diff options
author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2013-05-24 09:49:14 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2013-11-05 11:08:09 -0500 |
commit | 81407c84ace88368ff23abb81caaeacf050c8450 (patch) | |
tree | 16073582364ac97b798010640da348a68460b73d /kernel/auditsc.c | |
parent | 83fa6bbe4c4541ae748b550b4ec391f8a0acfe94 (diff) |
audit: allow unsetting the loginuid (with priv)
If a task has CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL allow that task to unset their loginuid.
This would allow a child of that task to set their loginuid without
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. Thus when launching a new login daemon, a
priviledged helper would be able to unset the loginuid and then the
daemon, which may be malicious user facing, do not need priv to function
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b55788bf1607..c75d7813aef2 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c | |||
@@ -2019,7 +2019,9 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) | |||
2019 | if (rc) | 2019 | if (rc) |
2020 | goto out; | 2020 | goto out; |
2021 | 2021 | ||
2022 | sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); | 2022 | /* are we setting or clearing? */ |
2023 | if (uid_valid(loginuid)) | ||
2024 | sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); | ||
2023 | 2025 | ||
2024 | task->sessionid = sessionid; | 2026 | task->sessionid = sessionid; |
2025 | task->loginuid = loginuid; | 2027 | task->loginuid = loginuid; |