[IPSEC] XFRM_USER: kernel panic when large security contexts in ACQUIRE

When sending a security context of 50+ characters in an ACQUIRE 
message, following kernel panic occurred.

kernel BUG in xfrm_send_acquire at net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1781!
cpu 0x3: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c0000000421bb2e0]
    pc: c00000000033b074: .xfrm_send_acquire+0x240/0x2c8
    lr: c00000000033b014: .xfrm_send_acquire+0x1e0/0x2c8
    sp: c0000000421bb560
   msr: 8000000000029032
  current = 0xc00000000fce8f00
  paca    = 0xc000000000464b00
    pid   = 2303, comm = ping
kernel BUG in xfrm_send_acquire at net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1781!
enter ? for help
3:mon> t
[c0000000421bb650] c00000000033538c .km_query+0x6c/0xec
[c0000000421bb6f0] c000000000337374 .xfrm_state_find+0x7f4/0xb88
[c0000000421bb7f0] c000000000332350 .xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xc4/0x21c
[c0000000421bb8d0] c0000000003326e8 .xfrm_lookup+0x1a0/0x5b0
[c0000000421bba00] c0000000002e6ea0 .ip_route_output_flow+0x88/0xb4
[c0000000421bbaa0] c0000000003106d8 .ip4_datagram_connect+0x218/0x374
[c0000000421bbbd0] c00000000031bc00 .inet_dgram_connect+0xac/0xd4
[c0000000421bbc60] c0000000002b11ac .sys_connect+0xd8/0x120
[c0000000421bbd90] c0000000002d38d0 .compat_sys_socketcall+0xdc/0x214
[c0000000421bbe30] c00000000000869c syscall_exit+0x0/0x40
--- Exception: c00 (System Call) at 0000000007f0ca9c
SP (fc0ef8f0) is in userspace

We are using size of security context from xfrm_policy to determine
how much space to alloc skb and then putting security context from
xfrm_state into skb. Should have been using size of security context 
from xfrm_state to alloc skb. Following fix does that

Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index e81e2fb3d429..816e3690b60f 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -272,9 +272,8 @@ static int attach_encap_tmpl(struct xfrm_encap_tmpl **encapp, struct rtattr *u_a
 }
 
 
-static inline int xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+static inline int xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx)
 {
-        struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx = xp->security;
         int len = 0;
 
         if (xfrm_ctx) {
@@ -2170,7 +2169,7 @@ static int xfrm_send_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *xt,
 
         len = RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr);
         len += NLMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_acquire));
-        len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp));
+        len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(x->security));
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
         len += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_type));
 #endif
@@ -2280,7 +2279,7 @@ static int xfrm_exp_policy_notify(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, struct km_eve
 
         len = RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr);
         len += NLMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_polexpire));
-        len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp));
+        len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp->security));
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
         len += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_type));
 #endif