Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security

* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (32 commits)
  ima: fix invalid memory reference
  ima: free duplicate measurement memory
  security: update security_file_mmap() docs
  selinux: Casting (void *) value returned by kmalloc is useless
  apparmor: fix module parameter handling
  Security: tomoyo: add .gitignore file
  tomoyo: add missing rcu_dereference()
  apparmor: add missing rcu_dereference()
  evm: prevent racing during tfm allocation
  evm: key must be set once during initialization
  mpi/mpi-mpow: NULL dereference on allocation failure
  digsig: build dependency fix
  KEYS: Give key types their own lockdep class for key->sem
  TPM: fix transmit_cmd error logic
  TPM: NSC and TIS drivers X86 dependency fix
  TPM: Export wait_for_stat for other vendor specific drivers
  TPM: Use vendor specific function for status probe
  tpm_tis: add delay after aborting command
  tpm_tis: Check return code from getting timeouts/durations
  tpm: Introduce function to poll for result of self test
  ...

Fix up trivial conflict in lib/Makefile due to addition of CONFIG_MPI
and SIGSIG next to CONFIG_DQL addition.

16 files changed, 259 insertions, 59 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 96502b22b268..f3fafedd798a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
                 struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad.profile;
                 pid_t pid;
                 rcu_read_lock();
-                pid = tsk->real_parent->pid;
+                pid = rcu_dereference(tsk->real_parent)->pid;
                 rcu_read_unlock();
                 audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", pid);
                 if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 2c0a0ff41399..d7f06f8b2837 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 
 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
 static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
         .set = param_set_aabool,
         .get = param_get_aabool
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
 
 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
 static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
         .set = param_set_aauint,
         .get = param_get_aauint
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
 
 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
 static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
         .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
         .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 4bf00acf7937..d384ea921482 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -3,5 +3,19 @@ config INTEGRITY
         def_bool y
         depends on IMA || EVM
 
+config INTEGRITY_DIGSIG
+        boolean "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
+        depends on INTEGRITY && KEYS
+        default n
+        select DIGSIG
+        help
+          This option enables digital signature verification support
+          using multiple keyrings. It defines separate keyrings for each
+          of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules.
+          Different keyrings improves search performance, but also allow
+          to "lock" certain keyring to prevent adding new keys.
+          This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
+          usually only added from initramfs.
+
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index 0ae44aea6516..bece0563ee5e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_DIGSIG) += digsig.o
 
 integrity-y := iint.o
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2dc167d7cde9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/digsig.h>
+
+#include "integrity.h"
+
+static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
+
+static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
+        "_evm",
+        "_module",
+        "_ima",
+};
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+                                        const char *digest, int digestlen)
+{
+        if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        if (!keyring[id]) {
+                keyring[id] =
+                        request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
+                if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
+                        int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
+                        pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
+                        keyring[id] = NULL;
+                        return err;
+                }
+        }
+
+        return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen, digest, digestlen);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index d320f5197437..c885247ebcf7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -12,14 +12,21 @@
  * File: evm.h
  *
  */
+
+#ifndef __INTEGRITY_EVM_H
+#define __INTEGRITY_EVM_H
+
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
 extern int evm_initialized;
 extern char *evm_hmac;
+extern char *evm_hash;
 
 extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
+extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
 
 /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
 extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
@@ -32,7 +39,12 @@ extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
                          const char *req_xattr_value,
                          size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+                         const char *req_xattr_value,
+                         size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
 extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
                          char *hmac_val);
 extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
 extern void evm_cleanup_secfs(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 8738deff26fa..49a464f5595b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -26,44 +26,56 @@ static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
 static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
 
 struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
+struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
 
-static struct shash_desc *init_desc(void)
+static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
 {
-        int rc;
+        long rc;
+        char *algo;
+        struct crypto_shash **tfm;
         struct shash_desc *desc;
 
