diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | init/Kconfig | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/module_signing.c | 222 |
2 files changed, 229 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 00d45799dee1..abc6e63f2fb8 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig | |||
| @@ -1588,6 +1588,14 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL | |||
| 1588 | config MODULE_SIG | 1588 | config MODULE_SIG |
| 1589 | bool "Module signature verification" | 1589 | bool "Module signature verification" |
| 1590 | depends on MODULES | 1590 | depends on MODULES |
| 1591 | select KEYS | ||
| 1592 | select CRYPTO | ||
| 1593 | select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE | ||
| 1594 | select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE | ||
| 1595 | select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA | ||
| 1596 | select ASN1 | ||
| 1597 | select OID_REGISTRY | ||
| 1598 | select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER | ||
| 1591 | help | 1599 | help |
| 1592 | Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature | 1600 | Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature |
| 1593 | is simply appended to the module. For more information see | 1601 | is simply appended to the module. For more information see |
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index 499728aecafb..6b09f6983ac0 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c | |||
| @@ -11,13 +11,233 @@ | |||
| 11 | 11 | ||
| 12 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | 12 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| 13 | #include <linux/err.h> | 13 | #include <linux/err.h> |
| 14 | #include <crypto/public_key.h> | ||
| 15 | #include <crypto/hash.h> | ||
| 16 | #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> | ||
| 14 | #include "module-internal.h" | 17 | #include "module-internal.h" |
| 15 | 18 | ||
| 16 | /* | 19 | /* |
| 20 | * Module signature information block. | ||
| 21 | * | ||
| 22 | * The constituents of the signature section are, in order: | ||
| 23 | * | ||
| 24 | * - Signer's name | ||
| 25 | * - Key identifier | ||
| 26 | * - Signature data | ||
| 27 | * - Information block | ||
| 28 | */ | ||
| 29 | struct module_signature { | ||
| 30 | enum pkey_algo algo : 8; /* Public-key crypto algorithm */ | ||
| 31 | enum pkey_hash_algo hash : 8; /* Digest algorithm */ | ||
| 32 | enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8; /* Key identifier type */ | ||
| 33 | u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name */ | ||
| 34 | u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier */ | ||
| 35 | u8 __pad[3]; | ||
| 36 | __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */ | ||
| 37 | }; | ||
| 38 | |||
| 39 | /* | ||
| 40 | * Digest the module contents. | ||
| 41 | */ | ||
| 42 | static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash, | ||
| 43 | const void *mod, | ||
| 44 | unsigned long modlen) | ||
| 45 | { | ||
| 46 | struct public_key_signature *pks; | ||
| 47 | struct crypto_shash *tfm; | ||
| 48 | struct shash_desc *desc; | ||
| 49 | size_t digest_size, desc_size; | ||
| 50 | int ret; | ||
| 51 | |||
| 52 | pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); | ||
| 53 | |||
| 54 | /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how | ||
| 55 | * big the hash operational data will be. | ||
| 56 | */ | ||
| 57 | tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash], 0, 0); | ||
| 58 | if (IS_ERR(tfm)) | ||
| 59 | return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm); | ||
| 60 | |||
| 61 | desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); | ||
| 62 | digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); | ||
| 63 | |||
| 64 | /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our | ||
| 65 | * context data and the digest output buffer on the end of that. | ||
| 66 | */ | ||
| 67 | ret = -ENOMEM; | ||
| 68 | pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); | ||
| 69 | if (!pks) | ||
| 70 | goto error_no_pks; | ||
| 71 | |||
| 72 | pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash; | ||
| 73 | pks->digest = (u8 *)pks + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size; | ||
| 74 | pks->digest_size = digest_size; | ||
| 75 | |||
| 76 | desc = (void *)pks + sizeof(*pks); | ||
| 77 | desc->tfm = tfm; | ||
| 78 | desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; | ||
| 79 | |||
| 80 | ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); | ||
| 81 | if (ret < 0) | ||
| 82 | goto error; | ||
| 83 | |||
| 84 | ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, modlen, pks->digest); | ||
| 85 | if (ret < 0) | ||
| 86 | goto error; | ||
| 87 | |||
| 88 | crypto_free_shash(tfm); | ||
| 89 | pr_devel("<==%s() = ok\n", __func__); | ||
| 90 | return pks; | ||
| 91 | |||
| 92 | error: | ||
| 93 | kfree(pks); | ||
| 94 | error_no_pks: | ||
| 95 | crypto_free_shash(tfm); | ||
| 96 | pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); | ||
| 97 | return ERR_PTR(ret); | ||
| 98 | } | ||
| 99 | |||
| 100 | /* | ||
| 101 | * Extract an MPI array from the signature data. This represents the actual | ||
| 102 | * signature. Each raw MPI is prefaced by a BE 2-byte value indicating the | ||
| 103 | * size of the MPI in bytes. | ||
| 104 | * | ||
