Merge branch 'audit.b10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current

* 'audit.b10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
  [PATCH] Audit Filter Performance
  [PATCH] Rework of IPC auditing
  [PATCH] More user space subject labels
  [PATCH] Reworked patch for labels on user space messages
  [PATCH] change lspp ipc auditing
  [PATCH] audit inode patch
  [PATCH] support for context based audit filtering, part 2
  [PATCH] support for context based audit filtering
  [PATCH] no need to wank with task_lock() and pinning task down in audit_syscall_exit()
  [PATCH] drop task argument of audit_syscall_{entry,exit}
  [PATCH] drop gfp_mask in audit_log_exit()
  [PATCH] move call of audit_free() into do_exit()
  [PATCH] sockaddr patch
  [PATCH] deal with deadlocks in audit_free()

6 files changed, 536 insertions, 197 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c8ccbd09048f..df57b493e1cb 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
 #include <net/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
 
 /* No auditing will take place until audit_initialized != 0.
  * (Initialization happens after skb_init is called.) */
@@ -227,49 +230,103 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
         }
 }
 
-static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-        int old          = audit_rate_limit;
-        audit_rate_limit = limit;
-        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, 
+        int old = audit_rate_limit;
+
+        if (sid) {
+                char *ctx = NULL;
+                u32 len;
+                int rc;
+                if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+                        return rc;
+                else
+                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                "audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+                                limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+                kfree(ctx);
+        } else
+                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
                         "audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-                        audit_rate_limit, old, loginuid);
+                        limit, old, loginuid);
+        audit_rate_limit = limit;
         return old;
 }
 
-static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-        int old          = audit_backlog_limit;
-        audit_backlog_limit = limit;
-        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+        int old = audit_backlog_limit;
+
+        if (sid) {
+                char *ctx = NULL;
+                u32 len;
+                int rc;
+                if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+                        return rc;
+                else
+                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                            "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+                                limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+                kfree(ctx);
+        } else
+                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
                         "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-                        audit_backlog_limit, old, loginuid);
+                        limit, old, loginuid);
+        audit_backlog_limit = limit;
         return old;
 }
 
-static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-        int old          = audit_enabled;
+        int old = audit_enabled;
+
         if (state != 0 && state != 1)
                 return -EINVAL;
-        audit_enabled = state;
-        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+
+        if (sid) {
+                char *ctx = NULL;
+                u32 len;
+                int rc;
+                if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+                        return rc;
+                else
+                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                "audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+                                state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+                kfree(ctx);
+        } else
+                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
                         "audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-                        audit_enabled, old, loginuid);
+                        state, old, loginuid);
+        audit_enabled = state;
         return old;
 }
 
-static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-        int old          = audit_failure;
+        int old = audit_failure;
+
         if (state != AUDIT_FAIL_SILENT
             && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK
             && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC)
                 return -EINVAL;
-        audit_failure = state;
-        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+
+        if (sid) {
+                char *ctx = NULL;
+                u32 len;
+                int rc;
+                if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+                        return rc;
+                else
+                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                "audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+                                state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+                kfree(ctx);
+        } else
+                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
                         "audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-                        audit_failure, old, loginuid);
+                        state, old, loginuid);
+        audit_failure = state;
         return old;
 }
 
@@ -387,7 +444,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type)
 
 static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 {
-        u32                     uid, pid, seq;
+        u32                     uid, pid, seq, sid;
         void                    *data;
         struct audit_status     *status_get, status_set;
         int                     err;
@@ -413,6 +470,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
         pid  = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->pid;
         uid  = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->uid;
         loginuid = NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid;
+        sid  = NETLINK_CB(skb).sid;
         seq  = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
         data = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
 
