KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]

Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.

To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.

The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.

Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.

This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18

	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		key_serial_t keyring, key;
		long ret;

		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");

		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
		OSERROR(key, "add_key");

		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");

		return 0;
	}

Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a

Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

10 files changed, 267 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 06400cf07757..93a2ffe65905 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -373,6 +373,11 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 }
@@ -386,6 +391,10 @@ static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 }
 
+static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
 static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
         return 0;
@@ -836,6 +845,13 @@ static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+                                     const struct cred *parent_cred,
+                                     struct key *key)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -961,9 +977,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
@@ -1063,6 +1081,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_session_to_parent);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index c766c68a63bc..792c0a611a6d 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
         case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
                 return keyctl_get_security(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
 
+        case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+                return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
         default:
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
         }
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 44adc325e15c..1e616aef55fd 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data)
  * - return true if we altered the keyring
  */
 static bool key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+        __releases(key_serial_lock)
 {
         struct keyring_list *klist;
         struct key *key;
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index fb830514c337..24ba0307b7ad 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ extern long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t, unsigned);
 extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
 extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
                                 size_t buflen);
+extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
 
 /*
  * debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 736d7800f97f..74c968524592 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1228,6 +1228,105 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
         return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
+ * parent process
+ * - the keyring must exist and must grant us LINK permission
+ * - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT)
+ */
+long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
+{
+        struct task_struct *me, *parent;
+        const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
+        struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
+        key_ref_t keyring_r;
+        int ret;
+
+        keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+        if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
+                return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
+
+        /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
+         * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
+         * our parent */
+        ret = -ENOMEM;
+        cred = cred_alloc_blank();
+        if (!cred)
+                goto error_keyring;
+
+        cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
+        keyring_r = NULL;
+
+        me = current;
+        write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+        parent = me->real_parent;
+        ret = -EPERM;
+
+        /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
+        if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the parent must be single threaded */
+        if (atomic_read(&parent->signal->count) != 1)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
+         * there's no point */
+        mycred = current_cred();
+        pcred = __task_cred(parent);
+        if (mycred == pcred ||
+            mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
+                goto already_same;
+
+        /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
+         * SUID/SGID */
+        if (pcred-> uid != mycred->euid ||
+            pcred->euid != mycred->euid ||
+            pcred->suid != mycred->euid ||
+            pcred-> gid != mycred->egid ||
+            pcred->egid != mycred->egid ||
+            pcred->sgid != mycred->egid)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
+        if (pcred ->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
+            mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the LSM must permit the replacement of the parent's keyring with the
+         * keyring from this process */
+        ret = security_key_session_to_parent(mycred, pcred,
+                                             key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r));
+        if (ret < 0)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
+         * that */
+        oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
+
+        /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
+         * restarting */
+        parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
+        cred = NULL;
+        set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+
+        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+        if (oldcred)
+                put_cred(oldcred);
+        return 0;
+
+already_same:
+        ret = 0;
+not_permitted:
+        put_cred(cred);
+        return ret;
+
+error_keyring:
+        key_ref_put(keyring_r);
+        return ret;
+}
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * the key control system call
@@ -1313,6 +1412,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
                                            (char __user *) arg3,
                                            (size_t) arg4);
 
+        case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+                return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
         default:
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
         }
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 4739cfbb41b7..5c23afb31ece 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -768,3 +769,51 @@ error:
         abort_creds(new);
         return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Replace a process's session keyring when that process resumes userspace on
+ * behalf of one of its children
+ */
+void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
+{
+        const struct cred *old;
+        struct cred *new;
+
+        if (!current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                return;
+
+        write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+        new = current->replacement_session_keyring;
+        current->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
+        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+        if (!new)
+                return;
+
+        old = current_cred();
+        new->  uid      = old->  uid;
+        new-> euid      = old-> euid;
+        new-> suid      = old-> suid;
+        new->fsuid      = old->fsuid;
+        new->  gid      = old->  gid;
+        new-> egid      = old-> egid;
+        new-> sgid      = old-> sgid;
+        new->fsgid      = old->fsgid;
+        new->user       = get_uid(old->user);
+        new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
+
+        new->securebits = old->securebits;
+        new->cap_inheritable    = old->cap_inheritable;
+        new->cap_permitted      = old->cap_permitted;
+        new->cap_effective      = old->cap_effective;
+        new->cap_bset           = old->cap_bset;
+
+        new->jit_keyring        = old->jit_keyring;
+        new->thread_keyring     = key_get(old->thread_keyring);
+        new->tgcred->tgid       = old->tgcred->tgid;
+        new->tgcred->process_keyring = key_get(old->tgcred->process_keyring);
+
+        security_transfer_creds(new, old);
+
+        commit_creds(new);
+}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f88eaf6b14cc..d8b727637f02 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -684,6 +684,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
 }
 
+int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
+}
+
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
         security_ops->cred_free(cred);
@@ -699,6 +704,11 @@ void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
         security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
 }
 
+void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
+}
+
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
         return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid);
@@ -1241,6 +1251,13 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
         return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
 }
 
+int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+                                   const struct cred *parent_cred,
+                                   struct key *key)
+{
+        return security_ops->key_session_to_parent(cred, parent_cred, key);
+}
+
 #endif  /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c3bb31ecc5aa..134a9c0d2004 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3233,6 +3233,21 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 }
 
 /*
+ * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+        tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+        if (!tsec)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        cred->security = tsec;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
  */
 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
@@ -3264,6 +3279,17 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+
+        *tsec = *old_tsec;
+}
+
+/*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
  */
@@ -5469,8 +5495,10 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .dentry_open =                  selinux_dentry_open,
 
         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
+        .cred_alloc_blank =             selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
+        .cred_transfer =                selinux_cred_transfer,
         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
         .kernel_module_request =        selinux_kernel_module_request,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index c243a2b25832..969f5fee1906 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1080,6 +1080,22 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  */
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
+ * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
+ * complete without error.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        cred->security = NULL;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
  * @cred: the credentials in question
  *
@@ -1117,6 +1133,18 @@ static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ *
+ * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        new->security = old->security;
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
  * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
  * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
@@ -3073,9 +3101,11 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
         .file_send_sigiotask =          smack_file_send_sigiotask,
         .file_receive =                 smack_file_receive,
 
+        .cred_alloc_blank =             smack_cred_alloc_blank,
         .cred_free =                    smack_cred_free,
         .cred_prepare =                 smack_cred_prepare,
         .cred_commit =                  smack_cred_commit,
+        .cred_transfer =                smack_cred_transfer,
         .kernel_act_as =                smack_kernel_act_as,
         .kernel_create_files_as =       smack_kernel_create_files_as,
         .task_setpgid =                 smack_task_setpgid,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 35a13e7915e4..9548a0984cc4 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@
 #include "tomoyo.h"
 #include "realpath.h"
 
+static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        new->security = NULL;
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                                gfp_t gfp)
 {
@@ -25,6 +31,15 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
         return 0;
 }
 
+static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        /*
+         * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer,
+         * we don't need to duplicate.
+         */
+        new->security = old->security;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         int rc;
@@ -262,7 +277,9 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
  */
 static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
         .name                = "tomoyo",
+        .cred_alloc_blank    = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank,
         .cred_prepare        = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
+        .cred_transfer       = tomoyo_cred_transfer,
         .bprm_set_creds      = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
         .bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL