Merge branch 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current

* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
  [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
  [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
  [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
  [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
  [PATCH] Fix audit operators
  [PATCH] promiscuous mode
  [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
  [PATCH] add/remove rule update
  [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
  [PATCH] SE Linux audit events
  [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
  [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
  [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
  [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
  [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
  [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
  [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
  [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
  [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
  [PATCH] Filter rule comparators
  ...

Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c

1 files changed, 434 insertions, 400 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c4394abcd5e6..7f160df21a23 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
  * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
  *
  * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
  * All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -27,11 +29,22 @@
  * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
  * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
  *
+ * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
+ * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
+ *
+ * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
+ * filesystem information.
+ *
+ * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
+ * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
  */
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <asm/types.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
@@ -39,16 +52,16 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
-#include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
 
-/* 0 = no checking
-   1 = put_count checking
-   2 = verbose put_count checking
-*/
-#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
 
 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
 extern int audit_enabled;
@@ -62,29 +75,6 @@ extern int audit_enabled;
  * path_lookup. */
 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
 
-/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
-   a per-task filter.  At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
-   the syscall filter. */
-enum audit_state {
-        AUDIT_DISABLED,         /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
-                                 * No syscall-specific audit records can
-                                 * be generated. */
-        AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT,    /* Create the per-task audit_context,
-                                 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
-                                 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
-                                 * instead). */
-        AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT,    /* Create the per-task audit_context,
-                                 * and always fill it in at syscall
-                                 * entry time.  This makes a full
-                                 * syscall record available if some
-                                 * other part of the kernel decides it
-                                 * should be recorded. */
-        AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT    /* Create the per-task audit_context,
-                                 * always fill it in at syscall entry
-                                 * time, and always write out the audit
-                                 * record at syscall exit time.  */
-};
-
 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
  * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
  * pointers at syscall exit time).
@@ -93,12 +83,13 @@ enum audit_state {
 struct audit_names {
         const char      *name;
         unsigned long   ino;
+        unsigned long   pino;
         dev_t           dev;
         umode_t         mode;
         uid_t           uid;
         gid_t           gid;
         dev_t           rdev;
-        unsigned        flags;
+        char            *ctx;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data {
@@ -115,6 +106,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
         uid_t                   uid;
         gid_t                   gid;
         mode_t                  mode;
+        char                    *ctx;
 };
 
 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -167,290 +159,72 @@ struct audit_context {
 #endif
 };
 
-                                /* Public API */
-/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
- * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
- * syscall exit time. */
-static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
-        LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
-        LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
-        LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
-        LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
-        LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
-#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
-#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
-#endif
-};
-
-struct audit_entry {
-        struct list_head  list;
-        struct rcu_head   rcu;
-        struct audit_rule rule;
-};
-
-extern int audit_pid;
-
-/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space.  Called from 
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
-static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
-{
-        int i;
-
-        if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
-            && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
-            && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
-                return -1;
-        if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
-                return -1;
-        if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
-                return -1;
-
-        d->flags        = s->flags;
-        d->action       = s->action;
-        d->field_count  = s->field_count;
-        for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
-                d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
-                d->values[i] = s->values[i];
-        }
-        for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
-        return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check to see if two rules are identical.  It is called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and 
- * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
-static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
-{
-        int i;
-
-        if (a->flags != b->flags)
-                return 1;
-
-        if (a->action != b->action)
-                return 1;
-
-        if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
-                return 1;
-
-        for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
-                if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
-                    || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
-                        return 1;
-        }
-
-        for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
-                if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
-                        return 1;
-
-        return 0;
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
-                                  struct list_head *list)
-{
-        struct audit_entry  *entry;
-
-        /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
-         * addition routine. */
-        list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
-                if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
-                        return -EEXIST;
-                }
-        }
-
-        if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
-                return -ENOMEM;
-        if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
-                kfree(entry);
-                return -EINVAL;
-        }
-
-        if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
-                entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
-                list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
-        } else {
-                list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
-        }
-
-        return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
-        struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
-        kfree(e);
-}
-
-/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
-                                 struct list_head *list)
-{
-        struct audit_entry  *e;
-
-        /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
-         * deletion routine. */
-        list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
-                if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
-                        list_del_rcu(&e->list);
-                        call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
-                        return 0;
-                }
-        }
-        return -ENOENT;         /* No matching rule */
-}
-
-static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
-{
-        int pid, seq;
-        int *dest = _dest;
-        struct audit_entry *entry;
-        int i;
-
-        pid = dest[0];
-        seq = dest[1];
-        kfree(dest);
-
-        down(&audit_netlink_sem);
-
-        /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
-           always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
-        for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
-                list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
-                        audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
-                                         &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
-        }
-        audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
-        
-        up(&audit_netlink_sem);
-        return 0;
-}
-
-int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
-                                                        uid_t loginuid)
-{
-        struct task_struct *tsk;
-        int *dest;
-        int                err = 0;
-        unsigned listnr;
-
-        switch (type) {
-        case AUDIT_LIST:
-                /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
-                 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
-                 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
-                 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
-                 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
-                 
-                dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
-                if (!dest)
-                        return -ENOMEM;
-                dest[0] = pid;
-                dest[1] = seq;
-
-                tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
-                if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
-                        kfree(dest);
-                        err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
-                }
-                break;
-        case AUDIT_ADD:
-                listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
-                if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
-                        return -EINVAL;
-
-                err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
-                if (!err)
-                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-                                  "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
-                break;
-        case AUDIT_DEL:
-                listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
-                if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
-                        return -EINVAL;
-
-                err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
-                if (!err)
-                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-                                  "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
-                break;
-        default:
-                return -EINVAL;
-        }
-
-        return err;
-}
 