@@ -433,25 +491,43 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
                         return -EINVAL;
                 status_get   = (struct audit_status *)data;
                 if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_ENABLED) {
-                        err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled, loginuid);
+                        err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled,
+                                                        loginuid, sid);
                         if (err < 0) return err;
                 }
                 if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_FAILURE) {
-                        err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure, loginuid);
+                        err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure,
+                                                         loginuid, sid);
                         if (err < 0) return err;
                 }
                 if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) {
                         int old   = audit_pid;
+                        if (sid) {
+                                char *ctx = NULL;
+                                u32 len;
+                                int rc;
+                                if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+                                                sid, &ctx, &len)))
+                                        return rc;
+                                else
+                                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+                                                AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                                "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+                                                status_get->pid, old,
+                                                loginuid, ctx);
+                                kfree(ctx);
+                        } else
+                                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                        "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+                                          status_get->pid, old, loginuid);
                         audit_pid = status_get->pid;
-                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-                                "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-                                  audit_pid, old, loginuid);
                 }
                 if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT)
-                        audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit, loginuid);
+                        audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit,
+                                                         loginuid, sid);
                 if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_LIMIT)
                         audit_set_backlog_limit(status_get->backlog_limit,
-                                                        loginuid);
+                                                        loginuid, sid);
                 break;
         case AUDIT_USER:
         case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
@@ -465,8 +541,23 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
                         ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
                         if (ab) {
                                 audit_log_format(ab,
-                                                 "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'",
-                                                 pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data);
+                                                 "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
+                                                 pid, uid, loginuid);
+                                if (sid) {
+                                        char *ctx = NULL;
+                                        u32 len;
+                                        if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+                                                        sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+                                                audit_log_format(ab, 
+                                                        " ssid=%u", sid);
+                                                /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+                                        } else
+                                                audit_log_format(ab, 
+                                                        " subj=%s", ctx);
+                                        kfree(ctx);
+                                }
+                                audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.1024s'",
+                                         (char *)data);
                                 audit_set_pid(ab, pid);
                                 audit_log_end(ab);
                         }
@@ -480,7 +571,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
         case AUDIT_LIST:
                 err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
                                            uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
-                                           loginuid);
+                                           loginuid, sid);
                 break;
         case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
         case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
@@ -490,7 +581,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
         case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
                 err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
                                            uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
-                                           loginuid);
+                                           loginuid, sid);
                 break;
         case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
                 sig_data.uid = audit_sig_uid;
@@ -564,6 +655,11 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
         skb_queue_head_init(&audit_skb_queue);
         audit_initialized = 1;
         audit_enabled = audit_default;
+
+        /* Register the callback with selinux.  This callback will be invoked
+         * when a new policy is loaded. */
+        selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
+
         audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index bc5392076e2b..6f733920fd32 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -54,9 +54,11 @@ enum audit_state {
 
 /* Rule lists */
 struct audit_field {
-        u32                     type;
-        u32                     val;
-        u32                     op;
+        u32                             type;
+        u32                             val;
+        u32                             op;
+        char                            *se_str;
+        struct selinux_audit_rule       *se_rule;
 };
 
 struct audit_krule {
@@ -86,3 +88,5 @@ extern void		    audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
 extern void                 audit_log_lost(const char *message);
 extern void                 audit_panic(const char *message);
 extern struct mutex audit_netlink_mutex;
+
+extern int selinux_audit_rule_update(void);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index d3a8539f3a83..7c134906d689 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include "audit.h"
 
 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
@@ -42,6 +43,13 @@ struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
 
 static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
 {
+        int i;
+        if (e->rule.fields)
+                for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+                        struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+                        kfree(f->se_str);
+                        selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+                }
         kfree(e->rule.fields);
         kfree(e);
 }
@@ -52,9 +60,29 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
         audit_free_rule(e);
 }
 
+/* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
+static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
+{
+        struct audit_entry *entry;
+        struct audit_field *fields;
+
+        entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (unlikely(!entry))
+                return NULL;
+
+        fields = kzalloc(sizeof(*fields) * field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (unlikely(!fields)) {
+                kfree(entry);
+                return NULL;
+        }
+        entry->rule.fields = fields;
+
+        return entry;
+}
+
 /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
  * buffer. */
-static __attribute__((unused)) char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
+static char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
 {
         char *str;
 
