capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability

Declare the more specific has_ns_capability first in the code and then call it
from has_capability.  The declaration reversal isn't stricty necessary since
they are both declared in header files, but it just makes sense to put more
specific functions first in the code.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index ff50ab62cfca..fb815d1b9ea2 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -287,47 +287,41 @@ error:
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
+ * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
  * @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
  *
  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+                       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
         int ret;
 
         rcu_read_lock();
-        ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), &init_user_ns, cap);
+        ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
         rcu_read_unlock();
 
         return (ret == 0);
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
  * @t: The task in question
- * @ns: target user namespace
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
  *
  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
-                       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 {
-        int ret;
-
-        rcu_read_lock();
-        ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
-        rcu_read_unlock();
-
-        return (ret == 0);
+        return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
 }
 
 /**