Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits)
  bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status
  xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup
  net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that
  bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag
  bonding: wrap slave state work
  net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags
  bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler
  be2net: Bump up the version number
  be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines
  e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency
  netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables
  xen network backend driver
  bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time
  bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice
  bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset
  net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio
  xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward()
  be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl
  Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve
  netxen: support for GbE port settings
  ...

Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c
with the staging updates.

6 files changed, 15 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index ab3d807accc3..2984ea4f776f 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ static int cap_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
 
 static int cap_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
                                          struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-                                         struct flowi *fl)
+                                         const struct flowi *fl)
 {
         return 1;
 }
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index dbfdaed4cc66..49c57fd60aea 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -52,13 +52,12 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
 
 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-        NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
         return 0;
 }
 
 int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
 {
-        if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
+        if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
                 return -EPERM;
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bab9b23c3ff4..9187665a3fdd 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 
 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl)
 {
-        security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->secid);
+        security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
 
@@ -1238,7 +1238,8 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
 }
 
 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
-                                       struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
+                                       struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+                                       const struct flowi *fl)
 {
         return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
 }
@@ -1250,7 +1251,7 @@ int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 
 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
 {
-        int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->secid, 0);
+        int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid, 0);
 
         BUG_ON(rc);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d52a92507412..6475e1f0223e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4346,7 +4346,7 @@ static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
                                       struct flowi *fl)
 {
-        fl->secid = req->secid;
+        fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
 }
 
 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
@@ -4695,6 +4695,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 {
         int err;
         struct common_audit_data ad;
+        u32 sid;
 
         err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
         if (err)
@@ -4703,8 +4704,9 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
         COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
         ad.u.cap = capability;
 
-        return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
-                            SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
+        security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+        return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
+                            CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
 }
 
 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 13128f9a3e5a..b43813c9e049 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
-                        struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl);
+                        struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl);
 
 /*
  * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 728c57e3d65d..68178b76a2b3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
  */
 
 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-                        struct flowi *fl)
+                        const struct flowi *fl)
 {
         u32 state_sid;
         int rc;
@@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *
 
         state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
 
-        if (fl->secid != state_sid)
+        if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
                 return 0;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+        rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
                           ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
                           NULL)? 0:1;