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authorMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>2008-09-09 01:19:20 -0400
committerMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>2008-09-09 01:19:20 -0400
commit09ab6f4c2376a0fc31abde1e2991513f900ea825 (patch)
treef002d719a8a9a2c6344f06a5b9346bc053b4054d /net/bluetooth
parentf1c08ca559387ab30992055596d54061dfa022b1 (diff)
[Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements
With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0 and before handle connections on PSM 1. For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used, but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding. If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known up-front and so enforce them. To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in the expected behavior. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c8
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/l2cap.c19
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/sco.c2
3 files changed, 23 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index ca8d05245ca0..a2f9efaa3361 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_get_route);
330 330
331/* Create SCO or ACL connection. 331/* Create SCO or ACL connection.
332 * Device _must_ be locked */ 332 * Device _must_ be locked */
333struct hci_conn *hci_connect(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst) 333struct hci_conn *hci_connect(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst, __u8 auth_type)
334{ 334{
335 struct hci_conn *acl; 335 struct hci_conn *acl;
336 struct hci_conn *sco; 336 struct hci_conn *sco;
@@ -344,8 +344,10 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_connect(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst)
344 344
345 hci_conn_hold(acl); 345 hci_conn_hold(acl);
346 346
347 if (acl->state == BT_OPEN || acl->state == BT_CLOSED) 347 if (acl->state == BT_OPEN || acl->state == BT_CLOSED) {
348 acl->auth_type = auth_type;
348 hci_acl_connect(acl); 349 hci_acl_connect(acl);
350 }
349 351
350 if (type == ACL_LINK) 352 if (type == ACL_LINK)
351 return acl; 353 return acl;
@@ -381,7 +383,7 @@ int hci_conn_auth(struct hci_conn *conn)
381 383
382 if (conn->ssp_mode > 0 && conn->hdev->ssp_mode > 0) { 384 if (conn->ssp_mode > 0 && conn->hdev->ssp_mode > 0) {
383 if (!(conn->auth_type & 0x01)) { 385 if (!(conn->auth_type & 0x01)) {
384 conn->auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM; 386 conn->auth_type |= 0x01;
385 conn->link_mode &= ~HCI_LM_AUTH; 387 conn->link_mode &= ~HCI_LM_AUTH;
386 } 388 }
387 } 389 }
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
index 3396d5bdef1c..a96d6de80d12 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
55#define BT_DBG(D...) 55#define BT_DBG(D...)
56#endif 56#endif
57 57
58#define VERSION "2.10" 58#define VERSION "2.11"
59 59
60static u32 l2cap_feat_mask = 0x0000; 60static u32 l2cap_feat_mask = 0x0000;
61 61
@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ static int l2cap_do_connect(struct sock *sk)
778 struct l2cap_conn *conn; 778 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
779 struct hci_conn *hcon; 779 struct hci_conn *hcon;
780 struct hci_dev *hdev; 780 struct hci_dev *hdev;
781 __u8 auth_type;
781 int err = 0; 782 int err = 0;
782 783
783 BT_DBG("%s -> %s psm 0x%2.2x", batostr(src), batostr(dst), l2cap_pi(sk)->psm); 784 BT_DBG("%s -> %s psm 0x%2.2x", batostr(src), batostr(dst), l2cap_pi(sk)->psm);
@@ -789,7 +790,21 @@ static int l2cap_do_connect(struct sock *sk)
789 790
790 err = -ENOMEM; 791 err = -ENOMEM;
791 792
792 hcon = hci_connect(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst); 793 if (l2cap_pi(sk)->link_mode & L2CAP_LM_AUTH ||
794 l2cap_pi(sk)->link_mode & L2CAP_LM_ENCRYPT ||
795 l2cap_pi(sk)->link_mode & L2CAP_LM_SECURE) {
796 if (l2cap_pi(sk)->psm == cpu_to_le16(0x0001))
797 auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM;
798 else
799 auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM;
800 } else {
801 if (l2cap_pi(sk)->psm == cpu_to_le16(0x0001))
802 auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
803 else
804 auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING;
805 }
806
807 hcon = hci_connect(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst, auth_type);
793 if (!hcon) 808 if (!hcon)
794 goto done; 809 goto done;
795 810
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/sco.c b/net/bluetooth/sco.c
index a16011fedc1d..0cc91e6da76d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/sco.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/sco.c
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static int sco_connect(struct sock *sk)
200 else 200 else
201 type = SCO_LINK; 201 type = SCO_LINK;
202 202
203 hcon = hci_connect(hdev, type, dst); 203 hcon = hci_connect(hdev, type, dst, HCI_AT_NO_BONDING);
204 if (!hcon) 204 if (!hcon)
205 goto done; 205 goto done;
206 206