diff options
author | Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> | 2009-08-06 18:09:28 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2009-08-07 13:39:56 -0400 |
commit | 9c8a8228d0827e0d91d28527209988f672f97d28 (patch) | |
tree | 795b72cfb89abe8bfae1c51dd329e0d6c2ed754f /kernel | |
parent | 2198a64a7487aba036f71998ade8a6528070d32c (diff) |
execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from
a dying "ps" program, we found following problem.
clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This
support includes two features.
One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the
TID value.
One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created
thread dies.
The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone()
time.
kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid.
At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user
provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one.
As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and
CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user
memory in forked processes.
Following sequence could happen:
1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that
glibc maps to a clone( ... CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID
...) syscall
2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a
location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context
(&THREAD_SELF->tid)
3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program.
current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value)
4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits,
kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by
current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() :
if (tsk->clear_child_tid
&& !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
&& atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
/*
* We don't check the error code - if userspace has
* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
*/
<< here >> put_user(0, tidptr);
sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid
users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program
could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped
file)
If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the
new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with
unexpected effects.
Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program.
Reported-by: Jens Rosenboom <jens@mcbone.net>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/fork.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 466531eb92cc..021e1138556e 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c | |||
@@ -568,18 +568,18 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm) | |||
568 | * the value intact in a core dump, and to save the unnecessary | 568 | * the value intact in a core dump, and to save the unnecessary |
569 | * trouble otherwise. Userland only wants this done for a sys_exit. | 569 | * trouble otherwise. Userland only wants this done for a sys_exit. |
570 | */ | 570 | */ |
571 | if (tsk->clear_child_tid | 571 | if (tsk->clear_child_tid) { |
572 | && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) | 572 | if (!(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) && |
573 | && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { | 573 | atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { |
574 | u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; | 574 | /* |
575 | * We don't check the error code - if userspace has | ||
576 | * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. | ||
577 | */ | ||
578 | put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid); | ||
579 | sys_futex(tsk->clear_child_tid, FUTEX_WAKE, | ||
580 | 1, NULL, NULL, 0); | ||
581 | } | ||
575 | tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL; | 582 | tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL; |
576 | |||
577 | /* | ||
578 | * We don't check the error code - if userspace has | ||
579 | * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. | ||
580 | */ | ||
581 | put_user(0, tidptr); | ||
582 | sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0); | ||
583 | } | 583 | } |
584 | } | 584 | } |
585 | 585 | ||