security: Protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap

Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting
to mmap to low area of the address space.  The amount of space protected is
indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to
0, preserving existing behavior.

This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect."  Policy already
contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being
one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its
best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also
want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of
the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other
memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time
we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

3 files changed, 14 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 906ed402f7ca..9f70c8e8c871 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file * file, unsigned long addr,
                 }
         }
 
-        error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+        error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
         if (error)
                 return error;
-                
+
         /* Clear old maps */
         error = -ENOMEM;
 munmap_back:
diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index 5d4bd4f95b8e..bc7c52efc71b 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -291,6 +291,10 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long addr,
                 if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr)
                         goto out;
 
+                ret = security_file_mmap(0, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
+                if (ret)
+                        goto out;
+
                 ret = do_munmap(mm, new_addr, new_len);
                 if (ret)
                         goto out;
@@ -390,8 +394,13 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long addr,
 
                         new_addr = get_unmapped_area(vma->vm_file, 0, new_len,
                                                 vma->vm_pgoff, map_flags);
-                        ret = new_addr;
-                        if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+                        if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
+                                ret = new_addr;
+                                goto out;
+                        }
+
+                        ret = security_file_mmap(0, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
+                        if (ret)
                                 goto out;
                 }
                 ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
index 2b16b00a5b11..989e2e9af5c3 100644
--- a/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/mm/nommu.c
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file,
         }
 
         /* allow the security API to have its say */
-        ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+        ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
         if (ret < 0)
                 return ret;