diff options
author | Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com> | 2007-07-16 02:40:56 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org> | 2007-07-16 12:05:47 -0400 |
commit | 522ed7767e800cff6c650ec64b0ee0677303119c (patch) | |
tree | f65ecb29f2cf885018d3557f840de3ef4be6ec64 /kernel/auditsc.c | |
parent | 4f27c00bf80f122513d3a5be16ed851573164534 (diff) |
Audit: add TTY input auditing
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index e36481ed61b4..7ccc3da30a91 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c | |||
@@ -71,9 +71,6 @@ | |||
71 | 71 | ||
72 | extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[]; | 72 | extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[]; |
73 | 73 | ||
74 | /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */ | ||
75 | extern int audit_enabled; | ||
76 | |||
77 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | 74 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context |
78 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | 75 | * for saving names from getname(). */ |
79 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | 76 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 |