[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.

This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.

This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.

Patch purpose:

The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.

Patch design approach:

The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.

A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.

Patch implementation details:

On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.

On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.

The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.

Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.

Testing:

The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.

The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.

Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 54 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index d19e274b9c4a..64a447375fdb 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  *      YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
  *              Split up af-specific portion
  *      Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>          Add the post_input processor
- *      
+ *
  */
 
 #include <asm/bug.h>
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ void __xfrm_policy_destroy(struct xfrm_policy *policy)
         if (del_timer(&policy->timer))
                 BUG();
 
+        security_xfrm_policy_free(policy);
         kfree(policy);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_policy_destroy);
@@ -350,7 +351,8 @@ int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct xfrm_policy *policy, int excl)
 
         write_lock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
         for (p = &xfrm_policy_list[dir]; (pol=*p)!=NULL;) {
-                if (!delpol && memcmp(&policy->selector, &pol->selector, sizeof(pol->selector)) == 0) {
+                if (!delpol && memcmp(&policy->selector, &pol->selector, sizeof(pol->selector)) == 0 &&
+                    xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security, policy->security)) {
                         if (excl) {
                                 write_unlock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
                                 return -EEXIST;
@@ -416,14 +418,15 @@ int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct xfrm_policy *policy, int excl)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_insert);
 
-struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel(int dir, struct xfrm_selector *sel,
-                                      int delete)
+struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(int dir, struct xfrm_selector *sel,
+                                          struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, int delete)
 {
         struct xfrm_policy *pol, **p;
 
         write_lock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
         for (p = &xfrm_policy_list[dir]; (pol=*p)!=NULL; p = &pol->next) {
-                if (memcmp(sel, &pol->selector, sizeof(*sel)) == 0) {
+                if ((memcmp(sel, &pol->selector, sizeof(*sel)) == 0) &&
+                    (xfrm_sec_ctx_match(ctx, pol->security))) {
                         xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
                         if (delete)
                                 *p = pol->next;
@@ -438,7 +441,7 @@ struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel(int dir, struct xfrm_selector *sel,
         }
         return pol;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_bysel);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx);
 
 struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(int dir, u32 id, int delete)
 {
@@ -519,7 +522,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_walk);
 
 /* Find policy to apply to this flow. */
 
-static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct flowi *fl, u16 family, u8 dir,
+static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct flowi *fl, u32 sk_sid, u16 family, u8 dir,
                                void **objp, atomic_t **obj_refp)
 {
         struct xfrm_policy *pol;
@@ -533,9 +536,12 @@ static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct flowi *fl, u16 family, u8 dir,
                         continue;
 
                 match = xfrm_selector_match(sel, fl, family);
+
                 if (match) {
-                        xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
-                        break;
+                        if (!security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, sk_sid, dir)) {
+                                xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
+                                break;
+                        }
                 }
         }
         read_unlock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
@@ -543,15 +549,37 @@ static void xfrm_policy_lookup(struct flowi *fl, u16 family, u8 dir,
                 *obj_refp = &pol->refcnt;
 }
 
-static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct flowi *fl)
+static inline int policy_to_flow_dir(int dir)
+{
+        if (XFRM_POLICY_IN == FLOW_DIR_IN &&
+            XFRM_POLICY_OUT == FLOW_DIR_OUT &&
+            XFRM_POLICY_FWD == FLOW_DIR_FWD)
+                return dir;
+        switch (dir) {
+        default:
+        case XFRM_POLICY_IN:
+                return FLOW_DIR_IN;
+        case XFRM_POLICY_OUT:
+                return FLOW_DIR_OUT;
+        case XFRM_POLICY_FWD:
+                return FLOW_DIR_FWD;
+        };
+}
+
+static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct flowi *fl, u32 sk_sid)
 {
         struct xfrm_policy *pol;
 
