7 files changed, 209 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h
index 650318b0c405..29c7727ff0e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ enum nf_ip_hook_priorities {
         NF_IP_PRI_MANGLE = -150,
         NF_IP_PRI_NAT_DST = -100,
         NF_IP_PRI_FILTER = 0,
+        NF_IP_PRI_SECURITY = 50,
         NF_IP_PRI_NAT_SRC = 100,
         NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST = 225,
         NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK_CONFIRM = INT_MAX,
diff --git a/include/net/netns/ipv4.h b/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
index 34ee348a2cf2..6ef90b5fafb3 100644
--- a/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
+++ b/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct netns_ipv4 {
         struct xt_table         *iptable_mangle;
         struct xt_table         *iptable_raw;
         struct xt_table         *arptable_filter;
+        struct xt_table         *iptable_security;
 #endif
 
         int sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig
index 2767841a8cef..6e251402506e 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig
@@ -365,6 +365,18 @@ config IP_NF_RAW
           If you want to compile it as a module, say M here and read
           <file:Documentation/kbuild/modules.txt>.  If unsure, say `N'.
 
+# security table for MAC policy
+config IP_NF_SECURITY
+        tristate "Security table"
+        depends on IP_NF_IPTABLES
+        depends on SECURITY
+        default m if NETFILTER_ADVANCED=n
+        help
+          This option adds a `security' table to iptables, for use
+          with Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policy.
+         
+          If unsure, say N.
+
 # ARP tables
 config IP_NF_ARPTABLES
         tristate "ARP tables support"
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile
index d9b92fbf5579..3f31291f37ce 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER) += iptable_filter.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MANGLE) += iptable_mangle.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NF_NAT) += iptable_nat.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_RAW) += iptable_raw.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_SECURITY) += iptable_security.o
 
 # matches
 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE) += ipt_addrtype.o
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_security.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_security.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2b472ac2263a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_security.c
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/*
+ * "security" table
+ *
+ * This is for use by Mandatory Access Control (MAC) security models,
+ * which need to be able to manage security policy in separate context
+ * to DAC.
+ *
+ * Based on iptable_mangle.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1999 Paul `Rusty' Russell & Michael J. Neuling
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Netfilter Core Team <coreteam <at> netfilter.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris <at> redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("James Morris <jmorris <at> redhat.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("iptables security table, for MAC rules");
+
+#define SECURITY_VALID_HOOKS    (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) | \
+                                (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD) | \
+                                (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT)
+
+static struct
+{
+        struct ipt_replace repl;
+        struct ipt_standard entries[3];
+        struct ipt_error term;
+} initial_table __initdata = {
+        .repl = {
+                .name = "security",
+                .valid_hooks = SECURITY_VALID_HOOKS,
+                .num_entries = 4,
+                .size = sizeof(struct ipt_standard) * 3 + sizeof(struct ipt_error),
+                .hook_entry = {
+                        [NF_INET_LOCAL_IN]      = 0,
+                        [NF_INET_FORWARD]       = sizeof(struct ipt_standard),
+                        [NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT]     = sizeof(struct ipt_standard) * 2,
+                },
+                .underflow = {
+                        [NF_INET_LOCAL_IN]      = 0,
+                        [NF_INET_FORWARD]       = sizeof(struct ipt_standard),
+                        [NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT]     = sizeof(struct ipt_standard) * 2,
+                },
+        },
+        .entries = {
+                IPT_STANDARD_INIT(NF_ACCEPT),   /* LOCAL_IN */
+                IPT_STANDARD_INIT(NF_ACCEPT),   /* FORWARD */
+                IPT_STANDARD_INIT(NF_ACCEPT),   /* LOCAL_OUT */
+        },
+        .term = IPT_ERROR_INIT,                 /* ERROR */
+};
+
+static struct xt_table security_table = {
+        .name           = "security",
+        .valid_hooks    = SECURITY_VALID_HOOKS,
+        .lock           = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(security_table.lock),
+        .me             = THIS_MODULE,
+        .af             = AF_INET,
+};
+
+static unsigned int
+ipt_local_in_hook(unsigned int hook,
+                  struct sk_buff *skb,
+                  const struct net_device *in,
+                  const struct net_device *out,
+                  int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+        return ipt_do_table(skb, hook, in, out,
+                            nf_local_in_net(in, out)->ipv4.iptable_security);
+}
+
+static unsigned int
+ipt_forward_hook(unsigned int hook,
+                 struct sk_buff *skb,
+                 const struct net_device *in,
+                 const struct net_device *out,
+                 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+        return ipt_do_table(skb, hook, in, out,
+                            nf_forward_net(in, out)->ipv4.iptable_security);
+}
+
+static unsigned int
+ipt_local_out_hook(unsigned int hook,
+                   struct sk_buff *skb,
+                   const struct net_device *in,
+                   const struct net_device *out,
+                   int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+        /* Somebody is playing with raw sockets. */
+        if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr)
+            || ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) {
+                if (net_ratelimit())
+                        printk(KERN_INFO "iptable_security: ignoring short "
+                               "SOCK_RAW packet.\n");
+                return NF_ACCEPT;
+        }
+        return ipt_do_table(skb, hook, in, out,
+                            nf_local_out_net(in, out)->ipv4.iptable_security);
+}
+
+static struct nf_hook_ops ipt_ops[] __read_mostly = {
+        {
+                .hook           = ipt_local_in_hook,
+                .owner          = THIS_MODULE,
+                .pf             = PF_INET,
+                .hooknum        = NF_INET_LOCAL_IN,
+                .priority       = NF_IP_PRI_SECURITY,
+        },
+        {
+                .hook           = ipt_forward_hook,
+                .owner          = THIS_MODULE,
+                .pf             = PF_INET,
+                .hooknum        = NF_INET_FORWARD,
+                .priority       = NF_IP_PRI_SECURITY,
+        },
+        {
+                .hook           = ipt_local_out_hook,
+                .owner          = THIS_MODULE,
+                .pf             = PF_INET,
+                .hooknum        = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+                .priority       = NF_IP_PRI_SECURITY,
+        },
+};
+
+static int __net_init iptable_security_net_init(struct net *net)
+{
+        net->ipv4.iptable_security =
+                ipt_register_table(net, &security_table, &initial_table.repl);
+
+        if (IS_ERR(net->ipv4.iptable_security))
+                return PTR_ERR(net->ipv4.iptable_security);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static void __net_exit iptable_security_net_exit(struct net *net)
+{
+        ipt_unregister_table(net->ipv4.iptable_security);
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations iptable_security_net_ops = {
+        .init = iptable_security_net_init,
+        .exit = iptable_security_net_exit,
+};
+
+static int __init iptable_security_init(void)
+{
+        int ret;
+
+        ret = register_pernet_subsys(&iptable_security_net_ops);
+        if (ret < 0)
+                return ret;
+
+        ret = nf_register_hooks(ipt_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(ipt_ops));
+        if (ret < 0)
+                goto cleanup_table;
+
+        return ret;
+
+cleanup_table:
+        unregister_pernet_subsys(&iptable_security_net_ops);
+        return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit iptable_security_fini(void)
+{
+        nf_unregister_hooks(ipt_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(ipt_ops));
+        unregister_pernet_subsys(&iptable_security_net_ops);
+}
+
+module_init(iptable_security_init);
+module_exit(iptable_security_fini);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_CONNSECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_CONNSECMARK.c
index 211189eb2b67..76ca1f2421eb 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_CONNSECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_CONNSECMARK.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  *   Copyright (C) 2002,2004 MARA Systems AB <http://www.marasystems.com>
  *    by Henrik Nordstrom <hno@marasystems.com>
  *
- * (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * (C) 2006,2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
@@ -94,6 +94,12 @@ connsecmark_tg_check(const char *tablename, const void *entry,
 {
         const struct xt_connsecmark_target_info *info = targinfo;
 
+        if (strcmp(tablename, "mangle") && strcmp(tablename, "security")) {
+                printk(KERN_INFO PFX "target only valid in the \'mangle\' "
+                       "or \'security\' tables, not \'%s\'.\n", tablename);
+                return false;
+        }
+
         switch (info->mode) {
         case CONNSECMARK_SAVE:
         case CONNSECMARK_RESTORE:
@@ -126,7 +132,6 @@ static struct xt_target connsecmark_tg_reg[] __read_mostly = {
                 .destroy        = connsecmark_tg_destroy,
                 .target         = connsecmark_tg,
                 .targetsize     = sizeof(struct xt_connsecmark_target_info),
-                .table          = "mangle",
                 .me             = THIS_MODULE,
         },
         {
@@ -136,7 +141,6 @@ static struct xt_target connsecmark_tg_reg[] __read_mostly = {
                 .destroy        = connsecmark_tg_destroy,
                 .target         = connsecmark_tg,
                 .targetsize     = sizeof(struct xt_connsecmark_target_info),
-                .table          = "mangle",
                 .me             = THIS_MODULE,
         },
 };
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index c0284856ccd4..94f87ee7552b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * Based on the nfmark match by:
  * (C) 1999-2001 Marc Boucher <marc@mbsi.ca>
  *
- * (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * (C) 2006,2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ secmark_tg_check(const char *tablename, const void *entry,
 {
         struct xt_secmark_target_info *info = targinfo;
 
+        if (strcmp(tablename, "mangle") && strcmp(tablename, "security")) {
+                printk(KERN_INFO PFX "target only valid in the \'mangle\' "
+                       "or \'security\' tables, not \'%s\'.\n", tablename);
+                return false;
+        }
+
         if (mode && mode != info->mode) {
                 printk(KERN_INFO PFX "mode already set to %hu cannot mix with "
                        "rules for mode %hu\n", mode, info->mode);
@@ -127,7 +133,6 @@ static struct xt_target secmark_tg_reg[] __read_mostly = {
                 .destroy        = secmark_tg_destroy,
                 .target         = secmark_tg,
                 .targetsize     = sizeof(struct xt_secmark_target_info),
-                .table          = "mangle",
                 .me             = THIS_MODULE,
         },
         {
@@ -137,7 +142,6 @@ static struct xt_target secmark_tg_reg[] __read_mostly = {
                 .destroy        = secmark_tg_destroy,
                 .target         = secmark_tg,
                 .targetsize     = sizeof(struct xt_secmark_target_info),
-                .table          = "mangle",
                 .me             = THIS_MODULE,
         },
 };