AppArmor: file enforcement routines

AppArmor does files enforcement via pathname matching.  Matching is done
at file open using a dfa match engine.  Permission is against the final
file object not parent directories, ie. the traversal of directories
as part of the file match is implicitly allowed.  In the case of nonexistant
files (creation) permissions are checked against the target file not the
directory.  eg. In case of creating the file /dir/new, permissions are
checked against the match /dir/new not against /dir/.

The permissions for matches are currently stored in the dfa accept table,
but this will change to allow for dfa reuse and also to allow for sharing
of wider accept states.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

1 files changed, 217 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..be36feabb16a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_FILE_H
+#define __AA_FILE_H
+
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+/*
+ * We use MAY_EXEC, MAY_WRITE, MAY_READ, MAY_APPEND and the following flags
+ * for profile permissions
+ */
+#define AA_MAY_CREATE                  0x0010
+#define AA_MAY_DELETE                  0x0020
+#define AA_MAY_META_WRITE              0x0040
+#define AA_MAY_META_READ               0x0080
+
+#define AA_MAY_CHMOD                   0x0100
+#define AA_MAY_CHOWN                   0x0200
+#define AA_MAY_LOCK                    0x0400
+#define AA_EXEC_MMAP                   0x0800
+
+#define AA_MAY_LINK                     0x1000
+#define AA_LINK_SUBSET                  AA_MAY_LOCK     /* overlaid */
+#define AA_MAY_ONEXEC                   0x40000000      /* exec allows onexec */
+#define AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE           0x80000000
+#define AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT                0x80000000      /* ctrl auditing only */
+
+#define AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK      (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND |\
+                                 AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE |        \
+                                 AA_MAY_META_READ | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | \
+                                 AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
+                                 AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_LINK)
+
+/*
+ * The xindex is broken into 3 parts
+ * - index - an index into either the exec name table or the variable table
+ * - exec type - which determines how the executable name and index are used
+ * - flags - which modify how the destination name is applied
+ */
+#define AA_X_INDEX_MASK         0x03ff
+
+#define AA_X_TYPE_MASK          0x0c00
+#define AA_X_TYPE_SHIFT         10
+#define AA_X_NONE               0x0000
+#define AA_X_NAME               0x0400  /* use executable name px */
+#define AA_X_TABLE              0x0800  /* use a specified name ->n# */
+
+#define AA_X_UNSAFE             0x1000
+#define AA_X_CHILD              0x2000  /* make >AA_X_NONE apply to children */
+#define AA_X_INHERIT            0x4000
+#define AA_X_UNCONFINED         0x8000
+
+/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */
+#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED      0x8000
+
+/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */
+struct path_cond {
+        uid_t uid;
+        umode_t mode;
+};
+
+/* struct file_perms - file permission
+ * @allow: mask of permissions that are allowed
+ * @audit: mask of permissions to force an audit message for
+ * @quiet: mask of permissions to quiet audit messages for
+ * @kill: mask of permissions that when matched will kill the task
+ * @xindex: exec transition index if @allow contains MAY_EXEC
+ *
+ * The @audit and @queit mask should be mutually exclusive.
+ */
+struct file_perms {
+        u32 allow;
+        u32 audit;
+        u32 quiet;
+        u32 kill;
+        u16 xindex;
+};
+
+extern struct file_perms nullperms;
+
+#define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allow | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill)
+
+/* FIXME: split perms from dfa and match this to description
+ *        also add delegation info.
+ */
+static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
+{
+        u16 old_index = (mask >> 10) & 0xf;
+        u16 index = 0;
+
+        if (mask & 0x100)
+                index |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
+        if (mask & 0x200)
+                index |= AA_X_INHERIT;
+        if (mask & 0x80)
+                index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
+
+        if (old_index == 1) {
+                index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
+        } else if (old_index == 2) {
+                index |= AA_X_NAME;
+        } else if (old_index == 3) {
+                index |= AA_X_NAME | AA_X_CHILD;
+        } else {
+                index |= AA_X_TABLE;
+                index |= old_index - 4;
+        }
+
+        return index;
+}
+
+/*
+ * map old dfa inline permissions to new format
+ */
+#define dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f) | \
+                                    ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_user_audit(dfa, state) ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state) \
+        (dfa_map_xindex(ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x3fff))
+
+#define dfa_other_allow(dfa, state) ((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & \
+                                      0x7f) |                           \
+                                     ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_other_audit(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state) \
+        ((((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state) \
+        dfa_map_xindex((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] >> 14) & 0x3fff)
+
+int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
+                  gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
+                  const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error);
+
+/**
+ * struct aa_file_rules - components used for file rule permissions
+ * @dfa: dfa to match path names and conditionals against
+ * @perms: permission table indexed by the matched state accept entry of @dfa
+ * @trans: transition table for indexed by named x transitions
+ *
+ * File permission are determined by matching a path against @dfa and then
+ * then using the value of the accept entry for the matching state as
+ * an index into @perms.  If a named exec transition is required it is
+ * looked up in the transition table.
+ */
+struct aa_file_rules {
+        unsigned int start;
+        struct aa_dfa *dfa;
+        /* struct perms perms; */
+        struct aa_domain trans;
+        /* TODO: add delegate table */
+};
+
+unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+                          const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
+                          struct file_perms *perms);
+
+int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+                 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond);
+
+int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+                 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+
+int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
+                 u32 request);
+
+static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
+{
+        aa_put_dfa(rules->dfa);
+        aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans);
+}
+
+#define ACC_FMODE(x) (("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | (((x) << 1) & 0x40))
+
+/* from namei.c */
+#define MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(x) ((((x) + 1) & O_ACCMODE) ? (x) + 1 : (x))
+
+/**
+ * aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions
+ * @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: apparmor permission set for the file
+ */
+static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file)
+{
+        int flags = MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(file->f_flags);
+        u32 perms = ACC_FMODE(file->f_mode);
+
+        if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE))
+                perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND;
+        /* trunc implies write permission */
+        if (flags & O_TRUNC)
+                perms |= MAY_WRITE;
+        if (flags & O_CREAT)
+                perms |= AA_MAY_CREATE;
+
+        return perms;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_FILE_H */