diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2009-12-05 12:44:57 -0500 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2009-12-05 12:44:57 -0500 |
commit | 83fdbfbfe6e7e8906e3a3f8f6bc074d887e92109 (patch) | |
tree | 977e10a076d76fdb2622f089211f3d0954ba6873 /include/linux/securebits.h | |
parent | d9b2c4d0b03c721808c0d259e43a27f1e80205bc (diff) | |
parent | c84d6efd363a3948eb32ec40d46bab6338580454 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (30 commits)
TOMOYO: Add recursive directory matching operator support.
remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option
SELinux: print denials for buggy kernel with unknown perms
Silence the existing API for capability version compatibility check.
LSM: Move security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() to after mutex_lock().
SELinux: header generation may hit infinite loop
selinux: Fix warnings
security: report the module name to security_module_request
Config option to set a default LSM
sysctl: require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to set mmap_min_addr
tpm: autoload tpm_tis based on system PnP IDs
tpm_tis: TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT workaround
define convenient securebits masks for prctl users (v2)
tpm: fix header for modular build
tomoyo: improve hash bucket dispersion
tpm add default function definitions
LSM: imbed ima calls in the security hooks
SELinux: add .gitignore files for dynamic classes
security: remove root_plug
SELinux: fix locking issue introduced with c6d3aaa4e35c71a3
...
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/securebits.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/securebits.h | 24 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h index d2c5ed845bcc..33406174cbe8 100644 --- a/include/linux/securebits.h +++ b/include/linux/securebits.h | |||
@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@ | |||
1 | #ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H | 1 | #ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H |
2 | #define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1 | 2 | #define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1 |
3 | 3 | ||
4 | /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies | ||
5 | whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the | ||
6 | setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be | ||
7 | changed from user-level. */ | ||
8 | #define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X)) | ||
9 | #ifdef __KERNEL__ | ||
10 | #define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits)) | ||
11 | #endif | ||
12 | |||
4 | #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 | 13 | #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 |
5 | 14 | ||
6 | /* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support | 15 | /* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support |
@@ -12,6 +21,9 @@ | |||
12 | #define SECURE_NOROOT 0 | 21 | #define SECURE_NOROOT 0 |
13 | #define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */ | 22 | #define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */ |
14 | 23 | ||
24 | #define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)) | ||
25 | #define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)) | ||
26 | |||
15 | /* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". | 27 | /* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". |
16 | When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on | 28 | When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on |
17 | set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause | 29 | set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause |
@@ -19,6 +31,10 @@ | |||
19 | #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 | 31 | #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 |
20 | #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */ | 32 | #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */ |
21 | 33 | ||
34 | #define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) | ||
35 | #define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ | ||
36 | (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)) | ||
37 | |||
22 | /* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after | 38 | /* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after |
23 | transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by | 39 | transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by |
24 | bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both | 40 | bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both |
@@ -27,12 +43,8 @@ | |||
27 | #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4 | 43 | #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4 |
28 | #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */ | 44 | #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */ |
29 | 45 | ||
30 | /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies | 46 | #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) |
31 | whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the | 47 | #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) |
32 | setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be | ||
33 | changed from user-level. */ | ||
34 | #define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X)) | ||
35 | #define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits)) | ||
36 | 48 | ||
37 | #define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ | 49 | #define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ |
38 | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ | 50 | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ |