aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2011-02-01 11:05:39 -0500
committerEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2011-02-01 11:12:29 -0500
commit2a7dba391e5628ad665ce84ef9a6648da541ebab (patch)
treeba0722bd74d2c883dbda7ff721850bab411cac04 /fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
parent821404434f3324bf23f545050ff64055a149766e (diff)
fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creation
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path, just the last component of the path. This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating /etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name exists it is fine to pass NULL. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ocfs2/xattr.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/ocfs2/xattr.c10
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
index 67cd43914641..6bb602486c6b 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -7185,7 +7185,8 @@ out:
7185 * must not hold any lock expect i_mutex. 7185 * must not hold any lock expect i_mutex.
7186 */ 7186 */
7187int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir, 7187int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir,
7188 struct inode *inode) 7188 struct inode *inode,
7189 const struct qstr *qstr)
7189{ 7190{
7190 int ret = 0; 7191 int ret = 0;
7191 struct buffer_head *dir_bh = NULL; 7192 struct buffer_head *dir_bh = NULL;
@@ -7193,7 +7194,7 @@ int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir,
7193 .enable = 1, 7194 .enable = 1,
7194 }; 7195 };
7195 7196
7196 ret = ocfs2_init_security_get(inode, dir, &si); 7197 ret = ocfs2_init_security_get(inode, dir, qstr, &si);
7197 if (!ret) { 7198 if (!ret) {
7198 ret = ocfs2_xattr_set(inode, OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY, 7199 ret = ocfs2_xattr_set(inode, OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
7199 si.name, si.value, si.value_len, 7200 si.name, si.value, si.value_len,
@@ -7261,13 +7262,14 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_security_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
7261 7262
7262int ocfs2_init_security_get(struct inode *inode, 7263int ocfs2_init_security_get(struct inode *inode,
7263 struct inode *dir, 7264 struct inode *dir,
7265 const struct qstr *qstr,
7264 struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *si) 7266 struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *si)
7265{ 7267{
7266 /* check whether ocfs2 support feature xattr */ 7268 /* check whether ocfs2 support feature xattr */
7267 if (!ocfs2_supports_xattr(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb))) 7269 if (!ocfs2_supports_xattr(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb)))
7268 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 7270 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
7269 return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &si->name, &si->value, 7271 return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &si->name,
7270 &si->value_len); 7272 &si->value, &si->value_len);
7271} 7273}
7272 7274
7273int ocfs2_init_security_set(handle_t *handle, 7275int ocfs2_init_security_set(handle_t *handle,