ALSA: usb-audio: avoid integer overflow in create_fixed_stream_quirk()

A malicious USB device could feed in a large nr_rates value.  This would
cause the subsequent call to kmemdup() to allocate a smaller buffer than
expected, leading to out-of-bounds access.

This patch validates the nr_rates value and reuses the limit introduced
in commit 4fa0e81b ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix possible hang and overflow
in parse_uac2_sample_rate_range()").

Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/sound/usb/format.c b/sound/usb/format.c
index e09aba19375c..ddfef57c4c9f 100644
--- a/sound/usb/format.c
+++ b/sound/usb/format.c
@@ -209,8 +209,6 @@ static int parse_audio_format_rates_v1(struct snd_usb_audio *chip, struct audiof
         return 0;
 }
 
-#define MAX_UAC2_NR_RATES 1024
-
 /*
  * Helper function to walk the array of sample rate triplets reported by
  * the device. The problem is that we need to parse whole array first to
@@ -255,7 +253,7 @@ static int parse_uac2_sample_rate_range(struct audioformat *fp, int nr_triplets,
                         fp->rates |= snd_pcm_rate_to_rate_bit(rate);
 
                         nr_rates++;
-                        if (nr_rates >= MAX_UAC2_NR_RATES) {
+                        if (nr_rates >= MAX_NR_RATES) {
                                 snd_printk(KERN_ERR "invalid uac2 rates\n");
                                 break;
                         }