security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook

In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be
a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel
itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious
firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index e76373de3129..a74fde6a7468 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
         return 0;
@@ -1015,6 +1020,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_fw_from_file);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);