Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (25 commits)
  security: remove register_security hook
  security: remove dummy module fix
  security: remove dummy module
  security: remove unused sb_get_mnt_opts hook
  LSM/SELinux: show LSM mount options in /proc/mounts
  SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present
  security: fix return of void-valued expressions
  SELinux: use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block
  SELinux: remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable
  SELinux: more user friendly unknown handling printk
  selinux: change handling of invalid classes (Was: Re: 2.6.26-rc5-mm1 selinux whine)
  SELinux: drop load_mutex in security_load_policy
  SELinux: fix off by 1 reference of class_to_string in context_struct_compute_av
  SELinux: open code sidtab lock
  SELinux: open code load_mutex
  SELinux: open code policy_rwlock
  selinux: fix endianness bug in network node address handling
  selinux: simplify ioctl checking
  SELinux: enable processes with mac_admin to get the raw inode contexts
  Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach
  ...

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 3b455371e7ff..58c3e6a8e15e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
          */
         if (task->parent == current && (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) &&
             task_is_stopped_or_traced(task) &&
-            ptrace_may_attach(task))
+            ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
                 return 0;
 
         /*
@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
         task_lock(task);
         if (task->mm != mm)
                 goto out;
-        if (task->mm != current->mm && __ptrace_may_attach(task) < 0)
+        if (task->mm != current->mm &&
+            __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
                 goto out;
         task_unlock(task);
         return mm;
@@ -518,7 +519,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
          */
         task = get_proc_task(inode);
         if (task) {
-                allowed = ptrace_may_attach(task);
+                allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
                 put_task_struct(task);
         }
         return allowed;
@@ -904,7 +905,7 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
         if (!task)
                 goto out_no_task;
 
-        if (!ptrace_may_attach(task))
+        if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
                 goto out;
 
         ret = -ENOMEM;