 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
  * otherwise. */
 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
-                              struct audit_rule *rule,
+                              struct audit_krule *rule,
                               struct audit_context *ctx,
                               enum audit_state *state)
 {
         int i, j;
 
         for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
-                u32 field  = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
-                u32 value  = rule->values[i];
+                struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
                 int result = 0;
 
-                switch (field) {
+                switch (f->type) {
                 case AUDIT_PID:
-                        result = (tsk->pid == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_UID:
-                        result = (tsk->uid == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_EUID:
-                        result = (tsk->euid == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_SUID:
-                        result = (tsk->suid == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_FSUID:
-                        result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_GID:
-                        result = (tsk->gid == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_EGID:
-                        result = (tsk->egid == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_SGID:
-                        result = (tsk->sgid == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_FSGID:
-                        result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_PERS:
-                        result = (tsk->personality == value);
+                        result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_ARCH:
-                        if (ctx) 
-                                result = (ctx->arch == value);
+                        if (ctx)
+                                result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
 
                 case AUDIT_EXIT:
                         if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
-                                result = (ctx->return_code == value);
+                                result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
                         if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
-                                if (value)
-                                        result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+                                if (f->val)
+                                        result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
                                 else
-                                        result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+                                        result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
                         }
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
                         if (ctx) {
                                 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-                                        if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+                                        if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev),  f->op, f->val)) {
                                                 ++result;
                                                 break;
                                         }
@@ -460,7 +234,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
                 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
                         if (ctx) {
                                 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-                                        if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+                                        if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
                                                 ++result;
                                                 break;
                                         }
@@ -470,7 +244,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
                 case AUDIT_INODE:
                         if (ctx) {
                                 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
-                                        if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
+                                        if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
+                                            audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
                                                 ++result;
                                                 break;
                                         }
@@ -480,19 +255,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
                 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
                         result = 0;
                         if (ctx)
-                                result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
+                                result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_ARG0:
                 case AUDIT_ARG1:
                 case AUDIT_ARG2:
                 case AUDIT_ARG3:
                         if (ctx)
-                                result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
+                                result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
                         break;
                 }
 