@@ -84,7 +112,6 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
 {
         unsigned listnr;
         struct audit_entry *entry;
-        struct audit_field *fields;
         int i, err;
 
         err = -EINVAL;
@@ -108,23 +135,14 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
                 goto exit_err;
 
         err = -ENOMEM;
-        entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (unlikely(!entry))
-                goto exit_err;
-        fields = kmalloc(sizeof(*fields) * rule->field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (unlikely(!fields)) {
-                kfree(entry);
+        entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
+        if (!entry)
                 goto exit_err;
-        }
-
-        memset(&entry->rule, 0, sizeof(struct audit_krule));
-        memset(fields, 0, sizeof(struct audit_field));
 
         entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
         entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
         entry->rule.action = rule->action;
         entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
-        entry->rule.fields = fields;
 
         for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
                 entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
@@ -150,15 +168,20 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
         for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
                 struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
 
-                if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) {
-                        err = -EINVAL;
-                        goto exit_free;
-                }
-
                 f->op = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
                 f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
                 f->val = rule->values[i];
 
+                if (f->type & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_USER ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_ROLE ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_TYPE ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_SEN ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_CLR) {
+                        err = -EINVAL;
+                        goto exit_free;
+                }
+
                 entry->rule.vers_ops = (f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
 
                 /* Support for legacy operators where
@@ -188,8 +211,9 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
         int err = 0;
         struct audit_entry *entry;
         void *bufp;
-        /* size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); */
+        size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
         int i;
+        char *str;
 
         entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data);
         if (IS_ERR(entry))
@@ -207,10 +231,35 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 
                 f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
                 f->type = data->fields[i];
+                f->val = data->values[i];
+                f->se_str = NULL;
+                f->se_rule = NULL;
                 switch(f->type) {
-                /* call type-specific conversion routines here */
-                default:
-                        f->val = data->values[i];
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+                        if (IS_ERR(str))
+                                goto exit_free;
+                        entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+
+                        err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+                                                      &f->se_rule);
+                        /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
+                         * become valid after a policy reload. */
+                        if (err == -EINVAL) {
+                                printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+                                       "\'%s\' is invalid\n",  str);
+                                err = 0;
+                        }
+                        if (err) {
+                                kfree(str);
+                                goto exit_free;
+                        } else
+                                f->se_str = str;
+                        break;
                 }
         }
 
@@ -286,7 +335,14 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
                 data->fields[i] = f->type;
                 data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
                 switch(f->type) {
-                /* call type-specific conversion routines here */
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        data->buflen += data->values[i] =
+                                audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+                        break;
                 default:
                         data->values[i] = f->val;
                 }
@@ -314,7 +370,14 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
                         return 1;
 
                 switch(a->fields[i].type) {
-                /* call type-specific comparison routines here */
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+                                return 1;
+                        break;
                 default:
                         if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
                                 return 1;
@@ -328,6 +391,81 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/* Duplicate selinux field information.  The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+ * re-initialized. */
+static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
+                                           struct audit_field *sf)
+{
+        int ret = 0;
+        char *se_str;
+
+        /* our own copy of se_str */
+        se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (unlikely(IS_ERR(se_str)))
+            return -ENOMEM;
+        df->se_str = se_str;
+
+        /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
+        ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
+                                      &df->se_rule);
+        /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
+         * become valid after a policy reload. */
+        if (ret == -EINVAL) {
+                printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
+                       "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+                ret = 0;
+        }
+
+        return ret;
+}
+
+/* Duplicate an audit rule.  This will be a deep copy with the exception
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over.  The selinux specific fields
+ * will be updated in the copy.  The point is to be able to replace the old
+ * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule. */
+static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
+{
+        u32 fcount = old->field_count;
+        struct audit_entry *entry;
+        struct audit_krule *new;
+        int i, err = 0;
+
+        entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
+        if (unlikely(!entry))
+                return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+        new = &entry->rule;
+        new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops;
+        new->flags = old->flags;
+        new->listnr = old->listnr;
+        new->action = old->action;
+        for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+                new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
+        new->buflen = old->buflen;
+        new->field_count = old->field_count;
+        memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
+
+        /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+         * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
+        for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
+                switch (new->fields[i].type) {
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+                                                       &old->fields[i]);
+                }
+                if (err) {
+                        audit_free_rule(entry);
+                        return ERR_PTR(err);
+                }
+        }
+
+        return entry;
+}
+
 /* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate.  Protected by
  * audit_netlink_mutex. */
 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
@@ -448,9 +586,10 @@ static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
  * @data: payload data
  * @datasz: size of payload data
  * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
+ * @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
  */
 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
-                         size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid)
+                         size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
         struct task_struct *tsk;
         int *dest;
@@ -493,9 +632,23 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 
                 err = audit_add_rule(entry,
                                      &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-                        "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d\n",
-                        loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                if (sid) {
+                        char *ctx = NULL;
+                        u32 len;
+                        if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+                                /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+                                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                 "auid=%u ssid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+                                 loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                        } else
+                                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                 "auid=%u subj=%s add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+                                 loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                        kfree(ctx);
+                } else
+                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+                                loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
 
