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authorJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2010-07-29 17:48:07 -0400
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2010-08-02 01:38:35 -0400
commitb5e95b48685e3481139a5634d14d630d12c7d5ce (patch)
tree1468141db6ff1a291bde0b6a960c2af7e520b52b /security
parentf9ad1af53d5232a89a1ff1827102843999975dfa (diff)
AppArmor: LSM interface, and security module initialization
AppArmor hooks to interface with the LSM, module parameters and module initialization. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c939
1 files changed, 939 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7daf0d528037
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
1/*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15#include <linux/security.h>
16#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
17#include <linux/mm.h>
18#include <linux/mman.h>
19#include <linux/mount.h>
20#include <linux/namei.h>
21#include <linux/ptrace.h>
22#include <linux/ctype.h>
23#include <linux/sysctl.h>
24#include <linux/audit.h>
25#include <net/sock.h>
26
27#include "include/apparmor.h"
28#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
29#include "include/audit.h"
30#include "include/capability.h"
31#include "include/context.h"
32#include "include/file.h"
33#include "include/ipc.h"
34#include "include/path.h"
35#include "include/policy.h"
36#include "include/procattr.h"
37
38/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
39int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
40
41/*
42 * LSM hook functions
43 */
44
45/*
46 * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
47 */
48static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
49{
50 aa_free_task_context(cred->security);
51 cred->security = NULL;
52}
53
54/*
55 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
56 */
57static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
58{
59 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
60 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
61 if (!cxt)
62 return -ENOMEM;
63
64 cred->security = cxt;
65 return 0;
66}
67
68/*
69 * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
70 */
71static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
72 gfp_t gfp)
73{
74 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
75 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
76 if (!cxt)
77 return -ENOMEM;
78
79 aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security);
80 new->security = cxt;
81 return 0;
82}
83
84/*
85 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
86 */
87static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
88{
89 const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security;
90 struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security;
91
92 aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
93}
94
95static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
96 unsigned int mode)
97{
98 int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
99 if (error)
100 return error;
101
102 return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
103}
104
105static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
106{
107 int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
108 if (error)
109 return error;
110
111 return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
112}
113
114/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
115static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
116 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
117{
118 struct aa_profile *profile;
119 const struct cred *cred;
120
121 rcu_read_lock();
122 cred = __task_cred(target);
123 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
124
125 *effective = cred->cap_effective;
126 *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
127 *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
128
129 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
130 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
131 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
132 }
133 rcu_read_unlock();
134
135 return 0;
136}
137
138static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
139 int cap, int audit)
140{
141 struct aa_profile *profile;
142 /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
143 int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit);
144 if (!error) {
145 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
146 if (!unconfined(profile))
147 error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
148 }
149 return error;
150}
151
152/**
153 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
154 * @op: operation being checked
155 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
156 * @mask: requested permissions mask
157 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
158 *
159 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
160 */
161static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
162 struct path_cond *cond)
163{
164 struct aa_profile *profile;
165 int error = 0;
166
167 profile = __aa_current_profile();
168 if (!unconfined(profile))
169 error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
170
171 return error;
172}
173
174/**
175 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
176 * @op: operation being checked
177 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
178 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
179 * @mask: requested permissions mask
180 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
181 *
182 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
183 */
184static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
185 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
186 struct path_cond *cond)
187{
188 struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
189
190 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
191}
192
193/**
194 * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
195 * @op: operation being checked
196 * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
197 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
198 * @mask: requested permissions mask
199 *
200 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
201 */
202static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
203 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
204{
205 struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
206 struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
207 dentry->d_inode->i_mode
208 };
209
210 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
211}
212
213/**
214 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
215 * @op: operation being checked
216 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
217 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
218 * @mask: requested permission mask
219 *
220 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
221 */
222static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
223 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
224{
225 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
226 struct path_cond cond = { };
227
228 if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode))
229 return 0;
230
231 cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
232 cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
233
234 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
235}
236
237/**
238 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
239 * @op: operation being checked
240 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
241 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
242 * @mask: request permission mask
243 * @mode: created file mode
244 *
245 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
246 */
247static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
248 u32 mask, umode_t mode)
249{
250 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
251
252 if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode))
253 return 0;
254
255 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
256}
257
258static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
259{
260 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
261}
262
263static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
264 int mode)
265{
266 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
267 S_IFDIR);
268}
269
270static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
271{
272 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
273}
274
275static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
276 int mode, unsigned int dev)
277{
278 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
279}
280
281static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
282 unsigned int time_attrs)
283{
284 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
285 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
286 };
287
288 if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
289 return 0;
290
291 return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
292 &cond);
293}
294
295static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
296 const char *old_name)
297{
298 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
299 S_IFLNK);
300}
301
302static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
303 struct dentry *new_dentry)
304{
305 struct aa_profile *profile;
306 int error = 0;
307
308 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
309 return 0;
310
311 profile = aa_current_profile();
312 if (!unconfined(profile))
313 error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
314 return error;
315}
316
317static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
318 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
319{
