL) { 158 while (cur) {
159 if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context)) 159 if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context))
160 return cur->sid; 160 return cur->sid;
161 cur = cur->next; 161 cur = cur->next;
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
242 242
243 for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) { 243 for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
244 cur = s->htable[i]; 244 cur = s->htable[i];
245 while (cur != NULL) { 245 while (cur) {
246 temp = cur; 246 temp = cur;
247 cur = cur->next; 247 cur = cur->next;
248 context_destroy(&temp->context); 248 context_destroy(&temp->context);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 4a4477f5afdc..31dce559595a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
178extern int smack_cipso_direct; 178extern int smack_cipso_direct;
179extern int smack_net_nltype; 179extern int smack_net_nltype;
180extern char *smack_net_ambient; 180extern char *smack_net_ambient;
181extern char *smack_onlycap;
181 182
182extern struct smack_known *smack_known; 183extern struct smack_known *smack_known;
183extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor; 184extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index f6b5f6eed6dd..79ff21ed4c3b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
157 * 157 *
158 * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair 158 * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
159 * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted, 159 * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
160 * non zero otherwise. It allows that current my have the capability 160 * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
161 * to override the rules. 161 * to override the rules.
162 */ 162 */
163int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode) 163int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
@@ -168,6 +168,14 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
168 if (rc == 0) 168 if (rc == 0)
169 return 0; 169 return 0;
170 170
171 /*
172 * Return if a specific label has been designated as the
173 * only one that gets privilege and current does not
174 * have that label.
175 */
176 if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->security)
177 return rc;
178
171 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) 179 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
172 return 0; 180 return 0;
173 181
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 271a835fbbe3..e7c642458ec9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
39 SMK_DIRECT = 6, /* CIPSO level indicating direct label */ 39 SMK_DIRECT = 6, /* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
40 SMK_AMBIENT = 7, /* internet ambient label */ 40 SMK_AMBIENT = 7, /* internet ambient label */
41 SMK_NLTYPE = 8, /* label scheme to use by default */ 41 SMK_NLTYPE = 8, /* label scheme to use by default */
42 SMK_ONLYCAP = 9, /* the only "capable" label */
42}; 43};
43 44
44/* 45/*
@@ -68,6 +69,16 @@ int smack_net_nltype = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
68 */ 69 */
69int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT; 70int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
70 71
72/*
73 * Unless a process is running with this label even
74 * having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
75 * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no label is
76 * designated (the NULL case) capabilities apply to
77 * everyone. It is expected that the hat (^) label
78 * will be used if any label is used.
79 */
80char *smack_onlycap;
81
71static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT; 82static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
72struct smk_list_entry *smack_list; 83struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
73 84
@@ -787,6 +798,85 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = {
787 .write = smk_write_ambient, 798 .write = smk_write_ambient,
788}; 799};
789 800
801/**
802 * smk_read_onlycap - read() for /smack/onlycap
803 * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
804 * @buf: where to put the result
805 * @cn: maximum to send along
806 * @ppos: where to start
807 *
808 * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
809 */
810static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
811 size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
812{
813 char *smack = "";
814 ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
815 int asize;
816
817 if (*ppos != 0)
818 return 0;
819
820 if (smack_onlycap != NULL)
821 smack = smack_onlycap;
822
823 asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
824
825 if (cn >= asize)
826 rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
827
828 return rc;
829}
830
831/**
832 * smk_write_onlycap - write() for /smack/onlycap
833 * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
834 * @buf: where to get the data from
835 * @count: bytes sent
836 * @ppos: where to start
837 *
838 * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
839 */
840static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
841 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
842{
843 char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
844 char *sp = current->security;
845
846 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
847 return -EPERM;
848
849 /*
850 * This can be done using smk_access() but is done
851 * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
852 * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
853 */
854 if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
855 return -EPERM;
856
857 if (count >= SMK_LABELLEN)
858 return -EINVAL;
859
860 if (copy_from_user(in, buf, count) != 0)
861 return -EFAULT;
862
863 /*
864 * Should the null string be passed in unset the onlycap value.
865 * This seems like something to be careful with as usually
866 * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It
867 * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be
868 * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here.
869 */
870 smack_onlycap = smk_import(in, count);
871
872 return count;
873}
874
875static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
876 .read = smk_read_onlycap,
877 .write = smk_write_onlycap,
878};
879
790struct option_names { 880struct option_names {
791 int o_number; 881 int o_number;
792 char *o_name; 882 char *o_name;
@@ -919,6 +1009,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
919 {"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, 1009 {"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
920 [SMK_NLTYPE] = 1010 [SMK_NLTYPE] =
921 {"nltype", &smk_nltype_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, 1011 {"nltype", &smk_nltype_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
1012 [SMK_ONLYCAP] =
1013 {"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
922 /* last one */ {""} 1014 /* last one */ {""}
923 }; 1015 };
924 1016
generated by cgit v1.2.2 (git 2.25.0) at 2024-11-16 08:50:11 -0500