[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec

This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket.  The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.

Patch design and implementation:

The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets.  Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).  To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications.  We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.

Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 27 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index d901465ce013..fd11d4048b52 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -128,6 +128,30 @@ static atomic_t unix_nr_socks = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 #define UNIX_ABSTRACT(sk)       (unix_sk(sk)->addr->hash != UNIX_HASH_SIZE)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+static void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+        int err;
+
+        err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb, UNIXSECDATA(skb),
+                                               UNIXSECLEN(skb));
+        if (err)
+                *(UNIXSECDATA(skb)) = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+        scm->secdata = *UNIXSECDATA(skb);
+        scm->seclen = *UNIXSECLEN(skb);
+}
+#else
+static void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{ }
+
+static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
 /*
  *  SMP locking strategy:
  *    hash table is protected with spinlock unix_table_lock
@@ -1291,6 +1315,8 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
         if (siocb->scm->fp)
                 unix_attach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
 
+        unix_get_peersec_dgram(skb);
+
         skb->h.raw = skb->data;
         err = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb,len), msg->msg_iov, len);
         if (err)
@@ -1570,6 +1596,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
                 memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
         }
         siocb->scm->creds = *UNIXCREDS(skb);
+        unix_set_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
 
         if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
         {