320 struct aa_profile *profile;
321 int error = 0;
322
323 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
324 return 0;
325
326 profile = aa_current_profile();
327 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
328 struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
329 struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
330 struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
331 old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
332 };
333
334 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
335 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
336 AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
337 &cond);
338 if (!error)
339 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
340 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
341 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
342
343 }
344 return error;
345}
346
347static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
348 mode_t mode)
349{
350 if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
351 return 0;
352
353 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, mnt, dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
354}
355
356static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
357{
358 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
359 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
360 };
361
362 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
363 return 0;
364
365 return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
366}
367
368static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
369{
370 if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
371 return 0;
372
373 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry,
374 AA_MAY_META_READ);
375}
376
377static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
378{
379 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
380 struct aa_profile *profile;
381 int error = 0;
382
383 if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
384 return 0;
385
386 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
387 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
388 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
389 * actually execute the image.
390 */
391 if (current->in_execve) {
392 fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
393 return 0;
394 }
395
396 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
397 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
398 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
399 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
400
401 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
402 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
403 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
404 fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
405 }
406
407 return error;
408}
409
410static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
411{
412 /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
413 file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
414 if (!file->f_security)
415 return -ENOMEM;
416 return 0;
417
418}
419
420static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
421{
422 struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
423
424 aa_free_file_context(cxt);
425}
426
427static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
428{
429 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
430 struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
431 int error = 0;
432
433 BUG_ON(!fprofile);
434
435 if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
436 !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
437 return 0;
438
439 profile = __aa_current_profile();
440
441 /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
442 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
443 * was granted.
444 *
445 * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
446 * delegation from unconfined tasks
447 */
448 if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
449 ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
450 error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
451
452 return error;
453}
454
455static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
456{
457 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
458}
459
460static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
461{
462 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
463
464 if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
465 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
466
467 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
468}
469
470static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
471 unsigned long flags)
472{
473 struct dentry *dentry;
474 int mask = 0;
475
476 if (!file || !file->f_security)
477 return 0;
478
479 if (prot & PROT_READ)
480 mask |= MAY_READ;
481 /*
482 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
483 * write back to the files
484 */
485 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
486 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
487 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
488 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
489
490 dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
491 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
492}
493
494static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
495 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
496 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
497{
498 int rc = 0;
499
500 /* do DAC check */
501 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
502 if (rc || addr_only)
503 return rc;
504
505 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
506}
507
508static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
509 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
510{
511 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
512 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
513}
514
515static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
516 char **value)
517{
518 int error = -ENOENT;
519 struct aa_profile *profile;
520 /* released below */
521 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
522 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
523 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
524
525 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
526 error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile),
527 value);
528 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
529 error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->previous),
530 value);
531 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
532 error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec),
533 value);
534 else
535 error = -EINVAL;
536
537 put_cred(cred);
538
539 return error;
540}
541
542static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
543 void *value, size_t size)
544{
545 char *command, *args = value;
546 size_t arg_size;
547 int error;
548
549 if (size == 0)
550 return -EINVAL;
551 /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
552 * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
553 * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
554 */
555 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
556 if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
557 return -EINVAL;
558 args[size] = '\0';
559 }
560
561 /* task can only write its own attributes */
562 if (current != task)
563 return -EACCES;
564
565 args = value;
566 args = strim(args);
567 command = strsep(&args, " ");
568 if (!args)
569 return -EINVAL;
570 args = skip_spaces(args);
571 if (!*args)
572 return -EINVAL;
573
574 arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
575 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
576 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
577 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
578 !AA_DO_TEST);
579 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
580 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
581 AA_DO_TEST);
582 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
583 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
584 !AA_DO_TEST);
585 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
586 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
587 AA_DO_TEST);
588 } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
589 error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
590 } else {
591 struct common_audit_data sa;
592 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
593 sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
594 sa.aad.info = name;
595 sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
596 return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
597 &sa, NULL);
598 }
599 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
600 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
601 !AA_DO_TEST);
602 } else {
603 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
604 return -EINVAL;
605 }
606 if (!error)
607 error = size;
608 return error;
609}
610
611static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
612 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
613{
614 struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile();
615 int error = 0;
616
617 if (!unconfined(profile))
618 error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim);
619
620 return error;
621}
622
623static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
624 .name = "apparmor",
625
626 .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
627 .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
628 .capget = apparmor_capget,
629 .capable = apparmor_capable,
630
631 .path_link = apparmor_path_link,
