diff options
author | Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> | 2013-02-22 20:13:47 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-02-23 13:51:54 -0500 |
commit | 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 (patch) | |
tree | fb4a77a604c2cd35d53ec2600b9bf612a47407ef /net | |
parent | c9b20a5effcb29acf0f8a2a31c875073b2a0c74e (diff) |
sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/sock_diag.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c index 602cd637182e..750f44f3aa31 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_diag.c +++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c | |||
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) | |||
121 | if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req)) | 121 | if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req)) |
122 | return -EINVAL; | 122 | return -EINVAL; |
123 | 123 | ||
124 | if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX) | ||
125 | return -EINVAL; | ||
126 | |||
124 | hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family); | 127 | hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family); |
125 | if (hndl == NULL) | 128 | if (hndl == NULL) |
126 | err = -ENOENT; | 129 | err = -ENOENT; |