-        if (hmac_tfm == NULL) {
+        if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+                tfm = &hmac_tfm;
+                algo = evm_hmac;
+        } else {
+                tfm = &hash_tfm;
+                algo = evm_hash;
+        }
+
+        if (*tfm == NULL) {
                 mutex_lock(&mutex);
-                if (hmac_tfm)
+                if (*tfm)
                         goto out;
-                hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(evm_hmac, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-                if (IS_ERR(hmac_tfm)) {
-                        pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n",
-                               evm_hmac, PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm));
-                        rc = PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm);
-                        hmac_tfm = NULL;
+                *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+                if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
+                        rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
+                        pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
+                        *tfm = NULL;
                         mutex_unlock(&mutex);
                         return ERR_PTR(rc);
                 }
-                rc = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
-                if (rc) {
-                        crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm);
-                        hmac_tfm = NULL;
-                        mutex_unlock(&mutex);
-                        return ERR_PTR(rc);
+                if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+                        rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
+                        if (rc) {
+                                crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
+                                *tfm = NULL;
+                                mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+                                return ERR_PTR(rc);
+                        }
                 }
 out:
                 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
         }
 
-        desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac_tfm),
+        desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
                         GFP_KERNEL);
         if (!desc)
                 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
-        desc->tfm = hmac_tfm;
+        desc->tfm = *tfm;
         desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
 
         rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
@@ -108,9 +120,11 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
  * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
  * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
  */
-int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
-                  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
-                  char *digest)
+static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
+                                const char *req_xattr_name,
+                                const char *req_xattr_value,
+                                size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+                                char type, char *digest)
 {
         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
         struct shash_desc *desc;
@@ -122,7 +136,7 @@ int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
 
         if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-        desc = init_desc();
+        desc = init_desc(type);
         if (IS_ERR(desc))
                 return PTR_ERR(desc);
 
@@ -156,6 +170,22 @@ out:
         return error;
 }
 
+int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+                  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+                  char *digest)
+{
+        return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
+                                req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
+}
+
+int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+                  const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+                  char *digest)
+{
+        return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
+                                req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest);
+}
+
 /*
  * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
  *
@@ -186,7 +216,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
 {
         struct shash_desc *desc;
 
-        desc = init_desc();
+        desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
         if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
                 printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
                 return PTR_ERR(desc);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 92d3d99a9f7b..8901501425f4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 int evm_initialized;
 
 char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
+char *evm_hash = "sha1";
 
 char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
@@ -46,6 +47,29 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
 }
 __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
 
+static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+        struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+        char **xattr;
+        int error;
+        int count = 0;
+
+        if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+        for (xattr = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattr != NULL; xattr++) {
+                error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, *xattr, NULL, 0);
+                if (error < 0) {
+                        if (error == -ENODATA)
+                                continue;
+                        return error;
+                }
+                count++;
+        }
+
+        return count;
+}
+
 /*
  * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
  *
@@ -65,32 +89,72 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
                                              size_t xattr_value_len,
                                              struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
-        struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
+        struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+        struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc;
         enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-        int rc;
+        int rc, xattr_len;
 
         if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
                 return iint->evm_status;
 
         /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
 
-        rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-                           xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
-        if (rc < 0) {
-                evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA)
-                    ? INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+        /* first need to know the sig type */
+        rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
+                                GFP_NOFS);
+        if (rc <= 0) {
+                if (rc == 0)
+                        evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; /* empty */
+                else if (rc == -ENODATA) {
+                        rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
+                        if (rc > 0)
+                                evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+                        else if (rc == 0)
+                                evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
+                }
                 goto out;
         }
 
-        xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
-        rc = vfs_xattr_cmp(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (u8 *)&xattr_data,
-                           sizeof xattr_data, GFP_NOFS);
-        if (rc < 0)
-                evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA)
-                    ? INTEGRITY_NOLABEL : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+        xattr_len = rc - 1;
+
+        /* check value type */
+        switch (xattr_data->type) {
+        case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
+                rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+                                   xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
+                if (rc)
+                        break;
+                rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
+                            sizeof(calc.digest));
+                if (rc)
+                        rc = -EINVAL;
+                break;
+        case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+                rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+                                xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
+                if (rc)
+                        break;
+                rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
+                                        xattr_data->digest, xattr_len,
+                                        calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
+                if (!rc) {
+                        /* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */
+                        evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+                                   xattr_value_len);
+                }
+                break;
+        default:
+                rc = -EINVAL;
+                break;
+        }
+
+        if (rc)
+                evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ?
+                                INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 out:
         if (iint)
                 iint->evm_status = evm_status;
+        kfree(xattr_data);
         return evm_status;
 }
 
