diff options
author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-04-22 20:32:51 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-04-22 20:32:51 -0400 |
commit | 6e0895c2ea326cc4bb11e8fa2f654628d5754c31 (patch) | |
tree | 7089303ac11a12edc43a8c4fa1b23974e10937ea /kernel/capability.c | |
parent | 55fbbe46e9eb3cbe6c335503f5550855a1128dce (diff) | |
parent | 60d509fa6a9c4653a86ad830e4c4b30360b23f0e (diff) |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c
drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmsmac/mac80211_if.c
include/net/scm.h
net/batman-adv/routing.c
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
The e{uid,gid} --> {uid,gid} credentials fix conflicted with the
cleanup in net-next to now pass cred structs around.
The be2net driver had a bug fix in 'net' that overlapped with the VLAN
interface changes by Patrick McHardy in net-next.
An IGB conflict existed because in 'net' the build_skb() support was
reverted, and in 'net-next' there was a comment style fix within that
code.
Several batman-adv conflicts were resolved by making sure that all
calls to batadv_is_my_mac() are changed to have a new bat_priv first
argument.
Eric Dumazet's TS ECR fix in TCP in 'net' conflicted with the F-RTO
rewrite in 'net-next', mostly overlapping changes.
Thanks to Stephen Rothwell and Antonio Quartulli for help with several
of these merge resolutions.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 24 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 493d97259484..f6c2ce5701e1 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c | |||
@@ -393,6 +393,30 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) | |||
393 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); | 393 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); |
394 | 394 | ||
395 | /** | 395 | /** |
396 | * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect | ||
397 | * @file: The file we want to check | ||
398 | * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in | ||
399 | * @cap: The capability to be tested for | ||
400 | * | ||
401 | * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect | ||
402 | * when the file was opened. | ||
403 | * | ||
404 | * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not | ||
405 | * actually be privileged. | ||
406 | */ | ||
407 | bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) | ||
408 | { | ||
409 | if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) | ||
410 | return false; | ||
411 | |||
412 | if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0) | ||
413 | return true; | ||
414 | |||
415 | return false; | ||
416 | } | ||
417 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable); | ||
418 | |||
419 | /** | ||
396 | * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect | 420 | * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect |
397 | * @cap: The capability to be tested for | 421 | * @cap: The capability to be tested for |
398 | * | 422 | * |