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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2008-11-13 18:39:23 -0500
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2008-11-13 18:39:23 -0500
commitd84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1 (patch)
treefc4a0349c42995715b93d0f7a3c78e9ea9b3f36e /security/security.c
parent745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227 (diff)
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c58
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f40a0a04c3c2..a55d739c6864 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -145,18 +145,13 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
145 return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); 145 return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
146} 146}
147 147
148int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective, 148int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
149 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 149 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
150 const kernel_cap_t *permitted) 150 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
151 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
151{ 152{
152 return security_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted); 153 return security_ops->capset(new, old,
153} 154 effective, inheritable, permitted);
154
155void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
156 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
157 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
158{
159 security_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
160} 155}
161 156
162int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) 157int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
@@ -228,9 +223,9 @@ void security_bprm_free(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
228 security_ops->bprm_free_security(bprm); 223 security_ops->bprm_free_security(bprm);
229} 224}
230 225
231void security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) 226int security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
232{ 227{
233 security_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe); 228 return security_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
234} 229}
235 230
236void security_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 231void security_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -616,14 +611,19 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
616 return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags); 611 return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
617} 612}
618 613
619int security_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred) 614void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
620{ 615{
621 return security_ops->cred_alloc_security(cred); 616 security_ops->cred_free(cred);
622} 617}
623 618
624void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 619int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
625{ 620{
626 security_ops->cred_free(cred); 621 return security_ops->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp);
622}
623
624void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
625{
626 return security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
627} 627}
628 628
629int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) 629int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -631,10 +631,10 @@ int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
631 return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags); 631 return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
632} 632}
633 633
634int security_task_post_setuid(uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, 634int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
635 uid_t old_suid, int flags) 635 int flags)
636{ 636{
637 return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, flags); 637 return security_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
638} 638}
639 639
640int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags) 640int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -716,14 +716,9 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
716} 716}
717 717
718int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, 718int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
719 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p) 719 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
720{
721 return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
722}
723
724void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
725{ 720{
726 security_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p); 721 return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
727} 722}
728 723
729void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) 724void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
@@ -1123,9 +1118,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
1123 1118
1124#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS 1119#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
1125 1120
1126int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags) 1121int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
1122 unsigned long flags)
1127{ 1123{
1128 return security_ops->key_alloc(key, tsk, flags); 1124 return security_ops->key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
1129} 1125}
1130 1126
1131void security_key_free(struct key *key) 1127void security_key_free(struct key *key)
@@ -1134,9 +1130,9 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key)
1134} 1130}
1135 1131
1136int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, 1132int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
1137 struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm) 1133 const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
1138{ 1134{
1139 return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, context, perm); 1135 return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
1140} 1136}
1141 1137
1142int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) 1138int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)