5 files changed, 2 insertions, 87 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index c8f2a5f70ed5..39e5ff512fbe 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -92,9 +92,7 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 extern int file_caps_enabled;
-#endif
 
 typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
         __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
index 21a6f5d9af22..8d10aa7fd4c9 100644
--- a/include/linux/init_task.h
+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
@@ -83,16 +83,12 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups;
 #define INIT_IDS
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 /*
  * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem
  * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow CAP_SETPCAP to
  * be available in the default configuration.
  */
 # define CAP_INIT_BSET  CAP_FULL_SET
-#else
-# define CAP_INIT_BSET  CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
-#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU
 #define INIT_TASK_RCU_PREEMPT(tsk)                                      \
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index c450375e855f..7f876e60521f 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 int file_caps_enabled = 1;
 
 static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
         return 1;
 }
 __setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable);
-#endif
 
 /*
  * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 95cc08913ca1..226b9556b25f 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -91,15 +91,6 @@ config SECURITY_PATH
           implement pathname based access controls.
           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-        bool "File POSIX Capabilities"
-        default n
-        help
-          This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give
-          binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0.
-
-          If in doubt, answer N.
-
 config INTEL_TXT
         bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
         depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 45b87af4ae5d..f800fdb3de94 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -173,7 +173,6 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
  */
 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 
         /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
          * capability
@@ -181,7 +180,6 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
         if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
                         SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
                 return 0;
-#endif
         return 1;
 }
 
@@ -239,8 +237,6 @@ static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         bprm->cap_effective = false;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-
 /**
  * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
  * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
@@ -421,49 +417,6 @@ out:
         return rc;
 }
 
-#else
-int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-        return 0;
-}
-
-int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-        return 0;
-}
-
-int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
-{
-        memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
-        return -ENODATA;
-}
-
-static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
-{
-        bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
-        return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Determine whether a exec'ing process's new permitted capabilities should be
- * limited to just what it already has.
- *
- * This prevents processes that are being ptraced from gaining access to
- * CAP_SETPCAP, unless the process they're tracing already has it, and the
- * binary they're executing has filecaps that elevate it.
- *
- *  Returns 1 if they should be limited, 0 if they are not.
- */
-static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
-{
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-        if (capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
-                return 0;
-#endif
-        return 1;
-}
-
 /**
  * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
  * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -523,9 +476,8 @@ skip:
                         new->euid = new->uid;
                         new->egid = new->gid;
                 }
-                if (cap_limit_ptraced_target())
-                        new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
-                                                           old->cap_permitted);
+                new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
+                                                   old->cap_permitted);
         }
 
         new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
@@ -739,7 +691,6 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
         return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 /*
  * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
  * task_setnice, assumes that
@@ -820,22 +771,6 @@ static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
         return 0;
 }
 
-#else
-int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
-                           struct sched_param *lp)
-{
-        return 0;
-}
-int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
-{
-        return 0;
-}
-int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
-{
-        return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
 /**
  * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
  * @option: The process control function requested
@@ -866,7 +801,6 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                 error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2);
                 goto no_change;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
         case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
                 error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2);
                 if (error < 0)
@@ -917,8 +851,6 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                 error = new->securebits;
                 goto no_change;
 
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-
         case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
                 if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
                         error = 1;