scm: Stop passing struct cred

Now that uids and gids are completely encapsulated in kuid_t
and kgid_t we no longer need to pass struct cred which allowed
us to test both the uid and the user namespace for equality.

Passing struct cred potentially allows us to pass the entire group
list as BSD does but I don't believe the cost of cache line misses
justifies retaining code for a future potential application.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 824eaf2c3afa..5ca1631de7ef 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1340,7 +1340,6 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
         struct scm_cookie scm;
         memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
         scm.pid  = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
-        scm.cred = UNIXCB(skb).cred;
         if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
                 unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
 
@@ -1391,8 +1390,8 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
         int err = 0;
 
         UNIXCB(skb).pid  = get_pid(scm->pid);
-        if (scm->cred)
-                UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred);
+        UNIXCB(skb).uid = scm->creds.uid;
+        UNIXCB(skb).gid = scm->creds.gid;
         UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
         if (scm->fp && send_fds)
                 err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb);
@@ -1409,13 +1408,13 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
 static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
                             const struct sock *other)
 {
-        if (UNIXCB(skb).cred)
+        if (UNIXCB(skb).pid)
                 return;
         if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
             !other->sk_socket ||
             test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) {
                 UNIXCB(skb).pid  = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
-                UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_current_cred();
+                current_euid_egid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid);
         }
 }
 
@@ -1819,7 +1818,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
                 siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
                 memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
         }
-        scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred);
+        scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).uid, UNIXCB(skb).gid);
         unix_set_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
 
         if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
@@ -1991,11 +1990,12 @@ again:
                 if (check_creds) {
                         /* Never glue messages from different writers */
                         if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid  != siocb->scm->pid) ||
-                            (UNIXCB(skb).cred != siocb->scm->cred))
+                            !uid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).uid, siocb->scm->creds.uid) ||
+                            !gid_eq(UNIXCB(skb).gid, siocb->scm->creds.gid))
                                 break;
                 } else if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
                         /* Copy credentials */
-                        scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred);
+                        scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).uid, UNIXCB(skb).gid);
                         check_creds = 1;
                 }