@@ -354,6 +418,8 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
                 printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n");
                 goto err;
         }
+
+        return 0;
 err:
         return error;
 }
@@ -363,6 +429,8 @@ static void __exit cleanup_evm(void)
         evm_cleanup_secfs();
         if (hmac_tfm)
                 crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm);
+        if (hash_tfm)
+                crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 0d50df04ccc4..88a2788b981d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
         strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
 
         result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
-        if (!result)
+        if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
                 iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
-        else
+        if (result < 0)
                 kfree(entry);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 8e28f04a5e2e..55a6271bce7a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
+#define AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX 32
+
 LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements);    /* list of all measurements */
 
 /* key: inode (before secure-hashing a file) */
@@ -94,7 +96,8 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
 
         result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
         if (result != 0)
-                pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+                pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n",
+                       result);
         return result;
 }
 
@@ -106,14 +109,16 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 {
         u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
         const char *audit_cause = "hash_added";
+        char tpm_audit_cause[AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX];
         int audit_info = 1;
-        int result = 0;
+        int result = 0, tpmresult = 0;
 
         mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
         if (!violation) {
                 memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
                 if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
                         audit_cause = "hash_exists";
+                        result = -EEXIST;
                         goto out;
                 }
         }
@@ -128,9 +133,11 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
         if (violation)          /* invalidate pcr */
                 memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
 
-        result = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
-        if (result != 0) {
-                audit_cause = "TPM error";
+        tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
+        if (tpmresult != 0) {
+                snprintf(tpm_audit_cause, AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX, "TPM_error(%d)",
+                         tpmresult);
+                audit_cause = tpm_audit_cause;
                 audit_info = 0;
         }
 out:
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 3143a3c39868..4da6ba81d153 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -46,5 +46,26 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
 struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM           0
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE        1
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA           2
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX           3
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_DIGSIG
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+                                        const char *digest, int digestlen);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
+                                          const char *sig, int siglen,
+                                          const char *digest, int digestlen)
+{
+        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_DIGSIG */
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int iint_initialized;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 4414abddcb5b..4f64c7267afb 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 
         atomic_set(&key->usage, 1);
         init_rwsem(&key->sem);
+        lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
         key->type = type;
         key->user = user;
         key->quotalen = quotalen;
@@ -946,6 +947,8 @@ int register_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
         struct key_type *p;
         int ret;
 
+        memset(&ktype->lock_class, 0, sizeof(ktype->lock_class));
+
         ret = -EEXIST;
         down_write(&key_types_sem);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index f46658722c78..48a7d0014b4f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -749,14 +749,6 @@ out:
         return length;
 }
 
-static inline int hexcode_to_int(int code) {
-        if (code == '\0' || !isxdigit(code))
-                return -1;
-        if (isdigit(code))
-                return code - '0';
-        return tolower(code) - 'a' + 10;
-}
-
 static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
         char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
@@ -808,9 +800,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
                         if (c1 == '+')
                                 c1 = ' ';
                         else if (c1 == '%') {
-                                if ((c1 = hexcode_to_int(*r++)) < 0)
+                                c1 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+                                if (c1 < 0)
                                         goto out;
-                                if ((c2 = hexcode_to_int(*r++)) < 0)
+                                c2 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+                                if (c2 < 0)
                                         goto out;
                                 c1 = (c1 << 4) | c2;
                         }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 2ec904177fe0..377d148e7157 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
 {
         kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
-        p->bool_val_to_struct = (struct cond_bool_datum **)
+        p->bool_val_to_struct =
                 kmalloc(p->p_bools.nprim * sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum *), GFP_KERNEL);
         if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
                 return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/.gitignore b/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5caf1a6f5907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+builtin-policy.h
+policy/
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index deeab7be5b97..9512222d5581 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@ static inline pid_t tomoyo_sys_getppid(void)
 {
         pid_t pid;
         rcu_read_lock();
-        pid = task_tgid_vnr(current->real_parent);
+        pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent));
         rcu_read_unlock();
         return pid;
 }