integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider

IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for
file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires,
IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the
integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap
hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the
TPM, measurements can not be removed.

In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which
can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM.  The
TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to
itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that
cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software.

- alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template()
- log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure
- removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN
- replaced hard coded string length with #define name

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

1 files changed, 78 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8a0f1e23ccf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * File: integrity_audit.c
+ *      Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static int ima_audit;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
+
+/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
+static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
+{
+        unsigned long audit;
+        int rc;
+        char *op;
+
+        rc = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit);
+        if (rc || audit > 1)
+                printk(KERN_INFO "ima: invalid ima_audit value\n");
+        else
+                ima_audit = audit;
+        op = ima_audit ? "ima_audit_enabled" : "ima_audit_not_enabled";
+        integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, NULL, op, 0, 0);
+        return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
+#endif
+
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+                         const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+                         const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
+{
+        struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+        if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */
+                return;
+
+        ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
+        audit_log_format(ab, "integrity: pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
+                         current->pid, current->cred->uid,
+                         audit_get_loginuid(current));
+        audit_log_task_context(ab);
+        switch (audit_msgno) {
+        case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA:
+        case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA:
+        case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR:
+                audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s", op, cause);
+                break;
+        case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH:
+                audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s hash=%s", op, cause);
+                break;
+        case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS:
+        default:
+                audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", op);
+        }
+        audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+        audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+        if (fname) {
+                audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+                audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);
+        }
+        if (inode)
+                audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
+                                 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+        audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", result);
+        audit_log_end(ab);
+}