security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()

Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.

__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags.  This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.

This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:

 (1) security_ptrace_may_access().  This passes judgement on whether one
     process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
     PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
     current is the parent.

 (2) security_ptrace_traceme().  This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
     and takes only a pointer to the parent process.  current is the child.

     In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
     the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
     This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().

Of the places that were using __capable():

 (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
     process.  All of these now use has_capability().

 (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
     whether the parent was allowed to trace any process.  As mentioned above,
     these have been split.  For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
     used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.

 (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().

 (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
     after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
     switched and capable() is used instead.

 (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
     receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.

 (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
     whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.

I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/mm/oom_kill.c b/mm/oom_kill.c
index 8a5467ee6265..64e5b4bcd964 100644
--- a/mm/oom_kill.c
+++ b/mm/oom_kill.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/notifier.h>
 #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 int sysctl_panic_on_oom;
 int sysctl_oom_kill_allocating_task;
@@ -128,7 +129,8 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long uptime)
          * Superuser processes are usually more important, so we make it
          * less likely that we kill those.
          */
-        if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || __capable(p, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+        if (has_capability(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+            has_capability(p, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
                 points /= 4;
 
         /*
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long uptime)
          * tend to only have this flag set on applications they think
          * of as important.
          */
-        if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+        if (has_capability(p, CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
                 points /= 4;
 
         /*