AF_RAW: Augment raw_send_hdrinc to expand skb to fit iphdr->ihl (v2)

Augment raw_send_hdrinc to correct for incorrect ip header length values

A series of oopses was reported to me recently.  Apparently when using AF_RAW
sockets to send data to peers that were reachable via ipsec encapsulation,
people could panic or BUG halt their systems.

I've tracked the problem down to user space sending an invalid ip header over an
AF_RAW socket with IP_HDRINCL set to 1.

Basically what happens is that userspace sends down an ip frame that includes
only the header (no data), but sets the ip header ihl value to a large number,
one that is larger than the total amount of data passed to the sendmsg call.  In
raw_send_hdrincl, we allocate an skb based on the size of the data in the msghdr
that was passed in, but assume the data is all valid.  Later during ipsec
encapsulation, xfrm4_tranport_output moves the entire frame back in the skbuff
to provide headroom for the ipsec headers.  During this operation, the
skb->transport_header is repointed to a spot computed by
skb->network_header + the ip header length (ihl).  Since so little data was
passed in relative to the value of ihl provided by the raw socket, we point
transport header to an unknown location, resulting in various crashes.

This fix for this is pretty straightforward, simply validate the value of of
iph->ihl when sending over a raw socket.  If (iph->ihl*4U) > user data buffer
size, drop the frame and return -EINVAL.  I just confirmed this fixes the
reported crashes.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 17 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
index 757c9171e7c2..ab996f9c0fe0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
@@ -352,13 +352,24 @@ static int raw_send_hdrinc(struct sock *sk, void *from, size_t length,
         skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
 
         skb->transport_header = skb->network_header;
-        err = memcpy_fromiovecend((void *)iph, from, 0, length);
-        if (err)
-                goto error_fault;
+        err = -EFAULT;
+        if (memcpy_fromiovecend((void *)iph, from, 0, length))
+                goto error_free;
 
-        /* We don't modify invalid header */
         iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;
-        if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph) && iphlen <= length) {
+
+        /*
+         * We don't want to modify the ip header, but we do need to
+         * be sure that it won't cause problems later along the network
+         * stack.  Specifically we want to make sure that iph->ihl is a
+         * sane value.  If ihl points beyond the length of the buffer passed
+         * in, reject the frame as invalid
+         */
+        err = -EINVAL;
+        if (iphlen > length)
+                goto error_free;
+
+        if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {
                 if (!iph->saddr)
                         iph->saddr = rt->rt_src;
                 iph->check   = 0;
@@ -381,8 +392,7 @@ static int raw_send_hdrinc(struct sock *sk, void *from, size_t length,
 out:
         return 0;
 
-error_fault:
-        err = -EFAULT;
+error_free:
         kfree_skb(skb);
 error:
         IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);