[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize

This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
contexts to IPsec policies and security associations.  In the previous
patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
assocations with security contexts.  Thus a user authorized to change
SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
deleteing policies with security contexts.  To fix this security hole,
an additional authorization check is added for removing security
policies and security associations with security contexts.

Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
unconditionally.  The hook is called on deletion when no context is
present, which we may want to change.  At present, I left it up to the
module.

LSM changes:

The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
xfrm_state_delete.  The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
of IPsec policies that have security contexts.  The existing hooks
xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
interface.

Use:

The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).

SELinux changes:

The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.

Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 81d1005830f4..a3733d2db3ba 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -427,23 +427,25 @@ static int xfrm_del_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
         if (x == NULL)
                 return -ESRCH;
 
+        if (err = security_xfrm_state_delete(x))
+                goto out;
+
         if (xfrm_state_kern(x)) {
-                xfrm_state_put(x);
-                return -EPERM;
+                err = -EPERM;
+                goto out;
         }
 
         err = xfrm_state_delete(x);
-        if (err < 0) {
-                xfrm_state_put(x);
-                return err;
-        }
+        if (err < 0)
+                goto out;
 
         c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
         c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
         c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
         km_state_notify(x, &c);
-        xfrm_state_put(x);
 
+out:
+        xfrm_state_put(x);
         return err;
 }
 
@@ -1055,6 +1057,8 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfr
                                               MSG_DONTWAIT);
                 }
         } else {
+                if (err = security_xfrm_policy_delete(xp))
+                        goto out;
                 c.data.byid = p->index;
                 c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
                 c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
@@ -1064,6 +1068,7 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfr
 
         xfrm_pol_put(xp);
 
+out:
         return err;
 }