knfsd: nfsd4: secinfo handling without secinfo= option

We could return some sort of error in the case where someone asks for secinfo
on an export without the secinfo= option set--that'd be no worse than what
we've been doing.  But it's not really correct.  So, hack up an approximate
secinfo response in that case--it may not be complete, but it'll tell the
client at least one acceptable security flavor.

Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index e4b3de08b040..490697542fc2 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -743,6 +743,15 @@ find_gss_auth_domain(struct gss_ctx *ctx, u32 svc)
 
 static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss;
 
+u32 svcauth_gss_flavor(struct auth_domain *dom)
+{
+        struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
+
+        return gd->pseudoflavor;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(svcauth_gss_flavor);
+
 int
 svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name)
 {