diff options
author | Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net> | 2007-05-08 03:26:04 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org> | 2007-05-08 14:15:02 -0400 |
commit | 5096add84b9e96e2e0a9c72675c442fe5433388a (patch) | |
tree | f0444013cb7db32596d2b6febafc1ee4c2a4ea1f /fs/proc/task_mmu.c | |
parent | 4a1ccb5b1eff949a90ab830869cb23d6609c3d5f (diff) |
proc: maps protection
The /proc/pid/ "maps", "smaps", and "numa_maps" files contain sensitive
information about the memory location and usage of processes. Issues:
- maps should not be world-readable, especially if programs expect any
kind of ASLR protection from local attackers.
- maps cannot just be 0400 because "-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O2" makes glibc
check the maps when %n is in a *printf call, and a setuid(getuid())
process wouldn't be able to read its own maps file. (For reference
see http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/22/150)
- a system-wide toggle is needed to allow prior behavior in the case of
non-root applications that depend on access to the maps contents.
This change implements a check using "ptrace_may_attach" before allowing
access to read the maps contents. To control this protection, the new knob
/proc/sys/kernel/maps_protect has been added, with corresponding updates to
the procfs documentation.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: New sysctl numbers are old hat]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/task_mmu.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index 4008c060f7ef..c24d81a5a040 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c | |||
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ | |||
3 | #include <linux/mount.h> | 3 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
4 | #include <linux/seq_file.h> | 4 | #include <linux/seq_file.h> |
5 | #include <linux/highmem.h> | 5 | #include <linux/highmem.h> |
6 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | ||
6 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | 7 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> |
7 | #include <linux/mempolicy.h> | 8 | #include <linux/mempolicy.h> |
8 | 9 | ||
@@ -142,6 +143,9 @@ static int show_map_internal(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct mem_size_stats | |||
142 | dev_t dev = 0; | 143 | dev_t dev = 0; |
143 | int len; | 144 | int len; |
144 | 145 | ||
146 | if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_attach(task)) | ||
147 | return -EACCES; | ||
148 | |||
145 | if (file) { | 149 | if (file) { |
146 | struct inode *inode = vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; | 150 | struct inode *inode = vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; |
147 | dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | 151 | dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; |
@@ -512,11 +516,22 @@ const struct file_operations proc_maps_operations = { | |||
512 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA | 516 | #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA |
513 | extern int show_numa_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v); | 517 | extern int show_numa_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v); |
514 | 518 | ||
519 | static int show_numa_map_checked(struct seq_file *m, void *v) | ||
520 | { | ||
521 | struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private; | ||
522 | struct task_struct *task = priv->task; | ||
523 | |||
524 | if (maps_protect && !ptrace_may_attach(task)) | ||
525 | return -EACCES; | ||
526 | |||
527 | return show_numa_map(m, v); | ||
528 | } | ||
529 | |||
515 | static struct seq_operations proc_pid_numa_maps_op = { | 530 | static struct seq_operations proc_pid_numa_maps_op = { |
516 | .start = m_start, | 531 | .start = m_start, |
517 | .next = m_next, | 532 | .next = m_next, |
518 | .stop = m_stop, | 533 | .stop = m_stop, |
519 | .show = show_numa_map | 534 | .show = show_numa_map_checked |
520 | }; | 535 | }; |
521 | 536 | ||
522 | static int numa_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) | 537 | static int numa_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) |