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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2013-11-12 18:11:17 -0500
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-11-12 22:09:33 -0500
commitd049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 (patch)
tree7d3b6d88824a0584ae3c8d86782d69bf331d6cef /kernel
parent1c3fc3e5cc8a81d21b199cb739d5d9c51f3688f4 (diff)
exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two places fixed in this patch. Wrong logic: if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ } or if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ } or if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ } Correct logic: if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ } or if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ } Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.) The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(), which means things like the ia64 code can see them too. CVE-2013-2929 Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c3
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index dd562e9aa2c8..1f4bcb3cc21c 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -257,7 +257,8 @@ ok:
257 if (task->mm) 257 if (task->mm)
258 dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm); 258 dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
259 rcu_read_lock(); 259 rcu_read_lock();
260 if (!dumpable && !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) { 260 if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER &&
261 !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
261 rcu_read_unlock(); 262 rcu_read_unlock();
262 return -EPERM; 263 return -EPERM;
263 } 264 }