CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct

Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 167b535fe1a9..80e8a6489f97 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static struct sigqueue *__sigqueue_alloc(struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags,
          * In order to avoid problems with "switch_user()", we want to make
          * sure that the compiler doesn't re-load "t->user"
          */
-        user = t->user;
+        user = t->cred->user;
         barrier();
         atomic_inc(&user->sigpending);
         if (override_rlimit ||
@@ -582,8 +582,8 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
 
         uid = current_uid();
         euid = current_euid();
-        if ((euid ^ t->suid) && (euid ^ t->uid) &&
-            (uid  ^ t->suid) && (uid  ^ t->uid) &&
+        if ((euid ^ t->cred->suid) && (euid ^ t->cred->uid) &&
+            (uid  ^ t->cred->suid) && (uid  ^ t->cred->uid) &&
             !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
                 switch (sig) {
                 case SIGCONT:
@@ -1100,8 +1100,8 @@ int kill_pid_info_as_uid(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid,
                 goto out_unlock;
         }
         if ((info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info)))
-            && (euid != p->suid) && (euid != p->uid)
-            && (uid != p->suid) && (uid != p->uid)) {
+            && (euid != p->cred->suid) && (euid != p->cred->uid)
+            && (uid != p->cred->suid) && (uid != p->cred->uid)) {
                 ret = -EPERM;
                 goto out_unlock;
         }
@@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ int do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig)
         info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, tsk->parent->nsproxy->pid_ns);
         rcu_read_unlock();
 
-        info.si_uid = tsk->uid;
+        info.si_uid = tsk->cred->uid;
 
         thread_group_cputime(tsk, &cputime);
         info.si_utime = cputime_to_jiffies(cputime.utime);
@@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ static void do_notify_parent_cldstop(struct task_struct *tsk, int why)
         info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, tsk->parent->nsproxy->pid_ns);
         rcu_read_unlock();
 
-        info.si_uid = tsk->uid;
+        info.si_uid = tsk->cred->uid;
 
         info.si_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->utime);
         info.si_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->stime);
@@ -1713,7 +1713,7 @@ static int ptrace_signal(int signr, siginfo_t *info,
                 info->si_errno = 0;
                 info->si_code = SI_USER;
                 info->si_pid = task_pid_vnr(current->parent);
-                info->si_uid = current->parent->uid;
+                info->si_uid = current->parent->cred->uid;
         }
 
         /* If the (new) signal is now blocked, requeue it.  */