selinux: simplify and clean up inode_has_perm()

This is a rather hot function that is called with a potentially NULL
"struct common_audit_data" pointer argument.  And in that case it has to
provide and initialize its own dummy common_audit_data structure.

However, all the _common_ cases already pass it a real audit-data
structure, so that uncommon NULL case not only creates a silly run-time
test, more importantly it causes that function to have a big stack frame
for the dummy variable that isn't even used in the common case!

So get rid of that stupid run-time behavior, and make the (few)
functions that currently call with a NULL pointer just call a new helper
function instead (naturally called inode_has_perm_noapd(), since it has
no adp argument).

This makes the run-time test be a static code generation issue instead,
and allows for a much denser stack since none of the common callers need
the dummy structure.  And a denser stack not only means less stack space
usage, it means better cache behavior.  So we have a win-win-win from
this simplification: less code executed, smaller stack footprint, and
better cache behavior.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 10 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a0d38459d650..20219ef5439a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1476,7 +1476,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
                           unsigned flags)
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid;
 
         validate_creds(cred);
@@ -1487,15 +1486,21 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
         sid = cred_sid(cred);
         isec = inode->i_security;
 
-        if (!adp) {
-                adp = &ad;
-                COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
-                ad.u.inode = inode;
-        }
-
         return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
 }
 
+static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
+                                struct inode *inode,
+                                u32 perms,
+                                unsigned flags)
+{
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+        ad.u.inode = inode;
+        return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
+}
+
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
    pathname if needed. */
@@ -2122,8 +2127,8 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
                                                 struct tty_file_private, list);
                         file = file_priv->file;
                         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-                        if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
-                                           FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL, 0)) {
+                        if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
+                                           FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
                                 drop_tty = 1;
                         }
                 }
@@ -3228,7 +3233,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
          * new inode label or new policy.
          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
          */
-        return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL, 0);
+        return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
 }
 
 /* task security operations */