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authorOleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>2008-04-30 03:52:42 -0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-04-30 11:29:34 -0400
commit3b5e9e53c6f31b5a5a0f5c43707503c62bdefa46 (patch)
tree1244b7cf2755c06a8a793149ce4717e4a1311218 /security
parent9e3bd6c3fb2334be171e69b432039cd18bce4458 (diff)
signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementation
Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from the kernel. This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the same check from ->task_kill() implementations. (sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here). NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think he is very right. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c3
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c9
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 85a220465a8f..1b50a6ebc55f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3286,9 +3286,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3286 if (rc) 3286 if (rc)
3287 return rc; 3287 return rc;
3288 3288
3289 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
3290 return 0;
3291
3292 if (!sig) 3289 if (!sig)
3293 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ 3290 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3294 else 3291 else
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fe0ae1bf1650..b5c8f9237008 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1131,15 +1131,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
1131 int sig, u32 secid) 1131 int sig, u32 secid)
1132{ 1132{
1133 /* 1133 /*
1134 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
1135 * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
1136 * make sense to change the caller so that it doesn't
1137 * bother with the LSM hook in these cases.
1138 */
1139 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO &&
1140 (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
1141 return 0;
1142 /*
1143 * Sending a signal requires that the sender 1134 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
1144 * can write the receiver. 1135 * can write the receiver.
1145 */ 1136 */