| 105 | * RSA signatures only have one MPI, so currently we only read one. | ||
| 106 | */ | ||
| 107 | static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks, | ||
| 108 | const void *data, size_t len) | ||
| 109 | { | ||
| 110 | size_t nbytes; | ||
| 111 | MPI mpi; | ||
| 112 | |||
| 113 | if (len < 3) | ||
| 114 | return -EBADMSG; | ||
| 115 | nbytes = ((const u8 *)data)[0] << 8 | ((const u8 *)data)[1]; | ||
| 116 | data += 2; | ||
| 117 | len -= 2; | ||
| 118 | if (len != nbytes) | ||
| 119 | return -EBADMSG; | ||
| 120 | |||
| 121 | mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(data, nbytes); | ||
| 122 | if (!mpi) | ||
| 123 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
| 124 | pks->mpi[0] = mpi; | ||
| 125 | pks->nr_mpi = 1; | ||
| 126 | return 0; | ||
| 127 | } | ||
| 128 | |||
| 129 | /* | ||
| 130 | * Request an asymmetric key. | ||
| 131 | */ | ||
| 132 | static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len, | ||
| 133 | const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len) | ||
| 134 | { | ||
| 135 | key_ref_t key; | ||
| 136 | size_t i; | ||
| 137 | char *id, *q; | ||
| 138 | |||
| 139 | pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu,,%zu)\n", __func__, signer_len, key_id_len); | ||
| 140 | |||
| 141 | /* Construct an identifier. */ | ||
| 142 | id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + key_id_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | ||
| 143 | if (!id) | ||
| 144 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); | ||
| 145 | |||
| 146 | memcpy(id, signer, signer_len); | ||
| 147 | |||
| 148 | q = id + signer_len; | ||
| 149 | *q++ = ':'; | ||
| 150 | *q++ = ' '; | ||
| 151 | for (i = 0; i < key_id_len; i++) { | ||
| 152 | *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id >> 4]; | ||
| 153 | *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id++ & 0x0f]; | ||
| 154 | } | ||
| 155 | |||
| 156 | *q = 0; | ||
| 157 | |||
| 158 | pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); | ||
| 159 | |||
| 160 | key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1), | ||
| 161 | &key_type_asymmetric, id); | ||
| 162 | if (IS_ERR(key)) | ||
| 163 | pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n", | ||
| 164 | id, PTR_ERR(key)); | ||
| 165 | kfree(id); | ||
| 166 | |||
| 167 | if (IS_ERR(key)) { | ||
| 168 | switch (PTR_ERR(key)) { | ||
| 169 | /* Hide some search errors */ | ||
| 170 | case -EACCES: | ||
| 171 | case -ENOTDIR: | ||
| 172 | case -EAGAIN: | ||
| 173 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); | ||
| 174 | default: | ||
| 175 | return ERR_CAST(key); | ||
| 176 | } | ||
| 177 | } | ||
| 178 | |||
| 179 | pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key))); | ||
| 180 | return key_ref_to_ptr(key); | ||
| 181 | } | ||
| 182 | |||
| 183 | /* | ||
| 17 | * Verify the signature on a module. | 184 | * Verify the signature on a module. |
| 18 | */ | 185 | */ |
| 19 | int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen, | 186 | int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen, |
| 20 | const void *sig, unsigned long siglen) | 187 | const void *sig, unsigned long siglen) |
| 21 | { | 188 | { |
| 22 | return -ENOKEY; | 189 | struct public_key_signature *pks; |
| 190 | struct module_signature ms; | ||
| 191 | struct key *key; | ||
| 192 | size_t sig_len; | ||
| 193 | int ret; | ||
| 194 | |||
| 195 | pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu,,%lu,)\n", __func__, modlen, siglen); | ||
| 196 | |||
| 197 | if (siglen <= sizeof(ms)) | ||
| 198 | return -EBADMSG; | ||
| 199 | |||
| 200 | memcpy(&ms, sig + (siglen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); | ||
| 201 | siglen -= sizeof(ms); | ||
| 202 | |||
| 203 | sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len); | ||
| 204 | if (sig_len >= siglen || | ||
| 205 | siglen - sig_len != (size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len) | ||
| 206 | return -EBADMSG; | ||
| 207 | |||
| 208 | /* For the moment, only support RSA and X.509 identifiers */ | ||
| 209 | if (ms.algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA || | ||
| 210 | ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_X509) | ||
| 211 | return -ENOPKG; | ||
| 212 | |||
| 213 | if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST || | ||
| 214 | !pkey_hash_algo[ms.hash]) | ||
| 215 | return -ENOPKG; | ||
| 216 | |||
| 217 | key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len, | ||
| 218 | sig + ms.signer_len, ms.key_id_len); | ||
| 219 | if (IS_ERR(key)) | ||
| 220 | return PTR_ERR(key); | ||
| 221 | |||
| 222 | pks = mod_make_digest(ms.hash, mod, modlen); | ||
| 223 | if (IS_ERR(pks)) { | ||
| 224 | ret = PTR_ERR(pks); | ||
| 225 | goto error_put_key; | ||
| 226 | } | ||
| 227 | |||
| 228 | ret = mod_extract_mpi_array(pks, sig + ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len, | ||
| 229 | sig_len); | ||
| 230 | if (ret < 0) | ||
| 231 | goto error_free_pks; | ||
| 232 | |||
| 233 | ret = verify_signature(key, pks); | ||
| 234 | pr_devel("verify_signature() = %d\n", ret); | ||
| 235 | |||
| 236 | error_free_pks: | ||
| 237 | mpi_free(pks->rsa.s); | ||
| 238 | kfree(pks); | ||
| 239 | error_put_key: | ||
| 240 | key_put(key); | ||
| 241 | pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); | ||
| 242 | return ret; | ||
| 23 | } | 243 | } |
