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authorJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>2012-03-12 08:49:14 -0400
committerJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>2012-03-13 14:54:17 -0400
commita8286911881948c7a2ecc63ee4224c258cce2da3 (patch)
treea35566503b81c654db55857f42fe9664d0aab3af /net/mac80211/wpa.c
parent617bbde878604adfcd557fc2a8952f77ab4ebd95 (diff)
mac80211: linearize SKBs as needed for crypto
Not linearizing every SKB will help actually pass non-linear SKBs all the way up when on an encrypted connection. For now, linearize TKIP completely as it is lower performance and I don't quite grok all the details. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/wpa.c')
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/wpa.c22
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index b758350919ff..0ae23c60968c 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
138 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) 138 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
139 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 139 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
140 140
141 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
142 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
143 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
144
141 data = skb->data + hdrlen; 145 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
142 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; 146 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
143 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY]; 147 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
@@ -253,6 +257,11 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
253 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12) 257 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
254 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 258 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
255 259
260 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
261 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
262 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
263 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
264
256 /* 265 /*
257 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption. 266 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
258 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well, 267 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
@@ -484,6 +493,14 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
484 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) 493 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
485 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 494 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
486 495
496 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
497 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
498 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
499 } else {
500 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
501 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
502 }
503
487 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); 504 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
488 505
489 queue = rx->security_idx; 506 queue = rx->security_idx;
@@ -509,7 +526,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
509 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); 526 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
510 527
511 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ 528 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
512 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN); 529 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN))
530 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
513 memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); 531 memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
514 skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN); 532 skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
515 533
@@ -609,6 +627,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
609 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) 627 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
610 return RX_CONTINUE; 628 return RX_CONTINUE;
611 629
630 /* management frames are already linear */
631
612 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) 632 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
613 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; 633 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
614 634