-                if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
-                        result = !result;
                 if (!result)
                         return 0;
         }
@@ -527,7 +300,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
  * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
  * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
- * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or  AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
+ * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
  */
 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
                                              struct audit_context *ctx,
@@ -541,77 +314,19 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 
         rcu_read_lock();
         if (!list_empty(list)) {
-                    int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
-                    int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
-                    list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
-                            if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
-                                && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
-                                    rcu_read_unlock();
-                                    return state;
-                            }
-                    }
-        }
-        rcu_read_unlock();
-        return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
-}
-
-static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
-                              struct audit_rule *rule,
-                              enum audit_state *state)
-{
-        int i;
-
-        for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
-                u32 field  = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
-                u32 value  = rule->values[i];
-                int result = 0;
-
-                switch (field) {
-                case AUDIT_PID:
-                        result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
-                        break;
-                case AUDIT_UID:
-                        result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
-                        break;
-                case AUDIT_GID:
-                        result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
-                        break;
-                case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
-                        result = (cb->loginuid == value);
-                        break;
-                }
-
-                if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
-                        result = !result;
-                if (!result)
-                        return 0;
-        }
-        switch (rule->action) {
-        case AUDIT_NEVER:    *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;       break;
-        case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;  break;
-        case AUDIT_ALWAYS:   *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
-        }
-        return 1;
-}
-
-int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
-{
-        struct audit_entry *e;
-        enum audit_state   state;
-        int ret = 1;
-
-        rcu_read_lock();
-        list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
-                if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
-                        if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
-                                ret = 0;
-                        break;
+                int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+                int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+
+                list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+                        if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
+                                        && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+                                rcu_read_unlock();
+                                return state;
+                        }
                 }
         }
         rcu_read_unlock();
-
-        return ret; /* Audit by default */
+        return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }
 
 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
@@ -654,17 +369,18 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
         if (context->auditable
             ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
-                printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
+                printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
                        " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
                        " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
-                       __LINE__,
+                       __FILE__, __LINE__,
                        context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
                        context->name_count, context->put_count,
                        context->ino_count);
-                for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+                for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
                         printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
                                context->names[i].name,
-                               context->names[i].name);
+                               context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
+                }
                 dump_stack();
                 return;
         }
@@ -674,9 +390,13 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
         context->ino_count  = 0;
 #endif
 
-        for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+        for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+                char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
+                context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
+                kfree(p);
                 if (context->names[i].name)
                         __putname(context->names[i].name);
+        }
         context->name_count = 0;
         if (context->pwd)
                 dput(context->pwd);
@@ -696,6 +416,12 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
                         dput(axi->dentry);
                         mntput(axi->mnt);
                 }
+                if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
+                        struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+                        if (axi->ctx)
+                                kfree(axi->ctx);
+                }
+
                 context->aux = aux->next;
                 kfree(aux);
         }
@@ -721,10 +447,15 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
         return context;
 }
 
-/* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
+/**
+ * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
+ * @tsk: task
+ *
+ * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
  * if necessary.  Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
  * specified task.  This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
- * needed. */
+ * needed.
+ */
 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
         struct audit_context *context;
@@ -775,7 +506,37 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
                 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+        char *ctx = NULL;
+        ssize_t len = 0;
+
+        len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
+        if (len < 0) {
+                if (len != -EINVAL)
+                        goto error_path;
+                return;
+        }
+
+        ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
+        if (!ctx)
+                goto error_path;
+
+        len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
+        if (len < 0 )
+                goto error_path;
+
+        audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+        return;
+
+error_path:
+        if (ctx)
+                kfree(ctx);
+        audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+        return;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 {
         char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
         struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
@@ -788,6 +549,10 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
         if (!mm)
                 return;
 
+        /*
+         * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
+         * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
+         */
         down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
         vma = mm->mmap;
         while (vma) {
@@ -801,6 +566,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
                 vma = vma->vm_next;
         }
         up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+        audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
 }
 
 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
@@ -808,6 +574,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
         int i;
         struct audit_buffer *ab;
         struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+        const char *tty;
 
         ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
         if (!ab)
@@ -820,11 +587,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 
                                  (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
                                  context->return_code);
+        if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
+                tty = current->signal->tty->name;
+        else
+                tty = "(none)";
         audit_log_format(ab,
                   " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
                   " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
                   " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
-                  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
+                  " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
                   context->argv[0],
                   context->argv[1],
                   context->argv[2],
@@ -835,8 +606,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                   context->uid,
                   context->gid,
                   context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
-                  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
-        audit_log_task_info(ab);
+                  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+        audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
         audit_log_end(ab);
 
         for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
@@ -849,8 +620,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                 case AUDIT_IPC: {
                         struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
                         audit_log_format(ab, 
-                                         " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
-                                         axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+                                         " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
+                                         axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
                         break; }
 
                 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
@@ -885,42 +656,62 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
                 }
         }
         for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+                unsigned long ino  = context->names[i].ino;
+                unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
+
                 ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
                 if (!ab)
                         continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
 
