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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-06-04 14:00:45 -0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-06-04 14:00:45 -0400
commit0640113be25d283e0ff77a9f041e1242182387f0 (patch)
tree10607912e3d16e9b0354a8f27c213a250608da8d /fs/proc/base.c
parent5041caa4d5e6dae418963de0c8f8a83f35e35dcf (diff)
vfs: Fix /proc/<tid>/fdinfo/<fd> file handling
Cyrill Gorcunov reports that I broke the fdinfo files with commit 30a08bf2d31d ("proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into tid_fd_revalidate()"), and he's quite right. The tid_fd_revalidate() function is not just used for the <tid>/fd symlinks, it's also used for the <tid>/fdinfo/<fd> files, and the permission model for those are different. So do the dynamic symlink permission handling just for symlinks, making the fdinfo files once more appear as the proper regular files they are. Of course, Al Viro argued (probably correctly) that we shouldn't do the symlink permission games at all, and make the symlinks always just be the normal 'lrwxrwxrwx'. That would have avoided this issue too, but since somebody noticed that the permissions had changed (which was the reason for that original commit 30a08bf2d31d in the first place), people do apparently use this feature. [ Basically, you can use the symlink permission data as a cheap "fdinfo" replacement, since you see whether the file is open for reading and/or writing by just looking at st_mode of the symlink. So the feature does make sense, even if the pain it has caused means we probably shouldn't have done it to begin with. ] Reported-and-tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/base.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c17
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 616f41a7cde6..437195f204e1 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1803,7 +1803,7 @@ static int tid_fd_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
1803 rcu_read_lock(); 1803 rcu_read_lock();
1804 file = fcheck_files(files, fd); 1804 file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
1805 if (file) { 1805 if (file) {
1806 unsigned i_mode, f_mode = file->f_mode; 1806 unsigned f_mode = file->f_mode;
1807 1807
1808 rcu_read_unlock(); 1808 rcu_read_unlock();
1809 put_files_struct(files); 1809 put_files_struct(files);
@@ -1819,12 +1819,14 @@ static int tid_fd_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
1819 inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; 1819 inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
1820 } 1820 }
1821 1821
1822 i_mode = S_IFLNK; 1822 if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1823 if (f_mode & FMODE_READ) 1823 unsigned i_mode = S_IFLNK;
1824 i_mode |= S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR; 1824 if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1825 if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) 1825 i_mode |= S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR;
1826 i_mode |= S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR; 1826 if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1827 inode->i_mode = i_mode; 1827 i_mode |= S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR;
1828 inode->i_mode = i_mode;
1829 }
1828 1830
1829 security_task_to_inode(task, inode); 1831 security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
1830 put_task_struct(task); 1832 put_task_struct(task);
@@ -1859,6 +1861,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_fd_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
1859 ei = PROC_I(inode); 1861 ei = PROC_I(inode);
1860 ei->fd = fd; 1862 ei->fd = fd;
1861 1863
1864 inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK;
1862 inode->i_op = &proc_pid_link_inode_operations; 1865 inode->i_op = &proc_pid_link_inode_operations;
1863 inode->i_size = 64; 1866 inode->i_size = 64;
1864 ei->op.proc_get_link = proc_fd_link; 1867 ei->op.proc_get_link = proc_fd_link;