                 if (err)
                         audit_free_rule(entry);
@@ -511,9 +664,24 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 
                 err = audit_del_rule(entry,
                                      &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-                        "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d\n",
-                        loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+
+                if (sid) {
+                        char *ctx = NULL;
+                        u32 len;
+                        if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+                                /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+                                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                        "auid=%u ssid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+                                         loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                        } else
+                                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                        "auid=%u subj=%s remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+                                         loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                        kfree(ctx);
+                } else
+                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+                                loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
 
                 audit_free_rule(entry);
                 break;
@@ -628,3 +796,62 @@ unlock_and_return:
         rcu_read_unlock();
         return result;
 }
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields.  Returns 1 if there
+   are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
+static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+                struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+                switch (f->type) {
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        return 1;
+                }
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+ * specific filter fields.  When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
+ * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * updated rule. */
+int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+{
+        struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
+        int i, err = 0;
+
+        /* audit_netlink_mutex synchronizes the writers */
+        mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+                list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
+                        if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+                                continue;
+
+                        nentry = audit_dupe_rule(&entry->rule);
+                        if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nentry))) {
+                                /* save the first error encountered for the
+                                 * return value */
+                                if (!err)
+                                        err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
+                                audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
+                                list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
+                        } else {
+                                list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
+                        }
+                        call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
+                }
+        }
+
+        mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+        return err;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7f160df21a23..1c03a4ed1b27 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
 
 #include "audit.h"
 
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ struct audit_names {
         uid_t           uid;
         gid_t           gid;
         dev_t           rdev;
-        char            *ctx;
+        u32             osid;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data {
@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
         uid_t                   uid;
         gid_t                   gid;
         mode_t                  mode;
-        char                    *ctx;
+        u32                     osid;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -167,7 +168,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
                               struct audit_context *ctx,
                               enum audit_state *state)
 {
-        int i, j;
+        int i, j, need_sid = 1;
+        u32 sid;
 
         for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
                 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
@@ -257,6 +259,27 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
                         if (ctx)
                                 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
+                           a temporary error.  We simply treat this as a
+                           match for now to avoid losing information that
+                           may be wanted.   An error message will also be
+                           logged upon error */
+                        if (f->se_rule) {
+                                if (need_sid) {
+                                        selinux_task_ctxid(tsk, &sid);
+                                        need_sid = 0;
+                                }
+                                result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+                                                                  f->op,
+                                                                  f->se_rule,
+                                                                  ctx);
+                        }
+                        break;
                 case AUDIT_ARG0:
                 case AUDIT_ARG1:
                 case AUDIT_ARG2:
@@ -329,7 +352,6 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
         return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }
 
