Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (44 commits)
  nommu: Provide mmap_min_addr definition.
  TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures.
  TOMOYO: Remove unused field.
  integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure
  TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter.
  security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
  TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader.
  TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers.
  SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
  TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex.
  tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct
  smack: Remove redundant initialization.
  integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
  rootplug: Remove redundant initialization.
  smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
  integrity: move ima_counts_get
  integrity: path_check update
  IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions
  IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy
  selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
  ...

31 files changed, 1690 insertions, 440 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index bb244774e9d7..d23c839038f0 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -110,28 +110,8 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 
           See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
           more information about this module.
-          
-          If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
-        int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
-        depends on SECURITY
-        default 0
-        help
-          This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
-          from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
-          can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
-
-          For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
-          a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
-          On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
-          Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
-          permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
-          this protection disabled.
-
-          This value can be changed after boot using the
-          /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
 
+          If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index fa77021d9778..c67557cdaa85 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)          += selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)            += smack/built-in.o
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_AUDIT),y)
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)            += lsm_audit.o
+endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)           += tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)         += root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)             += device_cgroup.o
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index beac0258c2a8..48b7e0228fa3 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,28 @@
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 
+/*
+ * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
+ * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
+ * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
+ * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
+ * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
+ * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
+ * support.  So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
+ *
+ * Warn if that happens, once per boot.
+ */
+static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(char *fname)
+{
+        static int warned;
+        if (!warned) {
+                printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
+                        " effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
+                        " capabilities.\n", fname);
+                warned = 1;
+        }
+}
+
 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
@@ -464,6 +486,15 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
         if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
                 /*
+                 * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
+                 * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
+                 * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
+                 */
+                if (effective && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
+                        warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
+                        goto skip;
+                }
+                /*
                  * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
                  * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
                  * capability sets for the file.
@@ -478,6 +509,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                 if (new->euid == 0)
                         effective = true;
         }
+skip:
 
         /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
          * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index f3b91bfbe4cb..f7496c6a022b 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         struct dentry *parent;
 
-        if (!dentry)
+        if (!dentry || IS_ERR(dentry))
                 return;
 
         parent = dentry->d_parent;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 1e082bb987be..ff513ff737f5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -22,18 +22,9 @@ static int ima_audit;
 static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
 {
         unsigned long audit;
-        int rc, result = 0;
-        char *op = "ima_audit";
-        char *cause;
 
-        rc = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit);
-        if (rc || audit > 1)
+        if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
+                ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;