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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-12-28 14:43:54 -0500 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-12-28 14:43:54 -0500 |
commit | bb26c6c29b7cc9f39e491b074b09f3c284738d36 (patch) | |
tree | c7867af2bb4ff0feae889183efcd4d79b0f9a325 /security/keys/proc.c | |
parent | e14e61e967f2b3bdf23f05e4ae5b9aa830151a44 (diff) | |
parent | cbacc2c7f066a1e01b33b0e27ae5efbf534bc2db (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (105 commits)
SELinux: don't check permissions for kernel mounts
security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()
SELinux: correctly detect proc filesystems of the form "proc/foo"
Audit: Log TIOCSTI
user namespaces: document CFS behavior
user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for CLONE_NEWUSER
user namespaces: let user_ns be cloned with fairsched
CRED: fix sparse warnings
User namespaces: use the current_user_ns() macro
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2)
nfsctl: add headers for credentials
coda: fix creds reference
capabilities: define get_vfs_caps_from_disk when file caps are not enabled
CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
CRED: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux
CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
CRED: Documentation
CRED: Use creds in file structs
CRED: Prettify commoncap.c
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/proc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/proc.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index f619170da760..7f508def50e3 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c | |||
@@ -136,8 +136,12 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | |||
136 | int rc; | 136 | int rc; |
137 | 137 | ||
138 | /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming | 138 | /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming |
139 | * non-possession) */ | 139 | * non-possession) |
140 | rc = key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, 0), current, KEY_VIEW); | 140 | * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our |
141 | * access to __current_cred() safe | ||
142 | */ | ||
143 | rc = key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, 0), current_cred(), | ||
144 | KEY_VIEW); | ||
141 | if (rc < 0) | 145 | if (rc < 0) |
142 | return 0; | 146 | return 0; |
143 | 147 | ||