-/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
                                                       int return_valid,
                                                       int return_code)
@@ -391,9 +413,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 #endif
 
         for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
-                char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
-                context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
-                kfree(p);
                 if (context->names[i].name)
                         __putname(context->names[i].name);
         }
@@ -416,11 +435,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
                         dput(axi->dentry);
                         mntput(axi->mnt);
                 }
-                if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
-                        struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
-                        if (axi->ctx)
-                                kfree(axi->ctx);
-                }
 
                 context->aux = aux->next;
                 kfree(aux);
@@ -506,7 +520,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
                 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
         char *ctx = NULL;
         ssize_t len = 0;
@@ -518,7 +532,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                 return;
         }
 
-        ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
+        ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
         if (!ctx)
                 goto error_path;
 
@@ -536,47 +550,46 @@ error_path:
         return;
 }
 
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-        char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
-        struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+        char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+        struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
         struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
-        get_task_comm(name, current);
+        /* tsk == current */
+
+        get_task_comm(name, tsk);
         audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
         audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
 
-        if (!mm)
-                return;
-
-        /*
-         * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
-         * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
-         */
-        down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-        vma = mm->mmap;
-        while (vma) {
-                if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
-                    vma->vm_file) {
-                        audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
-                                         vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
-                                         vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
-                        break;
+        if (mm) {
+                down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+                vma = mm->mmap;
+                while (vma) {
+                        if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+                            vma->vm_file) {
+                                audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+                                                 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
+                                                 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+                                break;
+                        }
+                        vma = vma->vm_next;
                 }
-                vma = vma->vm_next;
+                up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
         }
-        up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-        audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
+        audit_log_task_context(ab);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-        int i;
+        int i, call_panic = 0;
         struct audit_buffer *ab;
         struct audit_aux_data *aux;
         const char *tty;
 
-        ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+        /* tsk == current */
+
+        ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
         if (!ab)
                 return;         /* audit_panic has been called */
         audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
@@ -587,8 +600,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 
                                  (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
                                  context->return_code);
-        if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
-                tty = current->signal->tty->name;
+        if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+                tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
         else
                 tty = "(none)";
         audit_log_format(ab,
@@ -607,12 +620,12 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                   context->gid,
                   context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
                   context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
-        audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
+        audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
         audit_log_end(ab);
 
         for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
 
-                ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
+                ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
                 if (!ab)
                         continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
@@ -620,8 +633,39 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                 case AUDIT_IPC: {
                         struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
                         audit_log_format(ab, 
-                                         " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
-                                         axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
+                                 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
+                                 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+                        if (axi->osid != 0) {
+                                char *ctx = NULL;
+                                u32 len;
+                                if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+                                                axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+                                        audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+                                                        axi->osid);
+                                        call_panic = 1;
+                                } else
+                                        audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+                                kfree(ctx);
+                        }
+                        break; }
+
+                case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
+                        struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+                        audit_log_format(ab,
+                                " new qbytes=%lx new iuid=%u new igid=%u new mode=%x",
+                                axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+                        if (axi->osid != 0) {
+                                char *ctx = NULL;
+                                u32 len;
+                                if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+                                                axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+                                        audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+                                                        axi->osid);
+                                        call_panic = 1;
+                                } else
+                                        audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+                                kfree(ctx);
+                        }
                         break; }
 
                 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
@@ -649,7 +693,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
         }
 
         if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
-                ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
+                ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
                 if (ab) {
                         audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
                         audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -659,7 +703,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                 unsigned long ino  = context->names[i].ino;
                 unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
 
-                ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
+                ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
                 if (!ab)
                         continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
@@ -685,32 +729,35 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                                          context->names[i].gid, 
                                          MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), 
                                          MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
-                if (context->names[i].ctx) {
-                        audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
-                                        context->names[i].ctx);
+                if (context->names[i].osid != 0) {
+                        char *ctx = NULL;
+                        u32 len;
+                        if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+                                context->names[i].osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+                                audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+                                                context->names[i].osid);
+                                call_panic = 2;
+                        } else
+                                audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+                        kfree(ctx);
                 }
 
                 audit_log_end(ab);
         }
+        if (call_panic)
+                audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
 }
 