         read_lock_bh(&xfrm_policy_lock);
         if ((pol = sk->sk_policy[dir]) != NULL) {
-                int match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl,
+                int match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl,
                                                 sk->sk_family);
+                int err = 0;
+
                 if (match)
+                  err = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol, sk_sid, policy_to_flow_dir(dir));
+
+                if (match && !err)
                         xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
                 else
                         pol = NULL;
@@ -624,6 +652,10 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *clone_policy(struct xfrm_policy *old, int dir)
 
         if (newp) {
                 newp->selector = old->selector;
+                if (security_xfrm_policy_clone(old, newp)) {
+                        kfree(newp);
+                        return NULL;  /* ENOMEM */
+                }
                 newp->lft = old->lft;
                 newp->curlft = old->curlft;
                 newp->action = old->action;
@@ -735,22 +767,6 @@ xfrm_bundle_create(struct xfrm_policy *policy, struct xfrm_state **xfrm, int nx,
         return err;
 }
 
-static inline int policy_to_flow_dir(int dir)
-{
-        if (XFRM_POLICY_IN == FLOW_DIR_IN &&
-            XFRM_POLICY_OUT == FLOW_DIR_OUT &&
-            XFRM_POLICY_FWD == FLOW_DIR_FWD)
-                return dir;
-        switch (dir) {
-        default:
-        case XFRM_POLICY_IN:
-                return FLOW_DIR_IN;
-        case XFRM_POLICY_OUT:
-                return FLOW_DIR_OUT;
-        case XFRM_POLICY_FWD:
-                return FLOW_DIR_FWD;
-        };
-}
 
 static int stale_bundle(struct dst_entry *dst);
 
@@ -769,19 +785,20 @@ int xfrm_lookup(struct dst_entry **dst_p, struct flowi *fl,
         int err;
         u32 genid;
         u16 family = dst_orig->ops->family;
+        u8 dir = policy_to_flow_dir(XFRM_POLICY_OUT);
+        u32 sk_sid = security_sk_sid(sk, fl, dir);
 restart:
         genid = atomic_read(&flow_cache_genid);
         policy = NULL;
         if (sk && sk->sk_policy[1])
-                policy = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, fl);
+                policy = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, fl, sk_sid);
 
         if (!policy) {
                 /* To accelerate a bit...  */
                 if ((dst_orig->flags & DST_NOXFRM) || !xfrm_policy_list[XFRM_POLICY_OUT])
                         return 0;
 
-                policy = flow_cache_lookup(fl, family,
-                                           policy_to_flow_dir(XFRM_POLICY_OUT),
+                policy = flow_cache_lookup(fl, sk_sid, family, dir,
                                            xfrm_policy_lookup);
         }
 
@@ -962,16 +979,20 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
         struct xfrm_policy *pol;
         struct flowi fl;
+        u8 fl_dir = policy_to_flow_dir(dir);
+        u32 sk_sid;
 
         if (_decode_session(skb, &fl, family) < 0)
                 return 0;
 
+        sk_sid = security_sk_sid(sk, &fl, fl_dir);
+
         /* First, check used SA against their selectors. */
         if (skb->sp) {
                 int i;
 
                 for (i=skb->sp->len-1; i>=0; i--) {
-                  struct sec_decap_state *xvec = &(skb->sp->x[i]);
+                        struct sec_decap_state *xvec = &(skb->sp->x[i]);
                         if (!xfrm_selector_match(&xvec->xvec->sel, &fl, family))
                                 return 0;
 
@@ -986,11 +1007,10 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
         pol = NULL;
         if (sk && sk->sk_policy[dir])
-                pol = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, dir, &fl);
+                pol = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, dir, &fl, sk_sid);
 
         if (!pol)
-                pol = flow_cache_lookup(&fl, family,
-                                        policy_to_flow_dir(dir),
+                pol = flow_cache_lookup(&fl, sk_sid, family, fl_dir,
                                         xfrm_policy_lookup);
 
         if (!pol)