632 .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
633 .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
634 .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
635 .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
636 .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
637 .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
638 .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod,
639 .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown,
640 .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
641 .dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open,
642 .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr,
643
644 .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
645 .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
646 .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
647 .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap,
648 .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
649 .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
650
651 .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
652 .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
653
654 .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
655 .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
656 .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
657 .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer,
658
659 .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
660 .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
661 .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
662 .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
663
664 .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
665};
666
667/*
668 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
669 */
670
671static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
672static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
673#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
674
675static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
676static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
677#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
678
679static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
680static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
681#define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
682
683static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
684static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
685#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
686
687static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
688static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
689#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
690
691/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
692 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
693 */
694
695/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
696enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
697module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
698 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
699
700/* Debug mode */
701int aa_g_debug;
702module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
703
704/* Audit mode */
705enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
706module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
707 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
708
709/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
710 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
711 */
712int aa_g_audit_header = 1;
713module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
714 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
715
716/* lock out loading/removal of policy
717 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
718 * load policy, if lock_policy is set
719 */
720int aa_g_lock_policy;
721module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
722 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
723
724/* Syscall logging mode */
725int aa_g_logsyscall;
726module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
727
728/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
729unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
730module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
731
732/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
733 * on the loaded policy is done.
734 */
735int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
736module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
737 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
738
739/* Boot time disable flag */
740static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
741module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR);
742
743static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
744{
745 unsigned long enabled;
746 int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
747 if (!error)
748 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
749 return 1;
750}
751
752__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
753
754/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
755static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
756{
757 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
758 return -EPERM;
759 if (aa_g_lock_policy)
760 return -EACCES;
761 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
762}
763
764static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
765{
766 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
767 return -EPERM;
768 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
769}
770
771static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
772{
773 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
774 return -EPERM;
775 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
776}
777
778static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
779{
780 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
781 return -EPERM;
782 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
783}
784
785static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
786{
787 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
788 return -EPERM;
789 return param_set_uint(val, kp);
790}
791
792static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
793{
794 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
795 return -EPERM;
796 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
797}
798
799static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
800{
801 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
802 return -EPERM;
803
804 if (!apparmor_enabled)
805 return -EINVAL;
806
807 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
808}
809
810static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
811{
812 int i;
813 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
814 return -EPERM;
815
816 if (!apparmor_enabled)
817 return -EINVAL;
818
819 if (!val)
820 return -EINVAL;
821
822 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
823 if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
824 aa_g_audit = i;
825 return 0;
826 }
827 }
828
829 return -EINVAL;
830}
831
832static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
833{
834 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
835 return -EPERM;
836
837 if (!apparmor_enabled)
838 return -EINVAL;
839
840 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
841}
842
843static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
844{
845 int i;
846 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
847 return -EPERM;
848
849 if (!apparmor_enabled)
850 return -EINVAL;
851
852 if (!val)
853 return -EINVAL;
854
855 for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
856 if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
857 aa_g_profile_mode = i;
858 return 0;
859 }
860 }
861
862 return -EINVAL;
863}
864
865/*
866 * AppArmor init functions
867 */
868
869/**
870 * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
871 *
872 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
873 */
874static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
875{
876 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
877 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
878
879 cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
880 if (!cxt)
881 return -ENOMEM;
882
883 cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
884 cred->security = cxt;
885
886 return 0;
887}
888
889static int __init apparmor_init(void)
890{
891 int error;
892
893 if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
894 aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
895 apparmor_enabled = 0;
896 return 0;
897 }
898
899 error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
900 if (error) {
901 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
902 goto alloc_out;
903 }
904
905 error = set_init_cxt();
906 if (error) {
907 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
908 goto register_security_out;
909 }
910
911 error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
912 if (error) {
913 AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
914 goto register_security_out;
915 }
916
917 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
918 apparmor_initialized = 1;
919 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
920 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
921 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
922 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
923 else
924 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
925
926 return error;
927
928register_security_out:
929 aa_free_root_ns();
930
931alloc_out:
932 aa_destroy_aafs();
933
934 apparmor_enabled = 0;
935 return error;
936
937}
938
939security_initcall(apparmor_init);