                 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
-                if (context->names[i].name) {
-                        audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+
+                audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+                if (context->names[i].name)
                         audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
-                }
-                audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
-                         
-                if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
-                        audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
-                                             " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
-                                         context->names[i].ino,
-                                         MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
-                                         MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
-                                         context->names[i].mode,
-                                         context->names[i].uid,
-                                         context->names[i].gid,
-                                         MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
+                else
+                        audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
+
+                if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
+                        audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu",  pino);
+                if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+                        audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu",  ino);
+                if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
+                        audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" 
+                                         " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", 
+                                         MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), 
+                                         MINOR(context->names[i].dev), 
+                                         context->names[i].mode, 
+                                         context->names[i].uid, 
+                                         context->names[i].gid, 
+                                         MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), 
                                          MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
+                if (context->names[i].ctx) {
+                        audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
+                                        context->names[i].ctx);
+                }
+
                 audit_log_end(ab);
         }
 }
 
-/* Free a per-task audit context.  Called from copy_process and
- * __put_task_struct. */
+/**
+ * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
+ * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
+ *
+ * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ */
 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
         struct audit_context *context;
 
-        task_lock(tsk);
+        /*
+         * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free()
+         * then the task has no external references anymore, and
+         * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses
+         * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq
+         * contexts as well, via RCU.)
+         */
         context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
-        task_unlock(tsk);
-
         if (likely(!context))
                 return;
 
@@ -934,13 +725,24 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
         audit_free_context(context);
 }
 
-/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
+/**
+ * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
+ * @tsk: task being audited
+ * @arch: architecture type
+ * @major: major syscall type (function)
+ * @a1: additional syscall register 1
+ * @a2: additional syscall register 2
+ * @a3: additional syscall register 3
+ * @a4: additional syscall register 4
+ *
+ * Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
  * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
  * filters demand the audit context be built.  If the state from the
  * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
  * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
  * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
- * be written). */
+ * be written).
+ */
 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
                          unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
                          unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
@@ -950,7 +752,8 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
 
         BUG_ON(!context);
 
-        /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
+        /*
+         * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
          * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
          * with direct calls.  (If you are porting to a new
          * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
@@ -966,11 +769,6 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
         if (context->in_syscall) {
                 struct audit_context *newctx;
 
-#if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
-                /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
-                if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
-                        return;
-#endif
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
                 printk(KERN_ERR
                        "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
@@ -1014,11 +812,18 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
         context->auditable  = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
 }
 
-/* Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
+/**
+ * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
+ * @tsk: task being audited
+ * @valid: success/failure flag
+ * @return_code: syscall return value
+ *
+ * Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
  * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
  * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
  * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
- * free the names stored from getname(). */
+ * free the names stored from getname().
+ */
 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
 {
         struct audit_context *context;
@@ -1053,7 +858,13 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
         put_task_struct(tsk);
 }
 
-/* Add a name to the list.  Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
+/**
+ * audit_getname - add a name to the list
+ * @name: name to add
+ *
+ * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
+ */
 void audit_getname(const char *name)
 {
         struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1082,10 +893,13 @@ void audit_getname(const char *name)
                 
 }
 
-/* Intercept a putname request.  Called from
- * include/linux/fs.h:putname().  If we have stored the name from
- * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
- * exit. */
+/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
+ * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
+ *
+ * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
+ * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
+ * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
+ */
 void audit_putname(const char *name)
 {
         struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1100,7 +914,7 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
                         for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
                                 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
                                        context->names[i].name,
-                                       context->names[i].name);
+                                       context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
                 }
 #endif
                 __putname(name);
@@ -1122,9 +936,52 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
 #endif
 }
 