 /**
  * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
  * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
  *
- * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ * Called from copy_process and do_exit
  */
 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
         struct audit_context *context;
 
-        /*
-         * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free()
-         * then the task has no external references anymore, and
-         * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses
-         * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq
-         * contexts as well, via RCU.)
-         */
         context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
         if (likely(!context))
                 return;
@@ -719,8 +766,9 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
          * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. 
          * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this 
          * in the context of the idle thread */
+        /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
         if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
-                audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
+                audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
 
         audit_free_context(context);
 }
@@ -743,10 +791,11 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
  * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
  * be written).
  */
-void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
+void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
                          unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
                          unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
 {
+        struct task_struct *tsk = current;
         struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
         enum audit_state     state;
 
@@ -824,22 +873,18 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
  * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
  * free the names stored from getname().
  */
-void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
+void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
 {
+        struct task_struct *tsk = current;
         struct audit_context *context;
 
-        get_task_struct(tsk);
-        task_lock(tsk);
         context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
-        task_unlock(tsk);
 
-        /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
-         * called __put_task_struct. */
         if (likely(!context))
-                goto out;
+                return;
 
         if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
-                audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
+                audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
 
         context->in_syscall = 0;
         context->auditable  = 0;
@@ -854,8 +899,6 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
                 audit_free_aux(context);
                 tsk->audit_context = context;
         }
- out:
-        put_task_struct(tsk);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -936,40 +979,11 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
 #endif
 }
 
-void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+static void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
 {
         struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-        const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
-        char *ctx = NULL;
-        int len = 0;
-
-        if (!suffix)
-                goto ret;
-
-        len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
-        if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-                goto ret;
-        if (len < 0) 
-                goto error_path;
-
-        ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (!ctx) 
-                goto error_path;
 
-        len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
-        if (len < 0)
-                goto error_path;
-
-        kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
-        context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
-        goto ret;
-
-error_path:
-        if (ctx)
-                kfree(ctx);
-        audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
-ret:
-        return;
+        selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &context->names[idx].osid);
 }
 
 
@@ -1155,40 +1169,37 @@ uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
         return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
 }
 
-static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
+ * @ipcp: ipc permissions
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
+        struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
         struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-        char *ctx = NULL;
-        int len = 0;
 
         if (likely(!context))
-                return NULL;
-
-        len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
-        if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-                goto ret;
-        if (len < 0)
-                goto error_path;
-
-        ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
-        if (!ctx)
-                goto error_path;
+                return 0;
 
-        len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
-        if (len < 0)
-                goto error_path;
+        ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+        if (!ax)
+                return -ENOMEM;
 
-        return ctx;
+        ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
+        ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
+        ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
+        selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
 
-error_path:
-        kfree(ctx);
-        audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
-ret:
-        return NULL;
+        ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+        ax->d.next = context->aux;
+        context->aux = (void *)ax;
+        return 0;
 }
 
 /**
- * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
  * @qbytes: msgq bytes
  * @uid: msgq user id
  * @gid: msgq group id
@@ -1196,7 +1207,7 @@ ret:
  *
  * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
  */
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+int audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
         struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
         struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1212,9 +1223,9 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, str
         ax->uid = uid;
         ax->gid = gid;
         ax->mode = mode;
-        ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
+        selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
 
-        ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+        ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
         ax->d.next = context->aux;
         context->aux = (void *)ax;
         return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index f86434d7b3d1..e95b93282210 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/futex.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h> /* for audit_free() */
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -910,6 +911,8 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
         if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list))
                 compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
 #endif
+        if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
+                audit_free(tsk);
         exit_mm(tsk);
 
         exit_sem(tsk);
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index d2fa57d480d4..ac8100e3088a 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -114,8 +114,6 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
         WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
         WARN_ON(tsk == current);
 
-        if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
-                audit_free(tsk);
         security_task_free(tsk);
         free_uid(tsk->user);
         put_group_info(tsk->group_info);