Merge branch 'for-davem' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linville/wireless-next

John W. Linville says:

====================
Here is one more pull request for the 3.13 window.  This is primarily
composed of downstream pull requests that were posted while I was
traveling during the last part of the 3.12 release.

For the mac80211 bits, Johannes says:

"I have two DFS fixes (ath9k already supports DFS) and a fix for a
pointer race."

And...

"In this round for mac80211-next I have:
 * mesh channel switch support
 * a CCM rewrite, using potential hardware offloads
 * SMPS for AP mode
 * RF-kill GPIO driver updates to make it usable as an ACPI driver
 * regulatory improvements
 * documentation fixes
 * DFS for IBSS mode
 * and a few small other fixes/improvements"

For the TI driver bits, Luca says:

"Some patches intended for 3.13.  Eliad continues upstreaming pending
patches from the internal tree."

For the iwlwifi bits, Emmanuel says:

"There are a few fixes from Johannes mostly clean up patches. We have
also a few other fixes that are relevant for the new firmware that has
not been released yet."

For the Bluetooth bits, Gustavo says:

"A last fix to the 3.12. I ended forgetting to send it before, I hope we can
still make the way to 3.12. It is a revert and it fixes an issue with bluetooth
suspend/hibernate that had many bug reports. Please pull or let me know of any
problems. Thanks!"  (Obviously, that one didn't make 3.12...)

Also...

"One more big pull request for 3.13. These are the patches we queued during
last week. Here you will find a lot of improvements to the HCI and L2CAP and
MGMT layers with the main ones being a better debugfs support and end of work
of splitting L2CAP into Core and Socket parts."

Additionally, there is one ath9k patch to enable DFS in IBSS mode for
that driver.

I appreciate your consideration for taking this extra pull request
this cycle.  Please let me know if there are problems!
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 20 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index c9edfcb7a13b..d65728220763 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -301,22 +301,16 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 }
 
 
-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
+static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
                                 int encrypted)
 {
         __le16 mask_fc;
         int a4_included, mgmt;
         u8 qos_tid;
-        u8 *b_0, *aad;
-        u16 data_len, len_a;
+        u16 len_a;
         unsigned int hdrlen;
         struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 
-        memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
-        b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-        aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
         /*
          * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
          * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
@@ -338,20 +332,21 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
         else
                 qos_tid = 0;
 
-        data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
-        if (encrypted)
-                data_len -= IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+        /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
+         * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
+         * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
+         * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
+         * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
+         * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
+         */
+        b_0[0] = 0x1;
 
-        /* First block, b_0 */
-        b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
         /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
          * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
          */
         b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
         memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
         memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
-        /* l(m) */
-        put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
 
         /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
          * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
@@ -407,7 +402,8 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
         u8 *pos;
         u8 pn[6];
         u64 pn64;
-        u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
         if (info->control.hw_key &&
             !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
@@ -460,9 +456,9 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
                 return 0;
 
         pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
-        ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
-        ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
-                                  pos, skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
+        ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 0);
+        ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
+                                  skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
 
         return 0;
 }
@@ -525,16 +521,16 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
         }
 
         if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
-                u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+                u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+                u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
                 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
-                ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
+                ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 1);
 
                 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
-                            key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
+                            key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
                             skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
                             data_len,
-                            skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN,
-                            skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+                            skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
                         return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
         }