-/* Store the inode and device from a lookup.  Called from
- * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
-void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
+void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+{
+        struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+        const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
+        char *ctx = NULL;
+        int len = 0;
+
+        if (!suffix)
+                goto ret;
+
+        len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
+        if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+                goto ret;
+        if (len < 0) 
+                goto error_path;
+
+        ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!ctx) 
+                goto error_path;
+
+        len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
+        if (len < 0)
+                goto error_path;
+
+        kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
+        context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
+        goto ret;
+
+error_path:
+        if (ctx)
+                kfree(ctx);
+        audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
+ret:
+        return;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
+ * @name: name being audited
+ * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
+ *
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
+ */
+void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
 {
         int idx;
         struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1150,15 +1007,105 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
                 ++context->ino_count;
 #endif
         }
-        context->names[idx].flags = flags;
-        context->names[idx].ino   = inode->i_ino;
         context->names[idx].dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
         context->names[idx].mode  = inode->i_mode;
         context->names[idx].uid   = inode->i_uid;
         context->names[idx].gid   = inode->i_gid;
         context->names[idx].rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
+        audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+        if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) && 
+            (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
+                context->names[idx].ino   = (unsigned long)-1;
+                context->names[idx].pino  = inode->i_ino;
+        } else {
+                context->names[idx].ino   = inode->i_ino;
+                context->names[idx].pino  = (unsigned long)-1;
+        }
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
+ * @dname: inode's dentry name
+ * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
+ *
+ * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
+ * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
+ * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
+ * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
+ * the object is created.  Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
+ * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
+ * unsuccessful attempts.
+ */
+void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+                         unsigned long pino)
+{
+        int idx;
+        struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+        if (!context->in_syscall)
+                return;
+
+        /* determine matching parent */
+        if (dname)
+                for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
+                        if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
+                                const char *n;
+                                const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
+                                int dlen = strlen(dname);
+                                int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
+
+                                if (nlen < dlen)
+                                        continue;
+                                
+                                /* disregard trailing slashes */
+                                n = name + nlen - 1;
+                                while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
+                                        n--;
+
+                                /* find last path component */
+                                n = n - dlen + 1;
+                                if (n < name)
+                                        continue;
+                                else if (n > name) {
+                                        if (*--n != '/')
+                                                continue;
+                                        else
+                                                n++;
+                                }
+
+                                if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
+                                        goto update_context;
+                        }
+
+        /* catch-all in case match not found */
+        idx = context->name_count++;
+        context->names[idx].name  = NULL;
+        context->names[idx].pino  = pino;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+        context->ino_count++;
+#endif
+
+update_context:
+        if (inode) {
+                context->names[idx].ino   = inode->i_ino;
+                context->names[idx].dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+                context->names[idx].mode  = inode->i_mode;
+                context->names[idx].uid   = inode->i_uid;
+                context->names[idx].gid   = inode->i_gid;
+                context->names[idx].rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
+                audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+        }
 }
 
+/**
+ * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
+ * @ctx: audit_context for the task
+ * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
+ * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
+ *
+ * Also sets the context as auditable.
+ */
 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
                        struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
 {
@@ -1170,6 +1117,15 @@ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
         ctx->auditable = 1;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
+ * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
+ * @loginuid: loginuid value
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ *
+ * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
+ */
 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
 {
         if (task->audit_context) {
@@ -1188,12 +1144,59 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
+ * @ctx: the audit_context
+ *
+ * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
+ */
 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
         return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
 }
 
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+{
+        struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+        char *ctx = NULL;
+        int len = 0;
+
+        if (likely(!context))
+                return NULL;
+
+        len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
+        if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+                goto ret;
+        if (len < 0)
+                goto error_path;
+
+        ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+        if (!ctx)
+                goto error_path;
+
+        len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
+        if (len < 0)
+                goto error_path;
+
+        return ctx;
+
+error_path:
+        kfree(ctx);
+        audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
+ret:
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * @qbytes: msgq bytes
+ * @uid: msgq user id
+ * @gid: msgq group id
+ * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
         struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
         struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1201,7 +1204,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
         if (likely(!context))
                 return 0;
 
-        ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+        ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
         if (!ax)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1209,6 +1212,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
         ax->uid = uid;
         ax->gid = gid;
         ax->mode = mode;
+        ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
 
         ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
         ax->d.next = context->aux;
@@ -1216,6 +1220,13 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
+ * @nargs: number of args
+ * @args: args array
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
 {
         struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
@@ -1237,6 +1248,13 @@ int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
+ * @len: data length in user space
+ * @a: data address in kernel space
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 {
         struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
@@ -1258,6 +1276,15 @@ int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
+ * @dentry: dentry to record
+ * @mnt: mnt to record
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ *
+ * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
+ */
 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
 {
         struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
@@ -1279,6 +1306,14 @@ int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
+ * @sig: signal value
+ * @t: task being signaled
+ *
+ * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
+ * and uid that is doing that.
+ */
 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 {
         extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
@@ -1295,4 +1330,3 @@ void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
                 }
         }
 }
-